UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

PAUL D. CEGLIA, * Docket No.

* 1:10-cv-00569-RJA

*

Plaintiff, *

*

* Buffalo, New York

* August 17, 2011

2:04 p.m.

MARK ELLIOT ZUCKERBERG and * ORAL ARGUMENT

FACEBOOK, INC.,

V.

7

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE G. FOSCHIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: JEFFREY A. LAKE, ESQ.

LAKE, APC

835 5th Avenue, Suite 200A San Diego, California 92101

PAUL A. ARGENTIERI, ESQ.

LAW OFFICE OF PAUL A. ARGENTIERI

188 Main Street

Hornell, New York 14843

For the Defendants: ORIN SNYDER, ESQ.

AMANDA AYCOCK, ESQ.

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 200 Park Avenue, 47th Floor New York, New York 10166-0193

TERRANCE P. FLYNN, ESQ.

HARRIS BEACH PLLC

726 Exchange Street, Suite 1000

Buffalo, New York 14210

1	Court Reporter: JOLENE LAMPHIER, Notary Public Jack W. Hunt & Associates, Inc.
3	1420 Liberty Building Buffalo, New York 14202 (716) 853-5600
4	
5	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer.
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

THE CLERK: Ceglia versus Zuckerberg. Appearing for the Plaintiff is Jeffrey Lake and Paul Argentieri. Appearing for the Defendant is Orin Snyder and Amanda Aycock and Terrance Flynn. We are here for oral arguments on Plaintiff's motion to compel and Defendants' cross motion to compel.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Welcome back. I read the papers. We have a court reporter thinking that people may want to have a transcript and if they do, put the people to work here.

I've read the papers. I think the first thing to deal with is the issue of Mr. Lake's letter to the Court indicating that the Court's description of items 1 through 4, particularly two documents mentioned in the log that purport to be a contract for StreetFax between the Plaintiff and Mr. Zuckerberg, might not have been correctly -- correctly denominated in the Court's decision in order of Friday afternoon, August the 12th, which we were trying to accommodate the parties so that each side would know to what extent they could adverse to these documents in dispute in the course of today's hearing.

And I read Mr. Snyder's response indicating that the Court got it right and that perhaps the Court ought to reconsider item 29 as not being confidential in as much as that those emails were also appended to the complaint, another fact the Court may not have focused on when I wrote the note.

Of course, the parties did not make a lot of argument

1 13:43:18 14:04:32 2 14:04:34 3 14:04:39 4 14:04:43 5 14:04:52 6 7 14:04:57 14:05:28 8 14:05:33 9 14:05:37 10 14:05:41 11 14:05:48 12 14:05:56 13 14:06:01 14 14:06:08 15 14:06:15 16 14:06:18 17 14:06:22 18 14:06:25 19 14:06:28 20 14:06:45 21 14:06:50 22 14:06:59 23 14:07:05 24

14:07:10 25

about each and every item so it's somewhat easy to understand how we might not have focused on the fact that those emails were also appended to the contract.

I'm here to start off the proceedings by entertaining Mr. Lake's motion, which I suppose can be fairly denominated as a request for reconsideration on that point. I suppose Mr. Snyder's letter could also be considered to be a cross-request for reconsideration as to item 29.

And so how did -- how do you -- why do you think the confidentially of those items should be retained even if from a -- from a drafting point of view there is allegedly some variations between the two documents, one being what looks to be a straight-up software development contract for StreetFax and the other one to have a work-for-hire, which appears to include the reference to the Facebook ownership interest, allegedly created in favor of Mr. Ceglia. Both documents, at least purportedly, given the Plaintiff's proffering of them as confidential, were executed by Mr. Zuckerberg.

I guess part of my curiosity is are you -- your argument is that there were in fact two contracts that the StreetFax contracted alluded to in items 1 through 4 are one contract, but the contract at issue in the case, which was appended to the complaint is yet a completely different contract.

It just struck me when I wrote the decision that they

14:07:20 2 14:07:25 3 14:07:27 4 14:07:31 5 14:07:37 7 14:07:42 14:07:45 8 14:07:51 14:07:59 10 14:08:07 11 14:08:14 12 14:08:18 13 14:08:24 14 14:08:28 15 14:08:33 16 14:08:42 17 14:08:47 18 14:08:51 19

14:07:15

1

14:08:59 20 14:09:06 21 14:09:11 22

14:09:20 24

14:09:15 23

14:09:20 25

were -- they were essentially the same. And it's probably true 1 14:09:23 that it is -- it is true of course that the appended contract 14:09:29 2 does specifically reference the Facebook ownership interest, if 14:09:32 3 14:09:36 you will, but other than that, the thrust of both the documents 4 refers to the creation of this StreetFax software product, which 14:09:43 5 is really the whole avenue, if you will, of all of the other 14:09:50 6 documents as you proffered as being confidential, which I upheld 7 14:09:57 your argument on, didn't I? 8

MR. LAKE: Your Honor, I'd be happy to address that, but before I do, if I may request that I think we are currently under a protective order. We're about to be talking about some very sensitive information that I think is protected.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not asking you to quote from it.

MR. LAKE: Right.

THE COURT: But you're telling me --

MR. LAKE: No. No, I'm not, except I have a feeling that we have an entire press corps behind me and if we are going to be talking about protected documents, until and if and when the protected order is lifted, I think it would be appropriate that we excuse anyone who is associated with the press or a nonparty to this matter so that we can have a open discussion.

And if the Judge, you know, Your Honor rules that there is no reason for our discussion to be protected, then they can review the transcript, but I am uncomfortable --

THE COURT: Can't you just make your general

14:10:01 8 14:10:03 9 14:10:06 10 14:10:09 11

14:10:17 13

14:10:14 12

14:10:17 14

14:10:19 15

14:10:19 16 14:10:22 17

14:10:27 18

14:10:30 19

14:10:33 20

14:10:38 21

14:10:42 22

14:10:46 23

14:10:51 24

14:10:54 25

observations about why both should be considered confidential 1 14:10:56 without quoting from them? 14:11:00 2 MR. LAKE: The work-for-hire contract was attached to 14:11:01 3 14:11:06 the complaint. That has not been designated as confidential. 4 14:11:10 5 It's been produced. The other documents that were produced, as a result of the Court's July 1st, 2011 expedited discovery 14:11:14 6 order, have been designated confidential as a result of the 7 14:11:26 protective order that was requested and drafted by the 14:11:26 8 Defendants. 14:11:27 9 14:11:27 10 They drafted it and such a way that there was broad language. It was an all-encompassing protective order. I think 14:11:31 11 14:11:36 12 the reason for that is because, at this point in the litigation, 14:11:39 13 we have produced all of the information that has been requested 14:11:42 14 of us and they now want to be able to use that for a couple 14:11:46 15 reasons. One --14:11:47 16 THE COURT: Look, the question is whether or not the documents referred to as 1 through 4 carry with them a 14:11:49 17 reasonable expectation of confidentially at the time of the 14:11:53 18 14:11:58 19 designation. 14:11:58 20 MR. LAKE: Yes, I think two of them --14:12:00 21 THE COURT: Both documents substantially refer -- if 14:12:05 22 you count out the number of lines, substantially refer to the 14:12:10 23 StreetFax project. Isn't that a fair statement? 14:12:14 24 MR. LAKE: There's actually four documents. Two of

14:12:17 25

them --

14:12:17 1 THE COURT: Two of them are emails to some lawyer. 14:12:20 2 MR. LAKE: Correct. We designated those as attorney 14:12:23 3 client privilege. That was your order --14:12:25 THE COURT: Well, you haven't -- I gave you until this 4 morning to produce. I stayed as to the confidentially issue, 14:12:28 5 production issue, but your request said nothing about the 14:12:33 attorney client privilege so I'm assuming that you agree they 7 14:12:38 are not privileged. 8 14:12:42 MR. LAKE: No, they are privileged. 14:12:43 14:12:45 10 Did you take an appeal to Judge Arcara? 14:12:49 11 MR. LAKE: No. 14:12:50 12 THE COURT: Are you going to ask for a writ of 14:12:54 13 mandamus from the second circuit? 14:12:56 14 MR. LAKE: No, Your Honor. I was unable to procure a 14:12:59 15 declaration from the lawyer that they were sent to in time for this hearing because I don't think I could give you a hearsay 14:13:02 16 14:13:05 17 declaration saying that that attorney --THE COURT: You had the burden. 14:13:07 18 14:13:09 19 MR. LAKE: No, I understand that. 14:13:09 20 THE COURT: You were the one that nominated them as 14:13:11 21 attorney client privilege. It's Hornbook --14:13:14 22 MR. LAKE: No, I understand. 14:13:15 23 THE COURT: -- textbook law that you carry the burden 14:13:17 24 and there was very little offered to me in connection with the 14:13:23 25 -- in opposition for the de-designation motion by the

1 Defendants. I did the best I could. I gave you the benefit of 14:13:28 the doubt as to the confidentially order on all four items. 14:13:31 2 14:13:36 3 MR. LAKE: Yeah. THE COURT: We're here to hear how it was that I 14:13:37 4 14:13:41 5 mistook some facts in some material way that affects the analysis of whether Mr. Ceglia at the time of the designation 14:13:44 6 7 carried a reasonable expectation of confidentially. 14:13:48 MR. LAKE: Right, and what I'm --8 14:13:51 THE COURT: And I have not seen anything from the 14:13:52 9 14:13:57 10 Plaintiff that suggests that there is any substantial disagreement with my analysis, that none of the four are 14:14:00 11 14:14:05 12 protected by the attorney client privilege. 14:14:08 13 MR. LAKE: Right, I was going to address all four --14:14:11 14 THE COURT: Isn't that fair? If you're sitting in my 14:14:13 15 chair, is that not a fair perception? 14:14:15 16 MR. LAKE: I think it's a fair perception. I think 14:14:18 17 that in order for me to meet my burden at the time of admissibility, should this case proceed to trial, that I would 14:14:22 18 14:14:24 19 have to give you more information in regards to the two emails. 14:14:27 20 I agree with that. THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. As to 14:14:28 21 14:14:30 22 admissibility, I'm not sure what you mean. 14:14:32 23 MR. LAKE: Right. We've produced them pursuant to 14:14:34 24 your order. 14:14:34 25 THE COURT: You produced --

1 MR. LAKE: They've read them. 14:14:36 THE COURT: You produced all of them? 14:14:37 2 14:14:39 3 MR. LAKE: Yes, we produced them to the Defendants. I thought you had not produced the first 14:14:42 4 THE COURT: four because you were concerned with attorney client privilege. 14:14:46 5 MR. LAKE: We produced items 2 and 4. We designated 14:14:47 6 7 them as confidential. We did not produce items 1 and 3, which 14:14:50 were the emails. But in light of your order of last Friday, we 8 14:14:53 did produce them. They have them. 14:14:55 9 14:14:58 10 THE COURT: Well, if I made a mistake, you destroyed the privilege by your production. 14:15:02 11 14:15:04 12 MR. LAKE: Well, the issue now is confidentiality. 14:15:07 13 THE COURT: You did not ask for a stay for review from 14:15:11 14 me or from Judge Arcara. There is no, as you say, pending 14:15:17 15 request for mandamus review by the second circuit, which I'm sure they would have given you a stay if you asked for one. 14:15:22 16 14:15:25 17 MR. LAKE: We didn't do that. THE COURT: I think none of those items are 14:15:26 18 14:15:28 19 privileged. 14:15:29 20 MR. LAKE: But we've produced them. 14:15:31 21 THE COURT: Okay. 14:15:32 22 What I'm concerned with is confidentially. 14:15:35 23 THE COURT: And the question is whether there was a 14:15:37 24 reasonable expectation at the time they were designated as being confidential. 14:15:40 25

14:15:41	1	My problem is I see a document that's signed by one of
14:15:45	2	the two parties to the contract and I can't understand how one
14:15:50	3	party can now assert that it's confidential if the other party
14:15:56	4	has received a copy by virtue of being a party to it.
14:15:59	5	MR. LAKE: No, if we take the emails and separate
14:16:02	6	them, that's items 1 and 3, and we talk about the other two
14:16:06	7	documents, 2 and 4, number 4 is that that document is a TIFF
14:16:14	8	image, which essentially is a photograph of a page that was
14:16:21	9	attached to the original complaint
14:16:25	10	THE COURT: As allegedly signed by Mr. Zuckerberg?
14:16:28	11	MR. LAKE: That's right. That's page two.
14:16:30	12	THE COURT: How can your client have a reasonable
14:16:33	13	expectation of confidentially?
14:16:35	14	MR. LAKE: Page one of that
14:16:36	15	THE COURT: This is item 4?
14:16:47	16	MR. LAKE: Yeah, item 4. Item 4, the reason that that
14:16:47	17	was designated as privileged is if it was considered in
14:16:47	18	conjunction with item number 2, that was our fear because item
14:16:49	19	number 2 is not identical
14:16:52	20	THE COURT: If you use the word privilege, you're
14:16:56	21	confusing me because we've just established the privilege has
14:16:59	22	been lost. In my opinion, there was no privilege. You failed
14:17:03	23	to show that any of these pieces of paper were submitted in
14:17:03	24	connection with a request for confidential legal advise or
14:17:08	25	services by Mr. Cole or any other lawyer.

14:17:10 1	MR. LAKE: Right. I think I'm not articulating my
14:17:14 2	position clearly. I'm not worried about the production. That's
14:17:18 3	been produced. I'm worried about the protective order.
14:17:25 4	THE COURT: I know, but when you use the word
14:17:26 5	privilege, you are, to me, combining apples and oranges.
14:17:30 6	MR. LAKE: Okay. What I'm trying to say is that item
14:17:31 7	number 2, which is designated at scan TIFF 001
14:17:37 8	THE COURT: Yes.
14:17:38 9	MR. LAKE: was never attached to the original
14:17:40 10	complaint. It was different. It's a different document.
14:17:41 11	THE COURT: And I'll see that.
14:17:42 12	MR. LAKE: And
14:17:43 13	THE COURT: I acknowledge that.
14:17:45 14	MR. LAKE: Right.
14:17:46 15	THE COURT: My drafting might not have been as precise
14:17:50 16	as it could have been in that regard, but my thought was that
14:17:53 17	the substance, the printed text, is substantially the same as
14:18:01 18	the contract that was attached to the complaint. Is that not a
14:18:06 19	fair characterization?
14:18:08 20	MR. LAKE: Portions of it are, but portions of it are
14:18:11 21	erratically different. In fact
14:18:13 22	THE COURT: As to the Facebook issue?
14:18:15 23	MR. LAKE: Correct. The document that you're
14:18:17 24	referring to, there has been no foundation laid.
14:18:21 25	In fact, there was a declaration submitted by Mark

1 Zuckerberg himself to the contrary as to item 4, which is page 14:18:25 He's already told this Court that he never signed the 14:18:27 2 14:18:31 3 document that was attached to the complaint. We have a 14:18:33 declaration in the file that says that. 4 The second page that you're looking at, which is 14:18:35 5 designated as scan TIFF 002, is exactly that page. 14:18:37 6 7 Zuckerberg denies signing it. 14:18:42 Now, as of over the last couple days, in my view of 14:18:43 8 violation of the protective order, the Defendants are claiming 14:18:48 9 14:18:51 10 that they have found a smoking gun. And the smoking gun that they have provided to the press was item 2 and item 4 and they 14:18:54 11 14:18:59 12 are claiming that they are somehow connected, that they were 14:19:04 13 somehow drafted by Mr. --THE COURT: But you said you did not provide -- you 14:19:09 14 14:19:11 15 provided 2 and 4 to them. 14:19:13 16 MR. LAKE: That's correct. 14:19:14 17 THE COURT: But there is something still on the confidentially? 14:19:17 18 14:19:17 19 MR. LAKE: Correct. 14:19:18 20 THE COURT: So how did they provide them to the --14:19:22 21 MR. LAKE: They attached them -- well, first of all, they took press interviews. Second, and I have copies of 14:19:23 22 14:19:25 23 articles written, they filed a motion with unredacted statements 14:19:28 24 saying that they found --14:19:29 25 THE COURT: Which they corrected.

1 MR. LAKE: Yes. 14:19:31 THE COURT: And apparently that did not leak out to 14:19:32 2 14:19:34 3 the general public. MR. LAKE: No, they did. They did. It's been 14:19:36 4 14:19:39 5 published in numerous articles talking about the smoking qun authentic contract. 14:19:39 6 7 Then on Monday --14:19:43 That is not something the Court has any --THE COURT: 14:19:44 8 9 that was apparently a clerical or a procedural error on the part 14:19:46 14:19:51 10 of the Defendants. I'm well-aware of their efforts to correct 14:19:51 11 it. 14:19:52 12 What I'm not aware of is what you just said, that 14:19:55 13 there was actually any sharing of that from the clerk's office as a result of that mistaken file. 14:19:58 14 14:20:01 15 MR. LAKE: They also attached it saying that --14:20:02 16 THE COURT: You're saying there was? So somehow 14:20:06 17 somebody got into our ECF system despite the efforts of our --[Inaudible.] 14:20:14 18 THE CLERK: 14:20:14 19 THE COURT: But that actually happened? 14:20:18 20 THE CLERK: Yes. 14:20:19 21 THE COURT: I was not aware of that. 14:20:21 22 MR. LAKE: I can read you a quote. There are numerous 14:20:27 23 articles written that quote the redacted portions. 14:20:27 24 THE COURT: Mr. Lake, I only dealt with the motion 14:20:29 25 that was in front of me, which was the de-designation motion.

1 This problem with the clerk's office was totally unforeseen. 14:20:33 And if in fact the mistake was made, it appears to have been a 14:20:37 2 14:20:42 3 good-faith error on the part of the Defendants. 14:20:46 MR. LAKE: Except for that when we received the 4 Court's order on Friday, and in the order it referenced, and I 14:20:48 5 highlighted this from the letter that I sent you Monday, that 14:20:52 6 7 because the Court's opinion was that item 2 and item 4 were what 14:20:56 were already attached to the complaint, that therefore, there 8 14:21:01 was no protection that should be required. 14:21:04 9 14:21:06 10 We wrote -- immediately wrote a letter to Mr. Southwell that said Mr. Southwell, it's clear that the 14:21:09 11 14:21:14 12 Judge's order is erroneous because item 2 is not the same as the 14:21:19 13 first page of the contract that was attached to the complaint. 14:21:23 14 We are planning on addressing the Court on Monday 14:21:25 15 morning. Please abstain from publishing or making public under 14:21:30 16 the protective order item number 2, which is scan TIFF number 1, 14:21:36 17 until we have the opportunity to address the Court. We did that on Monday. Monday night they filed a 14:21:39 18 14:21:41 19 pleading that had item number 2, the scan TIFF version, attached 14:21:45 20 to it. It's been picked up by the press and published. 14:21:51 21 THE COURT: Wait, what? 14:21:52 22 MR. LAKE: That was on Monday. 14:21:54 23 THE COURT: Doc number 110, is that what you're 14:21:58 24 referring to? 14:21:59 25 MR. LAKE: Yeah. And then on Tuesday, the Court

14:22:12 1 issued the new --14:22:12 2 THE COURT: I put a stay on the order. 14:22:12 3 MR. LAKE: Right, but what happened between Friday in 14:22:12 receiving the order, recognizing that those pages were 4 different, notifying the Defendants of the error, notifying the 14:22:13 5 Court on Monday, between that time period, they went out and 14:22:17 6 7 published that actual document, which I think not only was it a 14:22:21 violation by the protective order to allude to it, but calling 8 14:22:25 it a smoking gun, calling it an authentic contract, then filing 14:22:27 9 14:22:30 10 an unredacted opposition where they refer to it again, then getting a letter that clearly points out where we were, then 14:22:36 11 14:22:40 12 publishing the actual document itself and then the next day the 14:22:43 13 Court plans to stay on the order I don't think is a good-faith 14:22:46 14 understanding. 14:22:47 15 THE COURT: Mr. Lake, are you referring -- when you 14:22:50 16 said they filed a repleading revealing the --14:22:54 17 MR. LAKE: Yeah, in reply, as their attachment to the 14:22:58 18 reply. 14:22:59 19 THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm looking for. You 14:23:04 20 say that would be in the brief? 14:23:04 21 THE CLERK: 111. I'm trying to locate where exactly there 14:23:06 22 THE COURT: was a divulgation, if you will, of the document in anything that 14:23:09 23 14:23:14 24 was filed. 14:23:15 25 THE CLERK: Document 111.

Your Honor, it's Exhibit A to the MR. SNYDER: 14:23:17 1 Southwell declaration 111-1. 14:23:20 2 That's Mr. Southwell's declaration? 14:23:31 3 THE COURT: MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. 14:23:34 4 THE COURT: Exhibit A? 14:23:35 5 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. 14:23:36 6 7 THE CLERK: Document 111. 14:23:40 THE COURT: Just give us a moment. We'll find it. 8 14:23:47 MR. SNYDER: May I approach, Your Honor? 14:23:54 9 14:23:55 10 THE COURT: Yes, it could possibly -- just to expedite. Now, I understand your point. Go ahead. 14:24:10 11 14:24:18 12 MR. LAKE: Well, the point is it was not an accident, 14:24:21 13 that that was published on that day and it was not in a good-faith error because they didn't understand the order that 14:24:26 14 14:24:30 15 was issued on Friday because we pointed it out to them. We also told them we would be addressing it with you Monday, which is 14:24:34 16 14:24:37 17 what we did. And they took that opportunity, before you had an 14:24:38 18 14:24:41 19 opportunity to revise your order, to publish that to the press 14:24:44 20 in violation of what I believe is the protective order. And I 14:24:48 21 think that that is extremely prejudicial because not only was it 14:24:52 22 done purposely, it was done for two reasons, I think. 14:24:55 23 Number one, and it's what we've seen through this 14:24:58 24 entire case, and that is the continued rhetoric that somehow 14:25:04 25 Mr. Ceglia is a liar and a fraud and a forger and now that I --

somehow my integrity is at issue.

I've read 40 pages of essentially the same thing, calling us liars. They cited four cases. None of them are on point. None of this is before the Court. We have not had an opportunity to conduct our discovery. We have not made any such excursions, but when there is a protective order in place, not only -- and we haven't gotten to the actual discovery order.

We haven't seen any emails yet, and we'll discuss this later, but in violation of the protective order, they're doing it for two reasons. One, they want to poison the jury pool. No doubt about it. They want everybody to think that Paul Ceglia somehow doesn't have a deal with Mark Zuckerberg.

Second thing they want to do is they want to try this case in the press. They want the press to see everything that they write, whether it's founded, whether it's based on fact, whether it's supported by declarations of the party or not.

They can exercise their litigation privilege all day long. They do it every chance they get. They do it by conducting press interviews. They do it by filing papers and they do it by alluding to things if they don't think it is under protective order.

Then in this case, they went a step further and actually produced the documents, which they now claim is a smoking gun and some authentic contract which there is no basis for that, there is no foundation.

1 14:25:08 14:25:12 2 14:25:18 3 14:25:22 4 14:25:25 5 14:25:31 6 7 14:25:34 14:25:34 8 14:25:38 9 14:25:42 10 14:25:48 11 14:25:51 12 14:25:53 13 14:25:56 14 14:25:59 15 14:26:03 16

14:26:05 17 14:26:10 18 14:26:12 19 14:26:15 20

14:26:21 22 14:26:24 23

14:26:25 24

14:26:21 21

14:26:29 25

Mark Zuckerberg himself has never said -- although now
I hear they're changing their position and they're saying yes,
the second page is authentic. Mark Zuckerberg did sign this
second page. That's what I'm reading in the press. That's what
it sounds like their argument now is.

So if that's the case, what is with this declaration saying I never signed it? That's why the protective order is so important. And it was drafted broadly by them for this very purpose. That's why we designated all of this as confidential.

We're either going to have this case heard, and we're going to have it heard on the merits the way it should be or this case is going to be in the press, which I think is extremely prejudicial to our client and that's why I'm upset with what happened with this particular document.

THE COURT: I understand. Anything else?

MR. LAKE: Well, you asked --

THE COURT: I asked at the beginning how Mr. Ceglia could expect a contract between himself and Mr. Zuckerberg to be a confidential item vis-a-vis the general public at the time he designated it as such.

MR. LAKE: And the answer to that is the contract between Ceglia and Zuckerberg has been made public when it was attached to the Complaint. The document you're looking at is not the contract that was entered into between Zuckerberg and Ceglia.

14:26:46 5
14:26:49 6
14:26:52 7
14:26:56 8
14:27:00 9
14:27:03 10
14:27:06 11
14:27:09 12

1

2

3

4

14:26:30

14:26:35

14:26:39

14:26:43

14:27:19 15

14:27:16 14

14:27:12 13

14:27:23 1614:27:25 17

14:27:29 18

14:27:34 19

14:27:46 20

14:27:46 21 14:27:48 22

14:27:51 23

14:27:53 24

14:27:56 25

THE COURT: How then would Mr. Zuckerberg's purported 14:27:57 1 14:28:03 2 signature get on it? 14:28:05 3 MR. LAKE: It's two different pages. They're not even the same. Those are TIFF images. There's no native format 14:28:08 4 We don't know when that was drafted. We don't 14:28:09 5 behind that. know by who. We don't even if it was made by Mr. Zuckerberg and 14:28:11 6 7 planted on Mr. Ceglia's computers. 14:28:17 THE COURT: I thought the document came from you. 8 14:28:20 That's why you wanted to designate it as confidential. 14:28:22 9 14:28:23 10 MR. LAKE: Right. There's been no showing of who wrote it, when or how it got there, which is exactly why the 14:28:25 11 14:28:28 12 next phase of this proceeding needs to be expedited discovery. 14:28:33 13 THE COURT: How would you have a expectation of a piece of paper being confidential when it came from you with --14:28:35 14 14:28:39 15 I mean, these signatures or what purport to be signatures on it from the Court's perspective, if you put yourself in my 14:28:43 16 14:28:48 17 position, being submitted to me on a claim that it's confidential? 14:28:51 18 14:28:52 19 MR. LAKE: You're looking at two different documents. 14:28:54 20 THE COURT: Ho can it be considered to be confidential? 14:28:56 21 Right. Scan TIFF 2, my understanding is 14:28:56 22 MR. LAKE: the same as the second page of the work-for-hire contract that 14:28:59 23 14:29:02 24 was attached to the complaint. 14:29:04 25 If the Court looks at that independently, I agree with

14:29:09 1	you that that is not a confidential document. If you are you
14:29:12 2	looking at it in conjunction with scan TIFF 1 and you believe
14:29:17 3	the Defendants claim that that is the smoking gun authentic
14:29:21 4	contract, although they have no proof of it
14:29:25 5	THE COURT: Scan TIFF 1?
14:29:26 6	MR. LAKE: That's page one.
14:29:28 7	THE COURT: Item 1 in the log?
14:29:31 8	MR. LAKE: That's item 2.
14:29:34 9	THE CLERK: Right.
14:29:35 10	MR. LAKE: Item 1 is the emails we just already
14:29:37 11	discussed.
14:29:38 12	THE COURT: Coming back to item 2
14:29:40 13	MR. LAKE: Right.
14:29:43 14	THE COURT: what is your argument?
14:29:46 15	MR. LAKE: Right. The argument is that
14:29:46 16	THE COURT: Why should I not in the way that it was
14:29:50 17	submitted to the Court, why wouldn't I deduce that the two
14:29:53 18	pieces of paper go together?
14:29:55 19	MR. LAKE: Because page two goes with the
14:29:59 20	work-for-hire contract that was attached to the complaint. And
14:30:01 21	the reason we know that is because
14:30:05 22	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, perhaps I can clarify.
14:30:07 23	THE COURT: Just a second. The log who prepared
14:30:30 24	the log?
14:30:30 25	MR. LAKE: The Defendants' experts.

14:30:34 1	THE COURT: Well, didn't you have something to do with
14:30:36 2	it?
14:30:37 3	MR. LAKE: No, Your Honor. If you recall, the way the
14:30:39 4	order was described that they, Stroz Friedberg, who was their
14:30:45 5	experts
14:30:45 6	THE COURT: Yes.
14:30:46 7	MR. LAKE: were to do a relevant search and when
14:30:50 8	they did, they were to produce a log of what they considered to
14:30:52 9	be presumed relevant documents.
14:30:54 10	THE COURT: Right.
14:30:54 11	MR. LAKE: And we were only allowed to do two things.
14:30:56 12	We were allowed to look at that designated things as either
14:31:00 13	privileged and/or confidential
14:31:01 14	MR. SNYDER: That's not accurate.
14:31:03 15	THE COURT: Before this log was submitted to the
14:31:05 16	Court, you had a chance to examine it?
14:31:07 17	MR. LAKE: Right.
14:31:07 18	THE COURT: So if you're the Court, wouldn't you
14:31:10 19	fairly conclude that this document, the log, was something that
14:31:15 20	both parties represented to the Court as a accurate reflection
14:31:22 21	of the Plaintiff's assertion of both attorney client privilege
14:31:26 22	and confidentiality per the confidentially agreement?
14:31:31 23	MR. LAKE: Right, and we designated two
14:31:33 24	THE COURT: Just one second.
14:31:33 25	MR. LAKE: Okay.

14:31:34	1	THE COURT: So far so good. So when I'm reading, as
14:31:37	2	I'd now would like to draw your attention to the verbiage
14:31:42	3	associated with item 2, it says page one of signed and dated
14:31:49	4	StreetFax.
14:31:50	5	If I'm going to say anything that in your view is
14:31:53	6	going to compromise the potential argument that it remains
14:31:58	7	confidential, then just say so. Just say so. I'll stop and say
14:32:03	8	you read it with me silently.
14:32:06	9	MR. LAKE: No, I have it here. I know what it says.
14:32:08 1	10	THE COURT: And then you move your eye down to item 4,
14:32:12	11	if you're the Court, would it not be a fair inference to believe
14:32:19 1	12	that the two pages were intended and are in fact physically
14:32:24	13	joined into a single contract?
14:32:26	14	MR. LAKE: If you look down to item 12
14:32:29	15	THE COURT: Am I missing something here?
14:32:31	16	MR. LAKE: Yeah, you are.
14:32:32	17	THE COURT: What is it?
14:32:33	18	MR. LAKE: If you look at item 12, it says what
14:32:38 1	19	appears to be, because when they wrote this. They did that.
14:32:38 2	20	THE COURT: How is the Court expected to go through
14:32:41 2	21	these manipulations when there's a request to enforce the
14:32:45 2	22	confidentially order and all I'm given is this and nothing else?
14:32:53 2	23	MR. LAKE: No.
14:32:53 2	24	THE COURT: I mean, may I be excused for not following
14:32:53 2	25	your train of thinking here, Mr. Lake?

```
1
                     MR. LAKE:
                                No, Your Honor.
14:32:53
                     THE COURT: I may not be excused?
14:32:55
        2
14:32:55
        3
                     MR. LAKE: You may be excused from whatever you like.
            My point is this --
14:32:59
        4
                                  That's right. But is it a fair inference
14:32:59
        5
                     THE COURT:
            for the Court to believe that items -- items 2 and 4 are part
14:33:02
       7
            and parcel of the same contract based on what you both presented
14:33:06
14:33:11
            to me?
        8
14:33:12
                     MR. LAKE:
                                Right. And that's why --
14:33:13 10
                     THE COURT: Is that not fair?
                     MR. LAKE: That's why we ask for oral argument so we
14:33:14 11
14:33:17 12
            can make any clarifications.
14:33:18 13
                     THE COURT: But we are trying to go back in time to
            explain to you how I arrived --
14:33:18 14
14:33:18 15
                     MR. LAKE: No, I understand.
                     THE COURT: -- at the conclusion I arrived at.
14:33:22 16
14:33:23 17
                     MR. LAKE: And I also know the cat's out of the bag
            because it's already been produced.
14:33:26 18
14:33:37 19
                     THE COURT: Well, that part I was not aware that it
14:33:37 20
            was out of the bag insofar as you already explained it to me.
14:33:37 21
            And truthfully, when I saw Mr. Southwell's filing, I guess I
            didn't realize that it was unredacted and that he was then --
14:33:38 22
14:33:44 23
            and that that filing occurred --
14:33:47 24
                     MR. LAKE: Monday.
14:33:48 25
                     THE COURT: -- before your letter came to me, is that
```

1 what you're saying? 14:33:50 MR. LAKE: I wrote a letter to him on Friday asking 14:33:51 2 14:33:53 3 him to be professional and to acknowledge that there could be an 14:33:56 error in the order and not to publish item 2. 4 THE COURT: So when he alludes to it and attaches 14:34:00 5 Exhibit A to document 111, he is flouting your requests? 14:34:03 6 7 MR. LAKE: Yeah, he is expressly ignoring it. 14:34:09 THE COURT: Yes or no? 14:34:12 8 MR. LAKE: 14:34:12 9 Yes. 14:34:12 10 THE COURT: So he then gets your letter. He doesn't attempt to withdraw it. He doesn't attempt to redact it as he 14:34:15 11 14:34:21 12 had done on an earlier occasion and that's the basis for your 14:34:23 13 assertion, that they acted in a way that is deserving, I'm assuming you're going to suggest, of sanctions of some form or 14:34:27 14 14:34:33 15 another. 14:34:33 16 And I was not aware that the cat was out of the bag in 14:34:37 17 the sense that the media had actually quoted verbatim or had actually examined Exhibit A --14:34:41 18 14:34:43 19 MR. LAKE: And published it. 14:34:44 20 THE COURT: And published it. I was not aware of 14:34:47 21 that. Hundreds of times. 14:34:48 22 MR. LAKE: 14:34:49 23 THE COURT: So can we come back to the question of 14:34:52 24 whether, if we examine each line of items 2 and 4, whether 14:34:57 25 joined or unjoined with the document that's attached to the

14:35:01 1	complaint, would you give attempt to give me a ball park
14:35:04 2	estimate of your own as to what percentage of all of the
14:35:09 3	verbiage in two documents are the same and what percentages are
14:35:12 4	materially different?
14:35:14 5	MR. LAKE: Paragraphs
14:35:16 6	THE COURT: Approximately.
14:35:17 7	MR. LAKE: There are two paragraphs that reference
14:35:20 8	Facebook on
14:35:21 9	THE COURT: Out of how many paragraphs?
14:35:22 10	MR. LAKE: On the first page there are seven and on
14:35:27 11	the second page it's identical.
14:35:29 12	THE COURT: So if you add them together, how many
14:35:32 13	paragraphs of the entirety of the document, both first page and
14:35:37 14	second page
14:35:37 15	MR. LAKE: Well
14:35:38 16	THE COURT: refer to Facebook, approximately?
14:35:41 17	MR. LAKE: On the work
14:35:44 18	THE COURT: 50 percent?
14:35:45 19	MR. LAKE: On the work-for-hire contract
14:35:47 20	THE COURT: 20 percent?
14:35:49 21	MR. LAKE: There are 18.
14:35:49 22	THE COURT: 10 percent?
14:35:50 23	MR. LAKE: There are 18 paragraphs. The second page
14:35:57 24	it's paragraphs eight through 18, those are boilerplate. On
14:36:03 25	page one, paragraphs one through seven, talks about what the

1 terms are to be in regards to the computer programming work and 14:36:08 the -- this Facebook purchase. And those are set forth in 14:36:13 2 14:36:18 3 paragraphs two and three. 14:36:19 So the majority of the first page has to do with what 4 the duties and obligations Mark Zuckerberg has for Paul Ceglia. 14:36:24 5 On the second page it's all boilerplate. So I would say that 14:36:29 6 7 the percentages are large, but it doesn't matter because the two 14:36:33 paragraphs that matter are paragraphs two and three. And if 14:36:37 8 you, the Court is inclined --14:36:40 9 14:36:43 10 THE COURT: And those two paragraphs -- do I get this part of it straight too, those two paragraphs are indeed 14:36:50 11 14:36:54 12 included in --14:36:54 13 MR. LAKE: Yes, yes. THE COURT: So the only material difference between 14:36:54 14 14:36:57 15 items 2 and 4 as to the confidentially issue are two paragraphs that are already made public by the Plaintiff? 14:37:04 16 14:37:06 17 MR. LAKE: No. 14:37:07 18 THE COURT: No? 14:37:08 19 MR. LAKE: There is --No. 14:37:10 20 THE COURT: What am I -- how can you say -- I thought 14:37:14 21 we just agreed that those are the two paragraphs that make this lawsuit what it is, and they are public. 14:37:18 22 14:37:20 23 There is different language. The title is 14:37:23 24 different. The fact that there is no metadata on the second 14:37:29 25 scan TIFF 2, because it's a TIFF file as opposed to a word file,

1 and we'll get to that later. 14:37:33 I'm sure Mr. Snyder is going to point out that the 14:37:35 2 final version made, a soft copy of the work-for-hire contract, 14:37:39 3 14:37:42 was not produced. I submitted a certification saying it's 4 because it could not be located. I'm sure it will --14:37:45 5 THE COURT: Again, I'm trying to help you, I believe, 14:37:47 6 7 Mr. Lake, by keeping you on track. The question is: Now that 14:37:50 we've got some sense of what portion of the verbiage in the 8 14:37:55 contract attached to the complaint and the contract, if you 14:38:02 9 14:38:04 10 will, that we're discussing are different, what I'm trying to understand now is if you excise out the two paragraphs allegedly 14:38:10 11 14:38:19 12 pertaining to Facebook out of items 2 and 4, on what basis does 14:38:25 13 the Plaintiff retain a reasonable belief in the confidentially 14:38:29 14 of the remaining paragraphs? 14:38:31 15 MR. LAKE: Okay. Just --14:38:32 16 THE COURT: Is that a fair question? 14:38:34 17 MR. LAKE: Of course it's a fair question. 14:38:35 18 try --14:38:35 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 14:38:36 20 MR. LAKE: I'll try to give you the best answer I can. 14:38:39 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 14:38:39 22 MR. LAKE: First, the two paragraphs that talk about 14:38:42 23 the terms of Facebook are the two paragraphs -- you're right. 14:38:45 24 In paragraph five it references Facebook. In other paragraphs 14:38:49 25 the language is different.

14:38:50	1	We've done an analysis word by word of these two
14:38:54	2	contracts side by side. I didn't bring that with me. I didn't
14:38:59	3	think I would be going into this level of minutia. I apologize.
14:39:03	4	I can have it sent over immediately.
14:39:03	5	THE COURT: Well, you're the one who raised it.
14:39:03	6	MR. LAKE: The title is different. And if where
14:39:03	7	you're going is that we should redact anything that's different
14:39:07	8	between the two
14:39:07	9	THE COURT: No, no. I'm simply asking myself the
14:39:11	10	question if I'm Mr. Ceglia, on what basis do I have a reasonable
14:39:23	11	belief that these two pieces of paper are documents which the
14:39:26	12	public wouldn't otherwise have access to and are within the four
14:39:31	13	corners of the confidentially requirements of proprietary,
14:39:36	14	business, personal, technical.
14:39:41	15	MR. LAKE: Right, or otherwise privileged.
14:39:44	16	THE COURT: And otherwise privileged. And we just
14:39:48	17	decreed that on the privilege issue I overruled you and that you
14:39:54	18	acquiesced in the rules.
14:39:54	19	MR. LAKE: Correct.
14:39:54	20	THE COURT: So don't tell me about privilege.
14:39:54	21	MR. LAKE: No, I wasn't if I said privilege, I
14:39:56	22	didn't mean it.
14:39:56	23	THE COURT: You did.
14:39:56	24	MR. LAKE: I meant to say prejudicial. And the reason
14:40:00	25	I

14:40:00	1	THE COURT: You said privileged.
14:40:02	2	MR. LAKE: Okay. Well, if I misspoke, I apologize. I
14:40:05	3	meant to say prejudicial, not privileged.
14:40:05	4	THE COURT: Prejudicial?
14:40:05	5	MR. LAKE: Correct.
14:40:07	6	THE COURT: And that is in the confidentially
14:40:09	7	agreement?
14:40:09	8	MR. LAKE: There is a catchall provision in there that
14:40:12	9	talks about and it's in the papers. But it is a broad
14:40:18	10	provision in the confidentially agreement and
14:40:24	11	THE COURT: Or otherwise reasonably designable as
14:40:27	12	confidential. It's quite circular actually.
14:40:30	13	MR. LAKE: Yeah.
14:40:31	14	THE COURT: And I didn't draft it.
14:40:33	15	MR. LAKE: I know.
14:40:33	16	THE COURT: But you people signed up for it.
14:40:37	17	MR. LAKE: Right.
14:40:37	18	THE COURT: So we're back to confidentially and what
14:40:39	19	I'm trying to understand is that how a document that you
14:40:41	20	provided, and you agreed is confidential with the people who for
14:40:46	21	the defense quote collaborated with you and drafted the
14:40:50	22	confidentiality agreement thought that a document that you
14:40:53	23	submitted to the Court with what purports to be a signature by
14:40:57	24	Mr. Zuckerberg, which is between the Plaintiff and
14:41:00	25	Mr. Zuckerberg I'm trying to remember if their names appears

on the first page. I can't see because the copy I have is not that good, conceivably could be something that should have been -- or perhaps a confidential nature or otherwise could be retained.

If three-quarters of the verbiage is the same as the document that's in the complaint, as you say, I perhaps could have used a slightly different phraseology in what I wrote. But the core concept is that we're looking at something that already has been made public by the Plaintiff.

Moreover, it's a document that the Plaintiff is representing to the Court was signed by Mr. Zuckerberg.

Otherwise, you would not have allowed to it to be sent to me in that form. You would have said oh, well, that name Zuckerberg on there, we don't know who put that on there. It came from our files, but how could we possibly be held to warranting that that's Mr. Zuckerberg's signature.

If you're looking at it, and if you're looking at it as I am as a neutral, it looks like it's being represented as a document that was signed by your client and Mr. Zuckerberg.

Ergo, how could Mr. Ceglia believe that it was a confidential document? Particularly when Mr. Zuckerberg is seriously defending the case as he is.

MR. LAKE: Right. I would agree with you 100 percent completely as to page two. But as to page one, I disagree. I disagree for the same reasons that the defense disagrees with

14:41:25 5 14:41:30 6 14:41:34 7 14:41:40 8

14:41:44

14:41:46 10

14:41:09

14:41:12

14:41:18

14:41:22

1

2

3

4

9

14:41:49 11 14:41:51 12 14:41:55 13 14:41:58 14 14:42:02 15 14:42:06 16

14:42:10 18 14:42:15 19 14:42:18 20 14:42:23 21

14:42:08 17

14:42:28 23 14:42:31 24 14:42:35 25

14:42:27 22

1 our interpretation for our work-for-hire contract. 14:42:39 THE COURT: We just went through about 10 minutes ago 14:42:41 2 a process by which you also agreed that the Court could 14:42:44 3 14:42:47 reasonably construe these submissions as indicating that the two 4 pages are bound together as a single document. 14:42:50 5 MR. LAKE: No. 14:42:55 6 7 THE COURT: Why it was portrayed the way it was was 14:42:55 never portrayed to the Court. 14:42:57 8 MR. LAKE: 14:42:57 9 No. 14:42:57 10 THE COURT: I've heard no argument as to this issue. I'm not getting this argument for the first time. 14:43:02 11 MR. LAKE: I will --14:43:05 12 14:43:06 13 THE COURT: Maybe I should have waited until today to go down and rule on all 120 items. I don't think the parties 14:43:08 14 14:43:13 15 wanted that. At least I got the impression that they were appreciative of the effort that we made to give you a ruling. 14:43:18 16 14:43:22 17 And now it's the clear both loose phenomena. No good deed goes unpunished, right, Mr. Lake? 14:43:29 18 14:43:30 19 MR. LAKE: That's right. And if I was prepared to 14:43:30 20 spend all day and go through 120, but I do appreciate the Court's efforts. 14:43:30 21 I will respectfully disagree that scan TIFF item 001 14:43:42 22 14:43:42 23 goes with 002 and I will never concede that. 14:43:45 24 THE COURT: But you will agree that the way it was 14:43:48 25 portrayed, that that was a logical conclusion?

14:43:51	1	MR. LAKE: Oh, yes. No, your logic makes perfect
14:43:56	2	sense.
14:43:58	3	MR. SNYDER: On that point just to complete the record
14:44:04	4	because I think
14:44:04	5	THE COURT: I know you like to use the podium. Would
14:44:04	6	you want to stand and deliver? Step to the podium. If you can
14:44:05	7	get in the habit of being seated, then stay there.
14:44:05	8	MR. SNYDER: Just to complete the record, of course
14:44:08	9	your Your Honor has reviewed the emails that the Plaintiff sent
14:44:11	10	in 2004 attaching the StreetFax contract. And in those emails,
14:44:17	11	which Your Honor has ruled properly and correctly
14:44:29	12	THE COURT: 1 and 3?
14:44:31	13	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. As your Your Honor
14:44:37	14	perceived, the Plaintiff, in 2004, states and admits indeed what
14:44:40	15	Mr. Lake was trying to
14:44:41	16	THE COURT: I thought I overlooked that.
14:44:42	17	MR. SNYDER: Page one and two.
14:44:44	18	THE COURT: I left you something to talk about.
14:44:46	19	MR. SNYDER: Yes, thank you. In fact, the Plaintiff
14:44:48	20	in 2004, which was
14:44:53	21	THE COURT: I understand your point. Both of them
14:44:56	22	purport to say RE StreetFax contracts and the first one, page
14:45:02	23	one of two for that and the second document is two of two were
14:45:06	24	
14:45:06	25	MR. SNYDER: Right.

14:45:07	1	THE COURT: for the same thing. So what else was I
14:45:10	2	supposed to conclude?
14:45:11	3	MR. SNYDER: The contemporaneous emission by the
14:45:15	4	Plaintiff in email stated in 2004
14:45:15	5	THE COURT: Anything else on that?
14:45:16	6	MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor.
14:45:17	7	THE COURT: What do you want me to do about the item
14:45:19	8	29 that arguably should have been ruled as not confidential? Do
14:45:25	9	you want to push that?
14:45:36	10	MR. SNYDER: I don't think there'd be any opposition
14:45:36	11	since the text of that purported email, which went
14:45:36	12	THE COURT: Well, I mean they're in the public domain.
14:45:36	13	MR. LAKE: That's fine. There are other designations.
14:45:36	14	I'm not
14:45:36	15	THE COURT: I don't know why they even went over.
14:45:39	16	Probably why I gave it the benefit of the doubt, thinking it's
14:45:43	17	new material and couldn't possibly be confidentiality as to the
14:45:47	18	emails that were attached to the complaint
14:45:48	19	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, those were
14:45:49	20	MR. SNYDER: They
14:45:50	21	THE COURT: Low and behold, certainly that's what I
14:45:51	22	I made that error too.
14:45:53	23	MR. SNYDER: Given the time constraints, there were
14:45:56	24	other designations that we wanted to address, we don't even need
14:46:04	25	to do it today, but just so Your Honor is aware, 40 through 45,

1 which Your Honor upheld as confidential actually contain among 14:46:10 the most damning evidence uncovered on the --14:46:15 2 14:46:19 3 **THE COURT:** It's not a matter of whether it's damning. 14:46:22 It's a matter of whether it should be treated as confidential or 4 5 14:46:25 not. Well, it's certainly not confidential MR. SNYDER: 14:46:25 6 because it's information that reflects the utilization without 7 14:46:28 disposing its contents in court. The utilization of various 14:46:35 8 computer --14:46:38 9 14:46:39 10 THE COURT: Would you say that this is -- I mean, now, I'm not a computer engineer and as you can see from my decision, 14:46:43 11 14:46:47 12 I have to rely on the absence of any help from the parties --14:46:50 13 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- on getting a glossary of some of the 14:46:51 14 14:46:54 15 numerous high-tech terms that were used by your computer mavins 14:46:59 16 from our able information management staff and I have a 14:47:03 17 representative here in case I need more help. 14:47:06 18 In looking at it from a non-technical point of view 14:47:12 19 and the absence of technical assistance from either the defense 14:47:16 20 or the Plaintiff, would you think the that layman would look at this material and say this is technical information or 14:47:20 21 14:47:24 22 non-technical information? 14:47:25 23 MR. SNYDER: I think Your Honor was correct under the 14:47:28 24 circumstances to sustain a confidentially designation based on the information available to the Court. 14:47:33 25

14:47:34	1	We did not
14:47:36	2	THE COURT: Do you seriously think that this is
14:47:39	3	non-technical information?
14:47:40	4	MR. SNYDER: It turns out to be not technical
14:47:42	5	information. Although
14:47:43	6	THE COURT: Turns out?
14:47:44	7	MR. SNYDER: Yes, on its face I could see how someone
14:47:44	8	without
14:47:47	9	THE COURT: So if you had an idea that it turns out
14:47:49	10	not to be technical, I should have been told about it when you
14:47:53	11	asked for the de-designation, don't you think?
14:47:56	12	MR. SNYDER: Well, Your Honor, we did not we only
14:47:57	13	challenged the two most important documents and what we could
14:48:00	14	do
14:48:01	15	THE COURT: Look, you're the ones who want expedition.
14:48:04	16	I'm giving it to you and now you're saying well, maybe not so
14:48:07	17	much, Judge. No.
14:48:07	18	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, we can address these other
14:48:10	19	documents at a future date?
14:48:11	20	THE COURT: If you want to, you can't I'm not going
14:48:14	21	to prohibit you from further motions. But for today's purposes,
14:48:20	22	there is no motion before me to reconsider my ruling as to item
14:48:24	23	29?
14:48:24	24	MR. SNYDER: At this point, no, Your Honor.
14:48:25	25	THE COURT: Your request for reconsideration is

granted. And upon further reconsideration, the Court finds its 1 14:48:28 original ruling was correct. The two documents are interlinked 14:48:33 2 and the substantial portion of the verbiage in both has already 14:48:36 3 14:48:41 been revealed to the public. 4 And the document, as represented to the Court, was a 14:48:42 5 bilateral contract, if so, then Mr. Ceglia, in my humble 14:48:45 6 estimation, could not entertain a reasonable belief in continued 7 14:48:52 confidentiality. 8 14:48:54 MR. SNYDER: On 29, Your Honor, my colleagues --14:48:54 14:48:57 10 THE COURT: So therefore, the Court adheres to its original ruling for the reason stated. 14:49:00 11 14:49:02 12 MR. SNYDER: On 29, my colleagues are reminding me 14:49:05 13 that that is an email as to which the Plaintiff put in the 14:49:10 14 complaint, the purported email. 14:49:11 15 There's been no objection so we would respectfully request that since it's before the Court, we discuss that the 14:49:15 16 14:49:17 17 Court de-designate item 29 just because -- -14:49:20 18 THE COURT: Do you have a problem with that, Mr. Lake? 14:49:22 19 MR. LAKE: If it's the email that was attached to the 14:49:26 20 complaint, I would agree with Mr. Snyder that it's been made 14:49:27 21 public by the Plaintiff. There's been an awful lot of papers and I 14:49:27 22 THE COURT: 14:49:27 23 have to make the comparison again for the parties. Are you able to provide the Court with that careful analysis? 14:49:32 24

MR. LAKE: Right.

14:49:34 25

14:49:34	1	THE COURT: We did the best we could.
14:49:36	2	MR. LAKE: No, I understand.
14:49:36	3	THE COURT: Upon mutual agreement, the parties will
14:49:42	4	amend their order saying there is a de-designation of item 29.
14:49:46	5	MR. SNYDER: Thank you.
14:49:46	6	THE COURT: Now, as to the merits of the two motions,
14:49:50	7	I would like to proceed in the order it's presented taking up,
14:49:51	8	first of all, Mr. Lake's motion to compel Mr. Zuckerberg's
14:49:55	9	production, I think, of the, if I could use the term loosely,
14:49:59 1	10	Harvard emails, at which turns on a interpretation of the
14:50:04 1	11	Court's order regarding production.
14:50:10 1	12	And I read the papers and I'm prepared to hear further
14:50:17 1	13	discussion, not too lengthy please, so we could then turn to the
14:50:21 1	14	more lengthy issues provided in the cross motion, which I would
14:50:27 1	15	purpose to go through item by item, hear arguments.
14:50:28 1	16	Again, I've read the papers. I do have a few
14:50:32 1	17	questions and I would purpose to a make a series of rulings on
14:50:36 1	18	each and every issue that's presented.
14:50:36 1	19	Does anybody need to take a comfort break before we
14:50:49 2	20	proceed? Very good. Mr. Lake, you have the floor.
14:50:50 2	21	MR. LAKE: Thank you, Your Honor.
14:50:52 2	22	Right now we're just talking about the 175 or so
14:50:55 2	23	emails that when you issued your order on July 1st, 2011 were to
14:51:01 2	24	be produced by the Defendants.
14:51:03 2	25	If you recall at the time, we were arguing and

negotiating that particular order. The fear that was presented by the defense was that if we didn't provide the Plaintiff's information first and we received their emails, that Paul Ceglia would somehow run out and fabricate some other emails.

That was the argument that was made. We didn't think that was something that was plausible, but we understood it and agreed that if we produced our information, that within five days they would be presented and they would give us the emails.

Compliant with the order, we produced all the information that we had. I did a very, I think above and beyond diligent search for everything that I could find.

We coordinated that the production of that information in three cities, Sarasota, Buffalo, Chicago simultaneously. We produced difference forensic images, as well as hard drives and discs and everything we could. We were trying to coordinate everything together. We put it all out, we gave it to their experts, Stroz Friedberg, and they took it and started to do their relevant search for what they were looking for.

No where in the order that I read says that there was a condition precedent that we had to in some way comply with the order based upon their interpretation, that was allow them any grounds to violate the order. Rather, they were supposed to provide them five days after. They didn't.

There's no condition precedent and even if there was, it was met. It was met first when everything was submitted to

1 14:51:06 14:51:20 2 14:51:20 3 14:51:20 4 14:51:25 5 14:51:27 6 7 14:51:31 14:51:34 8 14:51:37 14:51:40 10 14:51:46 11 14:51:48 12 14:51:51 13 14:51:55 14 14:52:00 15 14:52:03 16 14:52:09 17 14:52:12 18

14:52:12 16
14:52:16 19
14:52:19 20
14:52:25 21
14:52:31 22

14:52:37 24 14:52:40 25

14:52:35 23

Stroz and it was even further complied with, even though I don't think it was necessary, when the certifications were filed by me and Mr. Ceglia saying that we had produced everything that was within Mr. Ceglia's possession, custody and control. If that's the case, then the time should have started ticking then, and that would have been at the end of July.

Then even further, we had a series of meetings and conversed through emails and letters where we, out of professional courtesy, said you've seen everything, we've certified everything, we'll give you until August 7th. Just produce the emails because we're entitled to them. They still refused.

We think that was a deliberate violation of the order. It may have been because they disagreed with the interpretation of the order. We were all here when it was written. We complied to the best of our ability and we simply believe that we're entitled to get those emails now. Simple as that.

THE COURT: Maybe not. Mr. Snyder?

MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, this does dovetail with our motion to compel in that it's our position that the order by its terms does require the Plaintiff to produce the electronic assets and then five days later we are required to produce the so-called Harvard emails.

We had the Harvard emails ready on a disc on the 20th, which would have been our production date had the Plaintiff

1 14:52:45 14:52:50 2 14:52:53 3 14:52:59 4 14:53:02 5 14:53:05 6 7 14:53:08 8 14:53:13 14:53:16 9 14:53:20 10 14:53:24 11 14:53:28 12 14:53:29 13 14:53:32 14 14:53:35 15 14:53:38 16 14:53:41 17 14:53:45 18 14:53:47 19 14:53:51 20 14:53:56 21 14:54:02 22 14:54:07 23 14:54:12 24 14:54:16 25

1 produced the electronic assets as required. He failed miserably 14:54:19 14:54:24 2 to comply with the order in numerous material ways. 14:54:27 3 We met and conferred with Mr. Lake, pointed out this serious lapse in omission. By way of example, Your Honor, the 14:54:32 4 authentic contract, which we will address later, the one that in 14:54:36 5 2004 this Plaintiff acknowledged was the authentic contract was 14:54:40 6 7 found on the so-called Seagate computer. 14:54:46 That's a computer that this Plaintiff in a 8 14:54:50 certification identified in an affidavit earlier on in the case. 14:54:55 9 14:54:58 10 That on the 15th when he produced his electronic assets to us, low and behold that one was not included. Somehow that one was 14:55:03 11 14:55:08 12 omitted, but we pointed that out. Three days later they coughed 14:55:11 13 that one up. That was on the 18th, three days after the due 14:55:15 14 date. 14:55:16 15 That gave us serious concern because it was not 14:55:19 16 coincidence, now that we know the true facts. That one computer 14:55:21 17 he failed to give us was the computer on which the authentic contract was ultimately located. 14:55:25 18 14:55:27 19 There are other material ways which are essential to 14:55:31 20 our motion to compel in which this Plaintiff failed to produce his electronic assets. 14:55:35 21 14:55:37 22 THE COURT: Well, let's stick with the language of the 14:55:39 23 order. 14:55:39 24 MR. SNYDER: Sure.

It says the Plaintiff shall produce by the

THE COURT:

14:55:40 25

15th a series of electronic assets, if you will or however you 1 14:55:42 want to describe it, including electronic files, computers, 14:55:50 2 electronic media and the like. 14:55:55 3 14:55:57 MR. SNYDER: Yes. 4 THE COURT: And then five days after such production 14:55:58 5 -- we didn't number these paragraphs. We probably should have. 14:56:05 6 It's on the bottom of page two that five days subsequent to that 7 14:56:11 production of the so-called electronic assets and his sworn 14:56:13 8 declaration, Defendants shall produce the emails that are at 14:56:15 9 14:56:19 10 issue, correct, Mr. Lake? That's what you're referring to, captured from Mr. Zuckerberg's Harvard email account. Which 14:56:23 11 14:56:28 12 apparently there are such documents, correct, Mr. Snyder? 14:56:30 13 MR. SNYDER: Yes, and they reside on a disc and they 14:56:33 14 were ready to be produced had he produced the electronic assets 14:56:45 15 in the sworn declaration --14:56:45 16 THE COURT: Well, aside from the Seagate, which I 14:56:45 17 quess has now been resolved because you have it --MR. SNYDER: We have it late, but we have not 14:56:45 18 14:56:45 19 received --14:56:45 20 THE COURT: Well, there was something else. It was 14:56:46 21 the computer at home, at his parents' home? MR. SNYDER: That was another one that --14:56:49 22 14:56:50 23 THE COURT: Slipped passed them? 14:56:53 24 MR. SNYDER: -- slipped passed them. 14:56:55 25 THE COURT: But that's been corrected with an apology.

14:56:59	1	MR. SNYDER: That's been corrected with all sorts of
14:57:00	2	things. I haven't heard the apology, but
14:57:04	3	THE COURT: I thought they indicated the fact that
14:57:05	4	they had overlooked
14:57:05	5	MR. SNYDER: All right. Perhaps.
14:57:06	6	THE COURT: I'm trying to understand what else is
14:57:08	7	MR. SNYDER: I'll tell you what's critical
14:57:10	8	THE COURT: What else is it that is out there that you
14:57:12	9	haven't got that was
14:57:13	10	MR. SNYDER: If Your Honor recalls that the grave
14:57:16	11	concern we had is that the amended complaint
14:57:19	12	THE COURT: Yes, I
14:57:19	13	MR. SNYDER: It was the email that gave us concern
14:57:28	14	because of course we believe if we gave them the authentic
14:57:31	15	Harvard emails when he produced his so-called emails, he would
14:57:31	16	create more fiction.
14:57:35	17	What this Plaintiff failed to do on the 15th, as
14:57:38	18	required by this Court, is produce any electronic native email
14:57:43	19	files. Remember, Your Honor, Stroz Friedberg swore to this
14:57:47	20	Court that the bogus emails were counted in the amended
14:57:51	21	complaint.
14:57:51	22	THE COURT: Well, is there a difference between the
14:57:53	23	email files he did produce and the native version thereof?
14:57:56	24	MR. SNYDER: Yes. What he gave us, Your Honor, are
14:57:58	25	floppy discs that contain cut and paste jobs that he wants

14:58:03	everyone to believe were once actual emails. What he did not
14:58:06	produce, Your Honor, was a single
14:58:08	THE COURT: Excuse me. Were there any emails on the
14:58:11	floppy disc?
14:58:11	MR. SNYDER: No, they were documents which purport to
14:58:14	be emails. Meaning to say, they were cut and paste jobs of
14:58:18	words on pages, which the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff alone word
14:58:22	it required, in other words
14:58:25	THE COURT: Do you have any examples of it so I could
14:58:28 1	see what
14:58:28 1	MR. SNYDER: Yes, we'll get you examples.
14:58:30 1	THE COURT: I mean, where did you come up with the
14:58:32 1	words cut and paste?
14:58:33 1	MR. SNYDER: In other words, they're not real emails.
14:58:34 1	THE COURT: How do you know that?
14:58:36 1	MR. SNYDER: Because they're not on the Harvard server
14:58:38 1	because they are factually inconsistent with the historical
14:58:44 1	facts of the time. And because, Your Honor, they're no where to
14:58:49 1	be found on any of the computers that he gave us.
14:58:51 2	What was found on the computers that he gave us, the
14:58:54 2	2004 email with the authentic contract. And isn't it telling,
14:58:58 2	Your Honor, that the authentic contract is attached to actual
14:59:02 2	emails in native form in an email account on this Plaintiff's
14:59:02 2	Seagate computer?
14:59:08 2	THE COURT: What do you mean by "native"?

MR. SNYDER: Meaning it's native to resident on the actual computer and found in the sent box of an email account, which this Plaintiff used on his Seagate computer. So he had a Outlook account that he used to send and receive emails in 2004.

Our experts found that email account, went to sent box. In the sent box found --

THE COURT: Found an email account where?

MR. SNYDER: On the Seagate computer, which he produced. On that account on his computer were the emails in 2004 that he sent to Mr. Cole, which attached the authentic contract, the StreetFax contract that had nothing to do with Facebook.

But, Your Honor, the so-called emails that he quotes in the amended complaint are no where to be found on any computers that he gave us. They're only on floppy discs as Word documents, which are not attached to any computer, not attached to any metadata, which would date and corroborate and authenticate the so-called emails, and whose authenticity turns on the Plaintiff's word and the Plaintiff's word alone. And that's why we've cross-moved Your Honor to compel Plaintiff to consent to the acquisition of his webmail account, Gmail --

THE COURT: Just a second. I'm trying to focus on whether he's turned over all of the electronic assets. You're saying that these -- I guess I'm not sure what you're saying at this point.

1 14:59:09 14:59:16 2 14:59:22 3 14:59:28 4 14:59:33 5 14:59:37 6 7 14:59:39 14:59:41 8 14:59:46 9 14:59:52 10 14:59:58 11 15:00:02 12 15:00:02 13 15:00:06 14 15:00:09 15 15:00:15 16 15:00:19 17 15:00:24 18 15:00:32 19 15:00:35 20 15:00:39 21 15:00:44 22 15:00:46 23

15:00:51 24

15:00:57 25

15:00:57	1	MR. SNYDER: Right. So the point
15:00:57	2	THE COURT: You have documents on the Seagate
15:01:00	3	computer, which you claim are not emails?
15:01:03	4	MR. SNYDER: No, they are emails, Your Honor.
15:01:05	5	THE COURT: I thought you said they weren't?
15:01:06	6	MR. SNYDER: No, the Seagate emails
15:01:08	7	THE COURT: Excuse me
15:01:09	8	MR. SNYDER: The floppy discs are bogus Word documents
15:01:13	9	that are
15:01:13	10	THE COURT: So how does that bear on the issue that I
15:01:15	11	have to decide he is not entitled to his discovery?
15:01:19	12	MR. SNYDER: He has not turned over to us any native
15:01:22	13	email files.
15:01:26	14	THE COURT: How would you know if an email file on
15:01:31	15	these supposed emails, if you saw them
15:01:35	16	MR. SNYDER: This goes to the USB device, Your Honor,
15:01:35 15:01:39		MR. SNYDER: This goes to the USB device, Your Honor, because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit,
	17	
15:01:39	17 18	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit,
15:01:39 15:01:45	17 18 19	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit, accessed, Your Honor, remote storage devices, USB devices, on
15:01:39 15:01:45 15:01:56	17 18 19 20	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit, accessed, Your Honor, remote storage devices, USB devices, on which he had files that were critical to this lawsuit. He did
15:01:39 15:01:45 15:01:56 15:01:59	17 18 19 20 21	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit, accessed, Your Honor, remote storage devices, USB devices, on which he had files that were critical to this lawsuit. He did not identify them in his sworn certification to the Court, he
15:01:39 15:01:45 15:01:56 15:01:59 15:02:03	17 18 19 20 21 22	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit, accessed, Your Honor, remote storage devices, USB devices, on which he had files that were critical to this lawsuit. He did not identify them in his sworn certification to the Court, he concealed them and now they're destroyed or secreted somewhere.
15:01:39 15:01:45 15:01:56 15:01:59 15:02:03 15:02:08	17 18 19 20 21 22 23	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit, accessed, Your Honor, remote storage devices, USB devices, on which he had files that were critical to this lawsuit. He did not identify them in his sworn certification to the Court, he concealed them and now they're destroyed or secreted somewhere. Those devices though left a digital fingerprint on the
15:01:39 15:01:45 15:01:56 15:01:59 15:02:03 15:02:13	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	because this Plaintiff, since the commencement of this lawsuit, accessed, Your Honor, remote storage devices, USB devices, on which he had files that were critical to this lawsuit. He did not identify them in his sworn certification to the Court, he concealed them and now they're destroyed or secreted somewhere. Those devices though left a digital fingerprint on the Plaintiff's computer sand on the Plaintiff's computer files.

15:02:21	1	And our experts were able to determine that those
15:02:24	2	devices were used by this Plaintiff since the lawsuit was
15:02:36	3	commenced and contained files that included Zuckerberg contract
15:02:36	4	page two dot TIFF. Remember, the TIFF file is what the
15:02:37	5	authentic contract was in.
15:02:39	6	THE COURT: What you claim is the authentic contract.
15:02:50	7	MR. SNYDER: Well, I could erect that, Your Honor, in
15:02:50	8	detail. The other file was Zuckerberg contract page one dot
15:02:51	9	TIFF. Those were extracted from the computer, erased from the
15:02:56	10	computer, put on a storage device.
15:03:01	11	The storage device was taken off the computer, just
15:03:03	12	like this, Your Honor, pulled off the computer, thrown in the
15:03:06	13	river, destroyed, hidden, not produced to us.
15:03:09	14	THE COURT: Or as you suggest, Lake Erie.
15:03:12	15	MR. SNYDER: Lake Erie. I thought the Hudson River
15:03:15	16	would be too parochial so we used Lake Erie.
15:03:20	17	THE COURT: And what you just gestured to was a flash
15:03:26	18	drive, correct?
15:03:26	19	MR. SNYDER: Yes. This is grave a situation of
15:03:27	20	spoliation in a case that is imaginable.
15:03:30	21	THE COURT: If it is spoliation.
15:03:32	22	MR. SNYDER: Well, Your Honor, let's just say,
15:03:34	23	Plaintiff's excuse for not producing this critical evidence is,
15:03:37	24	quote
15:03:37	25	THE COURT: Excuse me. I'm trying to understand the

```
1
            notion of the fact that are you saying that there are documents
15:03:40
            on the floppies that purport to be emails, but really aren't?
15:03:44
        2
                     MR. SNYDER:
15:03:49
        3
                                  Yes.
15:03:49
                     THE COURT: Because they're not in native form?
        4
15:03:51
        5
                     MR. SNYDER:
                                  Yes.
                     THE COURT: Native form is what you mean by native
15:03:52
        6
       7
            format, correct?
15:03:56
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes. And, Your Honor, there are
        8
15:03:56
            documents --
15:03:59
       9
15:03:59 10
                     THE COURT: My question is so what. You have the
            Seagate and you have the floppy discs and --
15:04:04 11
15:04:08 12
                     MR. SNYDER: And he has not produced any of -- any
15:04:08 13
            computer.
                     THE COURT: Why should I believe that there are some
15:04:10 14
            -- well, apparently there are some other drives out there that
15:04:15 15
15:04:18 16
            he --
15:04:19 17
                     MR. SNYDER: Correct.
                     THE COURT: -- didn't turn over --
15:04:19 18
15:04:20 19
                     MR. SNYDER: Correct.
15:04:21 20
                     THE COURT: -- because they were listed on the
15:04:23 21
            confidentially log, is that right?
15:04:25 22
                     MR. SNYDER: Let me say it this way: When I -- yes.
15:04:26 23
            When I present my motion to compel, there are so many serious
15:04:30 24
            lapses here --
15:04:31 25
                     THE COURT: Well, just a second. What did they say in
```

15:04:32 1	response to that? What did you hear from Mr
15:04:35 2	MR. SNYDER: About the emails?
15:04:36 3	THE COURT: Well, the emails aren't really what's not
15:04:40 4	been turned over because you have what you have even though you
15:04:43 5	believe they're not authentic emails.
15:04:43 6	MR. SNYDER: Correct.
15:04:45 7	THE COURT: It's really that they're part of a paper
15:04:48 8	trail or a digital trail that leads you to believe that there
15:04:52 9	are other sources of relevant documents
15:04:54 10	MR. SNYDER: Form example, on these
15:04:55 11	THE COURT: on these mysterious drives.
15:04:57 12	MR. SNYDER: They're not mysterious, Your Honor. They
15:04:59 13	are
15:04:59 14	THE COURT: Well, it's a mystery as to where they are.
15:05:01 15	MR. SNYDER: Right, they existed in the real world.
15:05:04 16	They left digital fingerprints on his computer.
15:05:05 17	THE COURT: I didn't mean phantom by mysterious.
15:05:07 18	MR. SNYDER: And they're exactly the kind of files
15:05:09 19	that the TIFF files that were attached to
15:05:12 20	THE COURT: So what you are really are saying is you
15:05:15 21	have circumstantial evidence to believe that there are other
15:05:18 22	sources, i.e. drives, the USB drives.
15:05:21 23	MR. SNYDER: We believe, with all due respect
15:05:24 24	THE COURT: Universal Serial Bus.
15:05:27 25	MR. SNYDER: Yes. And we believe, Your Honor, not to

1 mix words, it's direct and irrefutable scientific evidence that 15:05:31 this Plaintiff stored on remote storage devices files essential 15:05:33 2 15:05:39 3 to his fraud in this case. Indeed, one of the files is called 15:05:42 Facebook files. They then says he's unable to locate these 4 devices. This is implausible and not credible. 15:05:46 5 Remember, Your Honor, this is a man who saved hundreds 15:05:49 6 7 of floppy discs, supposedly, and CDs, supposedly, dating back a 15:05:52 decade, supposedly, containing these made-up emails, supposedly. 8 15:05:57 So this is the man who saves thousands of floppy discs per 15:06:01 9 15:06:07 10 decade, but the USB device with the first page and second 15:06:08 11 page --15:06:09 12 THE COURT: Just a second. Can you take a pause here? 15:06:13 13 MR. SNYDER: Yes. THE COURT: I need to consult my technical assistant. 15:06:18 14 15:06:18 15 For the record, this is Mr. Brian Loliger. He's the deputy 15:06:24 16 assistant manager of our information system. 15:07:21 17 MR. SNYDER: There's one other critical category --THE COURT: They could have been on another computer 15:07:23 18 15:07:25 19 and then put on a drive, correct? 15:07:28 20 MR. SNYDER: The USB that was located by our forensic 15:07:33 21 experts was attached to specific computers, that's how we were 15:07:36 22 able to trace --15:07:37 23 THE COURT: But they may be created on a another 15:07:41 24 computer and then temporarily stored on the drive? 15:07:44 25 MR. SNYDER: We don't know where they were created.

We know that the files existed on computers, that we have, were moved onto a storage device, a storage device in Lake Erie or somewhere else, and we don't have the documents on the computer because they were wiped and they are somewhere on a disc or not.

There's another category though of electronic assets that this Plaintiff willfully withheld and did not produce, and this is critical as well. As Your Honor knows, it's our position that the document attached to the complaint is a fraud, a fabrication, a phoney.

So we asked this Plaintiff to produce to our experts all electronic copies of the purported contract. What do you know, we didn't get a single one.

All we have, Your Honor, is the two-page hard copy document that is attached to the complaint and the purported original that he made available for hard copy inspection, which is suspicious and irregular.

THE COURT: What is your point about electronic copies?

MR. SNYDER: He did not produce a single electronic version of the bogus contract from his computer, from his CDs, from his hundreds of floppy discs.

He didn't produce a single electronic image of the his signed version of his bogus contract. He didn't produce any electronic documents containing the unsigned version of the contract that's attached to the complaint.

15:08:01 5
15:08:04 6
15:08:08 7
15:08:15 8
15:08:19 9
15:08:20 10

1

2

3

4

15:07:46

15:07:50

15:07:55

15:07:57

15:08:29 12 15:08:31 13

15:08:35 14

15:08:24 11

15:08:38 15

15:08:42 16

15:08:47 17 15:08:50 18

15:08:51 19

15:08:54 20

15:08:56 21

15:08:59 22

15:09:09 23

15:09:09 24

15:09:11 25

15:09:13	1	As a result, all we have is his two-page document
15:09:18	2	attached to the complaint and the piece of paper that he calls
15:09:22	3	an original.
15:09:23	4	THE COURT: Is it not possible that there aren't any?
15:09:26	5	MR. SNYDER: No, and I'll tell Your Honor why. His
15:09:28	6	experts have images that were scanned off of a computer.
15:09:31	7	THE COURT: His experts?
15:09:32	8	MR. SNYDER: Let me address this. What we did find,
15:09:36	9	Your Honor, only aggravates our concern and highlighted our
15:09:40	10	grave concerns about both the destruction of evidence and the
15:09:46	11	withholding of evidence, and why we didn't produce the emails.
15:09:50	12	What they did find are Plaintiff's test attempts at
15:09:54	13	creating a phoney document
15:09:56	14	THE COURT: Your experts?
15:09:57	15	MR. SNYDER: Yes. We found seven unsigned electronic
15:10:02	16	drafts of the bogus contract that our experts said were telltale
15:10:06	17	practice forgeries, but they had different margins
15:10:11	18	THE COURT: Where were they?
15:10:12	19	MR. SNYDER: They were found on the Plaintiff's
15:10:15	20	computer. And what we found, Your Honor, our experts found that
15:10:19	21	he had different margins, different spaces. They were irregular
15:10:23	22	on different ways on page one as the Plaintiff was trying to cut
15:10:23	23	and paste and manipulate words to create a bogus page one.
15:10:27	24	And what we found is not a single electronic version
15:10:32	25	of the signed copy. And none of these documents, the seven of

1 those versions, drafts of the two-page documents attached to the 15:10:37 complaint matched what was attached to the complaint. 15:10:41 2 they're eight versions with different formats and margins and --15:10:44 3 15:10:48 Is it possible that he erased them? 4 THE COURT: Is it possible that he erased --15:10:52 5 MR. SNYDER: 15:10:55 THE COURT: Deleted. 6 7 MR. SNYDER: The signed electronic copy -- well, he 15:10:56 had seven copies. 8 15:11:00 Hard copies? 15:11:04 THE COURT: 15:11:05 10 MR. SNYDER: No, he had seven electronic copies of 15:11:09 11 different drafts of the bogus contract, different margins, 15:11:11 12 different spacing as he was trying to Jerry-rig page one to look 15:11:15 13 a certain way. But what we doesn't have on his computer is the version that ultimately was printed out and attached to the 15:11:19 14 15:11:23 15 complaint. THE COURT: And the reason for that would be that he 15:11:24 16 deleted it. 15:11:28 17 15:11:28 18 MR. SNYDER: He deleted it or he was required, Your 15:11:32 19 Honor, also in the order -- but it's not like a production 15:11:36 20 requirement. He also was required, Your Honor, and this was 15:11:36 21 critical and it was discussed with Your Honor to both produce 15:11:37 22 15:11:40 23 and identify and he failed to identify any of this for us. 15:11:45 24 failed to identify where the contracts were, what was the 15:11:48 25 authentic contract, what he purported to represent.

15:11:52 1	So we have now seven versions of fake forgeries or
15:11:57 2	practice forgeries. Which one does he contend is the so-called
15:12:01 3	contract? He can't contend any of them are the so-called
15:12:05 4	contract because none of them match what's attached to the
15:12:08 5	complaint. So our question is where is the electronic version
15:12:11 6	of the document that's attached to the complaint.
15:12:13 7	THE COURT: So if the Court agreed with you, my order
15:12:15 8	would be to comply fully with
15:12:18 9	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
15:12:19 10	THE COURT: Let's see. The paragraph that requires
15:12:21 11	him to not only to produce it, but to identify
15:12:25 12	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
15:12:25 13	THE COURT: as to the electronic version of the
15:12:30 14	final alleged contract between the parties?
15:12:34 15	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
15:12:35 16	THE COURT: And so if he gives you an affidavit saying
15:12:41 17	I don't have it, I don't know what happened to it, it may have
15:12:46 18	been I may have intentionally deleted it or unintentionally
15:12:51 19	deleted it, but I can't tell you more, that would be compliant?
15:12:56 20	MR. SNYDER: That would be partial compliance. There
15:12:59 21	are other ways in which he did not comply as well.
15:13:00 22	THE COURT: I know that, but as to that issue
15:13:02 23	MR. SNYDER: I suppose so.
15:13:04 24	THE COURT: Okay.
15:13:05 25	MR. SNYDER: Plaintiff did not produce a single

```
THE COURT:
                                  What's the next issue I have? Are you
15:13:07
        1
15:13:10
        2
            going to go through each one?
15:13:13
        3
                     MR. SNYDER: If it's helpful to the Court.
                     THE COURT: Because the question is whether he is in
15:13:14
        4
            compliance or not so as to trigger your obligation and how many
15:13:16
        5
            more examples of non-compliance, which could result in an order
15:13:21
        6
        7
            from the Court from that would, number one, forgo any
15:13:27
            obligations on your part agreeing with you that the discovery,
        8
15:13:29
            if you will or production, was to be sequential and conditional
15:13:33
        9
15:13:38 10
            on the one hand and on the other hand, provide enforcement of
            the order by virtue of further order compelling him to provide
15:13:43 11
15:13:49 12
            these supplemental disclosures.
15:13:51 13
                     MR. SNYDER: The way I count that, I think there are
15:13:54 14
            five ways in which he --
15:13:54 15
                     THE COURT: I'm trying to assist Mr. Lake so he knows
15:13:57 16
            when he is expected to attempt to rebut.
15:13:57 17
                     MR. SNYDER: I think there are five categories I'd
            like to --
15:14:00 18
15:14:00 19
                                  We just discussed one, the first category?
                     THE COURT:
15:14:04 20
                     MR. SNYDER: Okay. The first category in no
15:14:08 21
            particular order is his failure to produce the USB device or --
                     THE COURT: Or devices.
15:14:12 22
15:14:13 23
                     MR. SNYDER: Or devices, right.
15:14:13 24
                     THE COURT:
                                  This would be the -- what's the word I'm
15:14:18 25
            looking for?
```

1 MR. SNYDER: Pen drives. 15:14:18 The undisclosed drives --15:14:21 2 THE COURT: 15:14:21 3 MR. SNYDER: Yes. 15:14:22 THE COURT: -- that were attached and upon which 4 materials were created, arguably in native format, but are now 15:14:24 5 not produced because you don't have the drives so you don't know 15:14:31 6 7 what's on there. 15:14:35 MR. SNYDER: We do know what's on there and that's why 8 15:14:36 it is so serious, Your Honor. What's on there -- a digital 15:14:38 9 15:14:49 10 fingerprint was left on the computer. We can trace from the computer to the now destroyed or secreted --15:14:49 11 15:14:50 12 THE COURT: Drives. 15:14:51 13 MR. SNYDER: -- storage device the following files, 15:14:52 14 Zuckerberg contract page one dot TIFF, Zuckerberg contract page 15:14:58 15 two dot TIFF in a folder labelled Facebook files. Again, the 15:15:04 16 very same type of TIFF image files as the authentic contract from 2004. 15:15:10 17 15:15:10 18 THE COURT: Okay. 15:15:11 19 MR. SNYDER: And those are gone and the Plaintiff 15:15:13 20 either should produce the storage devices and the documents that 15:15:17 21 are on them or provide a certification telling the Court why, 15:15:21 22 since the commencement of the lawsuit he accessed them, but why 15:15:26 23 today they're either gone or supposedly lost. That's the first 15:15:32 24 category. 15:15:32 25 THE COURT: Or you could depose him.

15:15:35

15:15:36

15:15:42

15:15:44

15:15:44

15:15:49

15:15:51

15:15:55

15:16:00

15:16:04 10

15:16:07 11

15:16:12 12

15:16:17 13

15:16:20 14

15:16:24 15

15:16:27 16

15:16:31 17

15:16:35 18

15:16:35 19

15:16:37 20

15:16:39 21

15:16:45 22

15:16:50 23

15:16:54 24

15:16:56 25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

MR. SNYDER: I don't think there's any -- I think it speaks for itself. It's difficult to imagine more willful spoliation than that when the question in the case is where is the authentic page one of the contract --

THE COURT: I think that we're all familiar with the reasonable case law of spoliation issues and electronic discovery. And we know that conceivably when you have a spoliation issue, the Court may require an evidentiary hearing.

I'm trying to avoid doing that and I'm trying to keep clear for everybody's benefit this afternoon that we're not here to accuse the Plaintiff of spoliation.

You may think that has occurred, but as far as the Court is concerned, the only issue before it is whether or not there is enough of an indication that there is more out there that needs to be produced by the Plaintiff before your obligation, which it is sequential, to produce the so-called Harvard emails is triggered. That's all I want to be clear about.

MR. SNYDER: The first category --

THE COURT: If you need -- if you think you need to depose him or to understand whether or not -- I mean, you can see the two things get very interrelated at some point.

I mean, on the one hand is there a something showing that he has failed to fully comply with discovery obligations under the order. That's what we're discussing. And if they're

not what amounts to spoliation, it is arguably closely related 1 15:16:59 issue depending on what we find. 15:17:04 2 MR. SNYDER: And I would suggest, Your Honor, that I 15:17:04 3 agree, and in the future when we present the Court with our full 15:17:06 4 finding of the forensic examination and other information and 15:17:12 5 these discovery issues are resolve one way or another --15:17:15 6 7 THE COURT: Could you just -- so we can move ahead 15:17:18 here, we're not running out of time, but just --15:17:20 8 MR. SNYDER: The second --15:17:24 9 15:17:25 10 THE COURT: -- quickly denominate -- we've got item 1, those are the so-called USB devices. If you could just for the 15:17:28 11 15:17:32 12 record so I can call upon Mr. Lake to respond --15:17:34 13 MR. SNYDER: He should be required to produce --15:17:38 14 THE COURT: What are the other four items that give 15:17:41 15 rise to the current belief that he's not fully complied to the 15:17:42 16 order so as to trigger your obligations to produce? 15:17:44 17 MR. SNYDER: He should identify and produce all electronic copies of the purported contract. He's failed to do 15:17:49 18 15:17:54 19 that. 15:17:54 20 THE COURT: We've talked about that. MR. SNYDER: He should identify and produce all of 15:17:55 21 15:17:57 22 the --15:17:57 23 THE COURT: This is number three? 15:17:59 24 MR. SNYDER: Yes. All of the forms described in 15:18:02 25 paragraph eight of the Plaintiff's June 12th, 2011 declaration.

1 Those are the forms from which the contract was actually 15:18:08 created. He's failed to identify those or produce any 15:18:15 2 15:18:22 3 electronic assets containing those files. THE COURT: Are these items listed in Mr. Southwell's 15:18:24 4 declaration? 15:18:29 5 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. 15:18:31 6 7 THE COURT: And that would be, just in the interest of 15:18:32 time perhaps, if you could give me a reference to -- I know I 15:18:34 8 saw it. I'm just looking for it now so we can perhaps move more 15:18:37 9 15:18:43 10 quickly here. These would be pages -- we've got page 13 and 14. We've got electronic images of the StreetFax agreement. I think 15:18:54 11 15:19:00 12 those were the ones you were referring to. Six removable media 15:19:07 13 devices would be the so-called missing drives. And then are the other items listed somewhere that I could look at and follow 15:19:10 14 15:19:14 15 along with you? 15:19:17 16 MR. SNYDER: Yes. One moment, Your Honor. 15:19:19 17 THE COURT: Sure. And again, for Mr. Lake's benefit too if you can --15:19:23 18 15:19:47 19 There's a list on page four in their reply MR. LAKE: 15:19:53 20 under heading two, electronic documents. That would be doc number 110? 15:19:56 21 THE COURT: 15:19:59 22 MR. LAKE: Yes, page four at the bottom, Roman numeral II, paragraph A, first paragraph. 15:20:04 23 THE COURT: Well, I knew I saw something in 15:20:14 24 15:20:19 25 Southwell's affidavit, but now I realize it wasn't quite as

1 complete as I thought. It covers two of the items we've just 15:20:21 discussed with Mr. Snyder. 15:20:27 2 15:20:29 3 MR. SNYDER: I can go over the request, Your Honor. Ι 15:20:32 haven't --4 And the request of them are the categories 15:20:32 5 THE COURT: at the bottom of page four, is that it? The June 12th 15:20:35 6 7 declaration. 15:20:46 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, page 10 of our brief filed on 15:20:47 8 August 4th has a nice summary --15:20:57 9 15:21:15 10 THE COURT: What's the date of the brief again? 15:21:17 11 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor, it's August 4th. 15:21:32 12 THE COURT: What page? 15:21:33 13 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor, page 10. We're looking at the first full paragraph? 15:21:35 14 THE COURT: 15:21:37 15 MR. SNYDER: Right. 15:21:38 16 THE COURT: So is this the same listing of 15:21:41 17 unsatisfactory issues, production issues, as recapitulated at the bottom of page four of the doc number 110, the so-called 15:22:01 18 15:22:01 19 Defendants' reply? I just want to make sure we have everything 15:22:01 20 in front of us right here. 15:22:05 21 Page 10 refers to, while you're looking yourselves, native electronic version of the purported contract. Native 15:22:08 22 15:22:12 23 electronic version being the native format of it, just so we're 15:22:21 24 using correct terminology. And then all electronic copies of 15:22:28 25 the purported contract, including those in the possession of his

1 attorneys or his experts --15:22:32 MR. SNYDER: And that's critical, Your Honor, because 15:22:34 2 15:22:36 3 we believe that the fraudulent contract changed over time and 15:22:41 that versions that his experts, his agents, may have or do have 4 15:22:47 5 may indeed be similar to the version A that was attached to the complaint --15:22:53 6 7 The only word is may. 15:22:53 THE COURT: MR. SNYDER: Well, we know that -- and produced in 8 15:22:54 15:22:58 9 hard copy form to us so we want to see those electronic images. 15:23:04 10 THE COURT: I understand. And then the next category or part of the second one is mentioned about the purported 15:23:07 11 15:23:11 12 contracts are those in any webmail account. 15:23:16 13 And you think that -- let see here. And you think or 15:23:19 14 that you thought that you should order then from the acquisition 15:23:25 15 and inspection of the webmail account by your expert Stroz 15:23:30 16 Friedberg. 15:23:30 17 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And that's not an issue that was addressed 15:23:31 18 15:23:33 19 with the order? 15:23:33 20 MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor, and that was a new 15:23:35 21 request which we raised, and I raised moments ago, which is that, we believe, Your Honor --15:23:38 22 15:23:39 23 THE COURT: But he did not disclose having such email 15:23:42 24 accounts. 15:23:42 25 MR. SNYDER: We know that he has at least --

THE COURT: Well, he hasn't disclosed it in any 15:23:43 1 declaration? 15:23:46 2 15:23:46 3 MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor. Do you think he has one? 15:23:47 4 THE COURT: 15:23:48 5 MR. SNYDER: We know he has at least two, one is a Gmail account and the other is a Hotmail or Microsoft account. 15:23:52 6 7 And we believe that those, given the overwhelming evidence of 15:23:57 fraud before the Court and discovery misconduct, may well 8 15:24:01 contain additional evidence of fraud. 15:24:07 9 15:24:10 10 THE COURT: And how do you know that he has this, what you call, Gmail account and a so-called Hotmail account? 15:24:13 11 15:24:18 12 MR. SNYDER: He's been CCed in different emails that 15:24:21 13 have come into our possession that contain those addresses. 15:24:27 14 THE COURT: So there is a discrepancy between his 15:24:31 15 declaration and the facts? MR. SNYDER: Well, he didn't identify those accounts, 15:24:32 16 15:24:34 17 no. THE COURT: Right. Okay. And then the last -- not 15:24:35 18 15:24:38 19 the last category. The next category is electronic forms 15:24:45 20 described in the June 12th declaration. 15:24:47 21 MR. SNYDER: Those are the so-called forms that claims 15:24:49 22 he used to create the contract attached to the complaint. quess the templates or the forms that he claims to have filled 15:24:52 23 15:24:56 24 in when we created the account and we have no electronic copies 15:25:03 25 of any such forms.

15:25:05	1	THE COURT: Was the June 12th declaration an Exhibit
15:25:08	2	to any of the documents, June 14th perhaps?
15:25:16	3	MR. SNYDER: I can approach and hand it to Your Honor.
15:25:33	4	THE COURT: And that would be in paragraph what
15:25:35	5	paragraph would you be referring to there?
15:25:42	6	MR. SNYDER: Paragraph eight, Your Honor.
15:25:43	7	THE COURT: Paragraph eight. All right. Mr. Lake,
15:25:48	8	make a note of it. We're talking about the forms referred to in
15:25:51	9	paragraph eight. They are claiming that they're looking for the
15:25:57	10	electronic version of those forms. Is that specifically what
15:26:02	11	hasn't been produced?
15:26:04	12	MR. SNYDER: He has not identified or produced any
15:26:07	13	such forms and I just want to emphasize again, the
15:26:12	14	identification requirement was critical to the order because of
15:26:18	15	our concerns that he was not going to point out where documents
15:26:24	16	were or what documents represented the so-called contract.
15:26:29	17	THE COURT: And then the original or again so-called
15:26:32	18	native electronic or native form you don't have the word
15:26:37	19	format in there, but you say native electronic files consisting
15:26:43	20	of or containing the purported emails.
15:26:47	21	MR. SNYDER: Yes, and that goes to the issue that all
15:26:50	22	he's produced to us are floppy discs that contain Word document
15:26:50	23	files, but not the native email files.
15:26:54	24	And the difference, Your Honor, is important of
15:26:58	25	course. I can show Your Honor the difference. We have the 2004

email that this Plaintiff sent, by which we looked at earlier
today, attaching page one and page two of the StreetFax contract
are native emails.

What's he's attached -- what he's cut and pasted by

What's he's attached -- what he's cut and pasted by his own admission onto a Word document is not a native email.

It's a Word document that he says represents a pasting of an email that he took from a native format, but he hasn't produced any native format.

And the irony here is what we're purporting to produce, once he is in compliance, are native emails from Mark Zuckerberg's Harvard account, which contain none of the so-called emails recited in the narrative and in the amended complaint. So we want him to produce all native email files containing the purported emails. He's produced none.

THE COURT: My technical assistant tells me that some of these forms in native form could be on a server somewhere and Mr. Ceglia might not know how to actually produce them, is that not true?

MR. SNYDER: I don't know what he knows or does not know, but I know he was required to identify and produce the forms and he didn't do either. And if he didn't do that --

THE COURT: I mean, if he told you how he came to have access to these forms, that would be -- and if from his explanation it was clear that they did not reside on his computer, that would be satisfactory, wouldn't it?

15:27:02 15:27:05 15:27:10 15:27:13 4 15:27:17 5 15:27:22 6 7 15:27:27 15:27:31 8 15:27:32 9 15:27:36 10 15:27:41 11 15:27:47 12 15:27:50 13 15:27:57 14 15:29:07 15 15:29:12 16 15:29:17 17 15:29:28 18 15:29:28 19 15:29:28 20 15:29:28 21 15:29:32 22 15:29:35 23 15:29:40 24

15:29:43 25

We would then evaluate that at the time. 1 MR. SNYDER: 15:29:45 15:29:47 2 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 15:29:48 3 MR. SNYDER: And the final category which is the USB devices, which we've already addressed, Your Honor. 15:29:51 4 Yes, okay. And your view is that until he 15:29:54 5 THE COURT: provides that, there is still the risk that, as I remember you 15:29:57 6 7 very saliently drawing the Court's attention to that Mr. Ceglia, 15:30:08 in your view, could attempt to manufacture evidence, if you 8 15:30:12 will. 15:30:15 9 15:30:15 10 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor, in light of the ample 15:30:18 11 evidence --15:30:18 12 THE COURT: To respond to what he received --MR. SNYDER: Yes. 15:30:20 13 THE COURT: -- from Mr. Zuckerberg before he -- the 15:30:21 14 15:30:23 15 record of his electronic -- his electronic records going to the 15:30:29 16 purported contract have been pinned down, if you will. 15:30:33 17 MR. SNYDER: Yes, and in forming that is not only the fact or facts that we brought before the Court about the fraud 15:30:33 18 15:30:38 19 that he's perpetrated, but also the recent discoveries from the 15:30:42 20 forensic testing, which show that this Plaintiff, Your Honor, 15:30:45 21 has recently been in the past several months engaged in backdating, manipulation and alteration of numerous documents, 15:30:50 22 15:31:01 23 which when we present our report to the Court, will be fully 15:31:06 24 explicated. But we did not make the decision to not produce the 15:31:10 25 emails with that consideration of all the facts.

15:31:13	1	And an important one was the fact that this Plaintiff,
15:31:17	2	in addition to destroying or spoliating this device, also was
15:31:23	3	engaged in backdating and manipulation of critical documents
15:31:28	4	that go to the heart of this case. And until and unless he
15:31:35	5	THE COURT: What's the best example of this alleged
15:31:39	6	backdating, please?
15:31:40	7	MR. SNYDER: There is ample evidence on this
15:31:43	8	Plaintiff's computer that he has been, since the date of this
15:31:44	9	lawsuit, manipulating dates and dating applications to backdate
15:31:48	10	documents.
15:31:49	11	THE COURT: As regard to this case?
15:31:52	12	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
15:31:53	13	THE COURT: Or regard to something else?
15:31:55	14	MR. SNYDER: This case.
15:31:56	15	THE COURT: Can you give me an example?
15:31:57	16	MR. SNYDER: I think at this point, no, Your Honor,
15:32:00	17	because there are still some documents that are designated as
15:32:04	18	confidential.
15:32:04	19	THE COURT: Had I upheld it as confidential?
15:32:07	20	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. And that's something
15:32:09	21	that we can address
15:32:10	22	THE COURT: And what items are they? I mean,
15:32:29	23	everything I see on here goes back to the 2003, 2004 timeframe.
15:32:34	24	MR. LAKE: Again, Your Honor, I think we are treading
15:32:37	25	into protected water.

15:32:39 1	THE COURT: I just want to know what we overlooked.
15:32:42 2	MR. SNYDER: For example, Your Honor
15:32:42 3	MR. LAKE: You didn't.
15:32:43 4	
15:32:43 4	MR. SNYDER: There's an application that techie's use
15:32:49 5	called a hex editor and it is something that is used to
15:33:08 6	manipulate metadata on a computer, including to manipulate the
15:33:13 7	dates attached to different documents. There's ample evidence
15:33:18 8	that
15:33:18 9	THE COURT: Well, I think you told me about that when
15:33:20 10	we first considered this back in June
15:33:23 11	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
15:33:23 12	THE COURT: that there is indeed a website that you
15:33:26 13	can go to that teaches you how to make
15:33:28 14	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
15:33:29 15	THE COURT: documents appear to have a different
15:33:31 16	creation date than actually was the case.
15:33:34 17	MR. SNYDER: Absolutely.
15:33:35 18	THE COURT: Is that what you're talking about?
15:33:36 19	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
15:33:37 20	THE COURT: It's the same program you're referring to?
15:33:39 21	MR. SNYDER: It's one of many or several that exist
15:33:43 22	to accomplish that end. And what's relevant about it here, Your
15:33:46 23	Honor, and not to get into the nuts and bolts of it
15:33:49 24	THE COURT: You're saying that some of these documents
15:33:51 25	that I thought were technical and/or personal, if not

15:33:56	1	business-based, back in the time when they were created were
15:34:00	2	fabricated
15:34:00	3	MR. SNYDER: No.
15:34:01	4	THE COURT: and put up on the privileged log?
15:34:03	5	MR. SNYDER: No, were test-runs of that program.
15:34:08	6	THE COURT: So why wasn't that revealed to me on
15:34:13	7	privilege log?
15:34:14	8	MR. SNYDER: This is something that when we give our
15:34:17	9	full report, pursuant the Court's order, we're going to bring to
15:34:21	10	the Court's attention because the experts are still in the
15:34:24	11	process of evaluating the data.
15:34:27	12	For example, if Your Honor looks at documents 41 and
15:34:32	13	42 and 43
15:34:32	14	THE COURT: The ones that
15:34:32	15	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
15:34:33	16	THE COURT: we discussed earlier that look like
15:34:35	17	technical information to me?
15:34:37	18	MR. SNYDER: Yes. In fact, those are documents,
15:34:38	19	without revealing their substance because they are still
15:34:42	20	confidential, which demonstrate this Plaintiff's use of this
15:34:45	21	computer program, which is used to cut and paste and manipulate
15:34:51	22	documents.
15:34:53	23	THE COURT: So where it says in the document here that
15:34:56	24	it's a doc file that appears to be the test results of modifying
15:35:01	25	a Microsoft Word document, that's what you're referring to?

15:35:04	1	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
15:35:05	2	THE COURT: How would I know that?
15:35:07	3	MR. SNYDER: You would not, Your Honor. But when we
15:35:09	4	would report to Your Honor next month pursuant to the order
15:35:14	5	THE COURT: So you're going to ask me to reconsider my
15:35:17	6	ruling as to those items?
15:35:19	7	MR. SNYDER: Yes, but we thought it appropriate to do
15:35:22	8	so once the forensic testing was completed.
15:35:36	9	THE COURT: Okay.
15:35:36	10	MR. SNYDER: Which we can't do until this Plaintiff is
15:35:36	11	in compliance. In addition, Your Honor
15:35:36	12	THE COURT: I was trying to get Mr. Lake to respond.
15:35:36	13	MR. SNYDER: One of the other reasons why we did not
15:35:36	14	produce the emails was his requirement was not only to produce
15:35:40	15	electronic assets, but to provide a certification.
15:35:43	16	He provided a document which purported to be a
15:35:47	17	certification, but it was so manifestly incomplete and false
15:35:51	18	that it gave us additional concern about the integrity.
15:35:57	19	THE COURT: So if I direct him to either identify,
15:35:59	20	produce or explain the four or five categories of
15:36:05	21	incompleteness, if I can use that term
15:36:06	22	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
15:36:06	23	THE COURT: as a euphemism here, and then ask him
15:36:14	24	to recertify based on that production, that will then trigger
15:36:18	25	your obligation to

1 MR. SNYDER: If he is in compliance for sure. We have 15:36:20 15:36:23 2 nothing to hide with those Harvard emails. We are happy to 15:36:28 3 provide them once he is in compliance. THE COURT: Yes, but the problem -- you're a judicial 15:36:30 4 officer, as I am, presiding here. If he is in compliance, 15:36:33 5 according to your view --15:36:37 6 MR. SNYDER: Well, I think in --7 15:36:39 THE COURT: -- how do I finally decide ultimately 15:36:40 8 whether he is in compliance or not unless I let you depose him 15:36:42 9 15:36:48 10 and ultimately have a hearing when I assess credibility? 15:36:51 11 MR. SNYDER: Let me assess that correctly. This 15:36:51 12 Plaintiff has --15:36:53 13 THE COURT: Is that a fair question? MR. SNYDER: Yes, but this Plaintiff has filed in this 15:36:54 14 15:36:57 15 court a false certification that is demonstratively false. 15:37:01 16 deposition's required, no more inquiries required to conclude 15:37:07 17 that. THE COURT: Well, let me play devil's advocate to tee 15:37:07 18 15:37:12 19 up Mr. Lake's response. Except for the, I think, Seagate and the home computer in his parents' home, the Plaintiff hasn't in 15:37:17 20 any way shape or form so far actually acquiesced any of these 15:37:24 21 assertions, has he? 15:37:28 22 15:37:32 23 MR. SNYDER: Well, Your Honor, he hasn't acquiesced to 15:37:35 24 a lot of assertions that are mysterious to us, but there's one 15:37:37 25 assertion that is --

15:37:37	1	THE COURT: That may be mysterious, but for my
15:37:42	2	purposes of agreeing with you, I have to basically evaluate all
15:37:45	3	of this technical explanation and decide whether it is rounded
15:37:49	4	enough to warrant an inference.
15:37:51	5	And the purpose of a circumstantial evidence case is
15:37:54	6	deciding whether there is a strong likelihood, reasonable
15:38:00	7	likelihood, more likely than not likelihood that he is not in
15:38:04	8	compliance, absent bringing him in here at and assessing his
15:38:09	9	creditability under cross examination, which is the ultimate way
15:38:13	10	that we, in our system, decide whether something is true or not
15:38:17	11	true.
15:38:17	12	MR. SNYDER: Well, when something is so true that
15:38:18	13	no
15:38:18	14	THE COURT: With or without expert assistance.
15:38:21	15	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, just days this Plaintiff
15:38:24	16	filed is a declaration where he swore under oath pursuant to the
15:38:28	17	penalties of perjury
15:38:30	18	THE COURT: Which document are we talking about?
15:38:30	19	MR. SNYDER: This is his July 15th declaration.
15:38:34	20	THE COURT: Okay. Just a second. Is it one of your
15:38:50	21	Exhibits?
15:38:50	22	MR. SNYDER: Actually, July 17th. This would be
15:38:54	23	document 65. I think I handed that up to Your Honor.
15:39:00	24	THE COURT: Document 65, did you say.
15:39:02	25	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
		l l

1 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Go ahead. 15:39:03 So he swore under oath that he 15:39:05 2 MR. SNYDER: identified --15:39:07 3 15:39:08 THE COURT: Where is -- what paragraph am I looking 4 at? 15:39:10 5 MR. SNYDER: Okay. Yes. On paragraph 13, he falsely 15:39:15 6 7 swears I have not attempted to conceal or withhold any of my 15:39:24 electronically-stored information from the forensic document 15:39:30 8 experts. That was his sworn testimony to Your Honor. 15:39:32 9 15:39:35 10 In fact, unbeknownst to him, in the USB device, which contained the first and second page of the contract at issue in 15:39:41 11 15:39:47 12 this case, left a digital fingerprint on his computer and he 15:39:55 13 knowingly the only inference can be knowingly failed to disclose the existence of that remote storage device to this Court and he 15:40:01 14 15:40:05 15 did not give it to our experts. And the inference is that he did not give it to our 15:40:07 16 experts because it contained evidence that he didn't want us to 15:40:10 17 And indeed we know it contained evidence as relevant to 15:40:13 18 15:40:17 19 this case as anything the first and second page of the contract 15:40:17 20 at issue. And he declared to Your Honor in document number 91 15:40:23 21 filed on July 15th yet again as required by the Court's July 1 15:40:27 22 15:40:33 23 order, I hereby identify all computers and electronic media in 15:40:38 24 my possession, custody or control, then he lists everything

including the Seagate computer and a fails to disclose the

15:40:42 25

1 remote storage device. 15:40:46 THE COURT: Well, he wouldn't have it if they're gone 15:40:47 2 or they didn't exist, in his estimation. He wouldn't have them 15:40:50 3 15:40:53 in his possession or control. 4 MR. SNYDER: Well, they're two inferences. One, he 15:40:53 5 destroyed them knowingly and willfully. Two, he lost them 15:40:56 6 7 sometime between accessing them after the commencement of this 15:41:02 lawsuit and when he was required by Your Honor to produce them, 15:41:05 8 but failed to disclose to anyone not realizing that in the 15:41:08 9 15:41:13 10 bowels of one of his computers that there had been an electronic fingerprint that proved the existence of his missing pen drive. 15:41:17 11 15:41:27 12 And if his pen drive, Your Honor, we could not 15:41:27 13 ascertain what was on it and it was just a missing --15:41:30 14 THE COURT: Pen or pin? 15:41:31 15 MR. SNYDER: Pen remote drive. If we did not even know what was on it and all we know was that the Plaintiff had a 15:41:34 16 15:41:38 17 device that was now gone, we would be concerned enough, but we know that this device stored page one and two of a contract that 15:41:41 18 15:41:45 19 he calls the Facebook contract. 15:41:49 20 And we believe that is the instrument of the fraud. 15:41:52 21 We believe that is where a version of this contract exists, which will provide additional evidence, additional evidence of 15:41:55 22 15:41:59 23 the fraud that's at the heart of this case. 15:42:02 24 And so --

THE COURT: Additional evidence?

15:42:03 25

1 MR. SNYDER: Additional evidence, yes. 15:42:04 15:42:06 2 THE COURT: How so? 15:42:07 3 MR. SNYDER: We don't have it. We -- our experts 15:42:10 4 are --THE COURT: How do you know there's additional 15:42:10 5 evidence then? 15:42:12 6 7 MR. SNYDER: I think that given its willful either 15:42:13 destruction or withholding, that is a inference which the second 15:42:18 8 15:42:23 9 circuit permits under these circumstances given the extreme 15:42:29 10 prejudice to us by disappearance. At a minnimum --THE COURT: But if Mr. Lake stands up and says Your, 15:42:30 11 15:42:33 12 Honor, I talked to my client and he's happy to give us a 15:42:36 13 supplemental affidavit that explains it, he's forgotten about 15:42:40 14 these drives and since he may have used them, they're not lost, 15:42:45 15 not in his possession, which he regrets, sorry, then he hasn't 15:42:50 16 concealed anything, nor has he withheld anything. MR. SNYDER: Well, he has concealed and probably 15:42:52 17 destroyed. He could be swearing falsely again to the Court and 15:42:56 18 15:42:59 19 I would respectfully submit that a future date --15:42:59 20 THE COURT: He could --MR. SNYDER: At a future date we will address that. 15:43:00 21 15:43:03 22 THE COURT: All right. 15:43:04 23 MR. SNYDER: And this Plaintiff comes to the Court 15:43:06 24 with unclean hands and those kinds of certifications, I think, 15:43:11 25 should be give very little weight.

1 THE COURT: Let's hear from Mr. Lake. I want to hear 15:43:13 from his side before I can make a ruling. Thank you. 15:43:17 2 15:43:20 3 MR. LAKE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to 15:43:23 address the points as they were presented, if that's okay. 4 First, there was a discussion about the Seagate 15:43:27 5 computer and an allegation that it was not produced on July 15th 15:43:30 6 7 as required by the order. That's not true. It was actually 15:43:36 produced in Sarasota, the actual loose hard drive of the Seagate 15:43:39 8 computer. 15:43:44 9 What was not produced on the 15th was a forensic image 15:43:44 10 of that identical hard drive. And I was made aware of that on 15:43:48 11 15:43:53 12 the 16th by Mr. Southwell. We had hired a lawyer to attend with 15:43:58 13 the experts. They were all there in Chicago. I couldn't be there. I was in Buffalo. 15:43:58 14 15:44:03 15 At the end of the day, for some reason, I don't know what, they hadn't made an image of it. Mr. Southwell notified 15:44:04 16 15:44:08 17 me, I notified them that produce it. It was Friday and on Monday they hadn't produced all of their of images anyway. 15:44:12 18 15:44:15 19 We confirmed that they had found it and we produced it 15:44:18 20 immediately and I wrote Mr. Southwell a letter and apologized 15:44:22 21 for that. And they not only had the hard drive itself, but they also got the image. So they had that on the 15th. 15:44:25 22 15:44:29 23 The other one was the issue over his parents' 15:44:32 24 computer. And we had a long debate back at the end of June

about what computers needed to be produced.

15:44:35 25

If you recall, we sat around for over two hours. Paul Ceglia was going to have to search the entire world to find any computer had he had ever touched.

And it was conceded that that was impractical and probably impossible result. And as a result, he would only have to supply the computers that were within his possession, custody and control.

There was the issue of one computer at his parents' house that was referenced in a Wellsville newspaper last year that might have had some information on it. We asked for those computers and we produced that on the 15th.

Then out of an abundance of caution and a diligent search of all electronically-stored information that we could find to comply with the order, we asked Mr. Ceglia, Paul's dad, Carmen, if there were any other computers that may have been accessed by Paul Ceglia, his son. He said he didn't think so, but that he had one more computer, that was his personal computer.

Out of an abundance of caution, I notified

Mr. Benjamin and said we have another computer. We don't think
that it needs to be produced. We don't think it was in

Mr. Ceglia's custody, possession or control, but you know what,
if you want it, you can have it. Do you want it. He said yes
and so we said fine. Have your guy or gal come up and make an
image of it. So we brought it up the next day, they did.

15:44:44 2 15:44:47 3 15:44:50 4 15:44:55 5 15:44:56 6 15:44:59 7 15:45:00 8

15:44:39

1

15:45:09 10 15:45:10 11

15:45:13 12

9

15:45:04

15:45:18 13 15:45:21 14 15:45:28 15 15:45:32 16 15:45:37 17

15:45:40 18 15:45:40 19

15:45:43 20

15:45:48 21 15:45:51 22

15:45:54 23

15:45:57 24 15:46:01 25

1 THE COURT: They did not? 15:46:04 15:46:05 2 MR. LAKE: No, they did. 15:46:06 3 THE COURT: They did. 15:46:07 Yeah. We produced -- those are the 4 MR. LAKE: computers they're talking about and that was the first line of 15:46:11 5 their argument that why they didn't need to produce the emails. 15:46:14 6 7 Next, they talk about the USB devices and the 15:46:18 certifications that go along with that. And this has been a 8 15:46:21 issue that we have been debating now for many weeks. And asking 15:46:24 9 15:46:34 10 me to produce those USB devices would be like asking me to produce a unicorn or leprechaun. They don't exist. 15:46:34 11 15:46:35 12 I've asked and I've asked and I have asked again. 15:46:38 13 have searched everywhere that is practicable for me to look and 15:46:42 14 I cannot produce them because I can't find them. And I have 15:46:47 15 been told by everyone I've asked they don't have them. THE COURT: Can I ask you two quick questions? 15:46:51 16 15:46:54 17 pause. Number one, you've heard the Defendants' arguments as to why they believe, regardless of what you just said, why at some 15:46:58 18 15:47:03 19 point in time they did exist. 15:47:05 20 MR. LAKE: Yeah, they did find --THE COURT: And the relevance -- excuse me. 15:47:05 21 Do you 15:47:09 22 correlate with their technical analysis as to the basis of their 15:47:13 23 belief that these devices at some time, the so-called pen 15:47:18 24 drives, existed? 15:47:19 25 MR. LAKE: There were actually six that were

1 referenced --15:47:21 THE COURT: Because if I hold you just for one more 15:47:21 2 15:47:24 3 second before you respond, based on what I heard you just say, I don't think it would be unfair if I were to conclude that you 15:47:28 4 concede that at one point they did exist. 15:47:33 5 MR. LAKE: Oh, no. They absolutely did exist. 15:47:34 6 7 THE COURT: And when did they exist. 15:47:37 MR. LAKE: Well, we know that they existed by virtue 15:47:38 8 of a report that shows that they were inserted into a computer, 15:47:42 9 15:47:47 10 now what we don't know is whose they are. THE COURT: Well, how would you characterize on behalf 15:47:50 11 15:47:52 12 of your client the date of their approximate existence and the 15:47:57 13 date of their approximate nonexistence? Is that a fair way to 15:48:00 14 put that? 15:48:01 15 MR. LAKE: Yeah, there's a report and they have it and 15:48:03 16 that's what Mr. Snyder is referring to. 15:48:06 17 THE COURT: What do you say as to the timeframe that these USB storage devices existed? 15:48:09 18 15:48:13 19 MR. LAKE: I'm conceding that of the six devices that are referred to, one was produced, according to the reports that 15:48:16 20 15:48:21 21 I'm reading, the same one they got, that at some point there 15:48:27 22 were USB devices that were inserted into a computer and so as 15:48:33 23 of --THE COURT: When approximately are those dates, the 15:48:33 24 timeframe? 15:48:40 25

15:48:41 1	MR. LAKE: I'm trying to see if I can tell the dates
15:48:43 2	that they were.
15:48:44 3	THE COURT: Mr. Snyder would like to attempt to assist
15:48:49 4	you.
15:48:49 5	MR. LAKE: I think the experts will tell you and when
15:48:52 6	he brings his motion when they were last
15:48:56 7	THE COURT: No, tell me when they first existed.
15:48:59 8	MR. LAKE: That I don't know and I don't think you can
15:49:01 9	tell. I think all you can tell
15:49:03 10	THE COURT: Why is that?
15:49:03 11	MR. LAKE: Well, I think the only thing we have is a
15:49:06 12	he's correct. When you take a thumb drive, the little device
15:49:09 13	he showed you, and you put it into the computer, the computer
15:49:13 14	reads it and says what the device is.
15:49:16 15	THE COURT: So do you have a record of doing so?
15:49:17 16	MR. LAKE: Yes. And that's what he's referring to.
15:49:20 17	THE COURT: Would not that record indicate when it was
15:49:23 18	inserted?
15:49:24 19	MR. LAKE: Yes.
15:49:25 20	THE COURT: When is the earliest date that one of
15:49:28 21	these drives was inserted?
15:49:30 22	MR. LAKE: No, the experts would have to tell you that
15:49:33 23	because we'd have to pull the report and read it. They may have
15:49:36 24	that.
15:49:37 25	MR. SNYDER: Presumably, the Plaintiff would know.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just asking what the record 1 15:49:40 shows what we have in front of us. I'm going to ask another 15:49:42 2 15:49:46 3 question, Mr. Snyder. Bear with me. I just want to know, you have all of this technical 15:49:47 4 assistance and a lot of money for it and you're telling me that 15:49:51 5 while you know the drive was inserted, you can't tell me when it 15:49:54 7 was first inserted on the computer? 15:49:57 MR. LAKE: The experts could run a report on that and 8 15:49:59 they could probably tell you that. I don't have that report 15:50:03 9 15:50:03 10 with me. Their experts may have done that and they may be able 15:50:03 11 15:50:07 12 to produce the report. I'm not denying the existence because I 15:50:10 13 saw the report that said that --THE COURT: Would the Court fairly conclude that they 15:50:11 14 15:50:14 15 existed and were inserted in the computer in the 2003 and 2004 timeframe? 15:50:20 16 15:50:21 17 MR. LAKE: That I don't know. THE COURT: How about the 2005, 2006 timeframe? 15:50:23 18 15:50:26 19 Again, Your Honor, I don't know. MR. LAKE: 15:50:28 20 THE COURT: Well, apparently they were inserted 15:50:31 21 sometime before today. 15:50:33 22 MR. LAKE: Yes. 15:50:33 23 THE COURT: Otherwise, they wouldn't be the subject of 15:50:37 24 this report. 15:50:37 25 MR. LAKE: Right.

15:50:38	1	THE COURT: So should the Court fairly conclude for
15:50:42	2	the sake of asking the next question provide a foundation that
15:50:47	3	they existed and were inserted in the computer, say, within the
15:50:51	4	last five years?
15:51:00	5	MR. LAKE: I think the one that they're I don't
15:51:01	6	know, but I think the one that well, I'm looking at a report.
15:51:04	7	THE COURT: You know what my next question is going
15:51:06	8	be. I'm not trying to beat a dead horse.
15:51:06	9	MR. LAKE: The question is
15:51:07 1	10	THE COURT: My next question obviously is did you ask
15:51:10 1	11	your client the question.
15:51:11 1	12	MR. LAKE: Yes, of course I did.
15:51:12 1	13	THE COURT: And what did he say?
15:51:13 1	14	MR. LAKE: He said I asked him even specifically by
15:51:17 1	15	name because we had a list of the names.
15:51:17 1	16	THE COURT: What did he say?
15:51:20 1	17	MR. LAKE: He said I do not have them. I cannot
15:51:23 1	18	produce them.
15:51:24 1	19	THE COURT: Did you ask him when they were used.
15:51:27 2	20	MR. LAKE: I didn't know well, I asked him if he
15:51:31 2	21	had them, but I didn't know where they were used.
15:51:33 2	22	THE COURT: Did you next him the next obvious question
15:51:35 2	23	which is
15:51:36 2	24	MR. LAKE: Where are they?
15:51:38 2	25	THE COURT: what happened to them?

1 MR. LAKE: Yes, I did. 15:51:39 THE COURT: And what was his answer? 15:51:40 2 15:51:42 3 MR. LAKE: His answer was I lost them, I misplaced 15:51:51 them. 4 THE COURT: Those were his words? 15:51:51 5 I'll have to give you a declaration. 15:51:51 6 MR. LAKE: 7 paraphrasing what I recall from my conversation, but I had a 15:51:51 direct conversation with him. 15:51:51 8 The other thing that --15:51:51 15:51:53 10 THE COURT: While he's in Ireland? MR. LAKE: Correct. The other thing he said is that 15:51:55 11 15:51:59 12 he wanted to know what computers the thumb drives were put in 15:52:04 13 because they may not have been his and so I said that's a fair 15:52:10 14 question. 15:52:10 15 Because if somebody had access to the computers that we turned over, for example his father's, which was not Paul's, 15:52:14 16 15:52:20 17 that he didn't use, but we turned it over anyway, if his father would have put a thumb drive in that computer, it wouldn't be 15:52:22 18 15:52:23 19 within Paul Ceglia's possession, custody or control anyway. 15:52:27 20 So we went a step further and asked of his parents if 15:52:30 21 they had a thumb drive that they may have used. Paul Ceglia told me that if other people used his computer while he wasn't 15:52:34 22 15:52:37 23 there and they had it --15:52:38 24 THE COURT: Sounds to me that from everything 15:52:43 25 Mr. Snyder has said, that we're not talking about the parents'

1 computer. 15:52:43 MR. LAKE: No, they're. 15:52:43 2 15:52:44 3 THE COURT: The analysis of the experts points to 15:52:47 computers that were used by Mr. Ceglia at the residence, is that 4 correct. 15:52:52 5 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. And indeed --15:52:52 6 7 THE COURT: So why would you need to ask that 15:52:54 question? 8 15:52:57 Because while I followed up with the 15:52:57 9 MR. LAKE: 15:52:59 10 question that -- the obvious question to ask is where are they, where would they be, give them to me, I need to produce them --15:53:03 11 15:53:07 12 By the way, and I think it's a good time to point this 15:53:11 13 out, the whole thing is they're implying that we're somehow withholding evidence that could be important to their case and 15:53:13 14 15:53:16 15 that we have thrown the pen drive into Lake Erie. And I think we have to add that'd be a long toss from Hornell to Lake Erie. 15:53:21 16 15:53:27 17 So here's why I think this whole line of accusation to me is unfounded and it's frankly offensive. Because if he was 15:53:34 18 15:53:39 19 going to throw anything into Lake Erie, do you have it think it 15:53:42 20 would have been the pen drive or do you think it would have been the computer? 15:53:45 21 15:53:46 22 I have no idea whether spoliation has 15:53:49 23 occurred, but I'm trying to find out whether there is a failure 15:53:54 24 to identify and a failure to produce.

If you're telling me, as I think you are, and if I'm

15:53:55 25

not hearing correctly, this is the time to tell me and straighten me out, that Mr. Ceglia concedes that there were drives connected to his computers upon which documents that were created in relationship to this lawsuit existed or were produced, that arguably his declaration was incomplete insofar as it failed to identify the prior existence of such devices, storage devices.

MR. LAKE: I will clarify. You're right that there were pen drives, but they were identified. And they were identified — and this is where I think there's been some difference in interpretation of the order because this whole issue of what is supposed to be identified and what is not, the Stroz report that you've seen a copy of identifies everything that was produced and it does identify it in very great details. All I can identify is what I have.

And the only things that are relevant to our discussion today is the document and whether or not it was authentic and that has to do with the forensic testing and the electronically-stored information.

And so what we did was he asked for all of it over and over again. We produced it all. Than ran their search and we made a detailed report identifying everything that was on the computer.

THE COURT: I need to get calibrated here. I know that those documents are items listed in the report of your

1 15:53:59 15:54:02 2 15:54:06 3 15:54:14 4 15:54:20 5 15:54:25 6 7 15:54:31 15:54:33 8

15:54:39 10 15:54:43 11 15:54:48 12 15:54:54 13 15:54:58 14

15:54:36

9

15:55:05 16 15:55:10 17 15:55:15 18 15:55:18 19

15:55:03 15

15:55:23 21 15:55:26 22 15:55:29 23

15:55:19 20

15:55:30 2415:55:33 25

```
1
            expert, I just need to see it. What should I look at to see
15:55:40
            that to track Mr. Lake's statement?
15:55:46
        2
                     MR. LAKE: It's the big Excel spreadsheet.
15:55:50
        3
                     MR. SNYDER: It's Exhibit I to the Southwell
15:55:56
        4
            declaration, which is --
15:56:00
        5
                     MR. LAKE: It's lists 120 items that were produced.
15:56:07
        6
        7
                     THE COURT: I'm looking for the expert statement of
15:56:13
            the things that were identified by Mr. Ceglia.
15:56:16
        8
15:56:19
        9
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes, if I can approach, Your Honor.
15:56:23 10
                     THE COURT:
                                  That's not what you're referring to,
            right, Mr. Lake?
15:56:26 11
15:56:26 12
                     MR. LAKE: No, I'm referring to the Stroz Friedberg
15:56:30 13
            report.
15:56:30 14
                     THE COURT: Somewhere there is an expert statement
            about what he expects to be produced per the order.
15:56:33 15
15:56:37 16
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes, it's Plaintiff's privilege log and
            it contains.
15:56:41 17
                                  No, it's in the expert's declaration.
15:56:42 18
                     THE COURT:
15:56:46 19
                     MR. SNYDER: May, I approach Your Honor?
15:56:48 20
                     MR. LAKE: Are you referring to the John Evans
            declaration?
15:57:01 21
15:57:02 22
                     THE COURT:
                                  I think so. Is that what you're referring
15:57:05 23
            to?
15:57:06 24
                     MR. LAKE:
                                No. Mr. Snyder is, I think, arguing that I
15:57:09 25
            didn't identify things that were produced or should have been
```

```
1
            produced.
15:57:12
                                  Isn't there an expert declaration which
15:57:13
        2
                      THE COURT:
            states in a series of items what's to be turned over from the
15:57:17
        3
            Plaintiff?
15:57:23
        4
                                 No, there's an order. We have an order.
15:57:23
        5
                     MR. LAKE:
                     MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, may I approach?
15:57:28
        6
                                  I'm recalling something very specific
        7
                     THE COURT:
15:57:32
            here.
15:57:34
        8
                     MR. SNYDER: It is document 61 which is the
15:57:34
        9
15:57:39 10
            declaration of John Evans' support of Plaintiff's opposition.
                      THE COURT: I am trying to correlate your statement to
15:58:01 11
15:58:01 12
            what Mr. Evans said that alleged the custody from Mr. Ceglia and
15:58:05 13
            has in possession certain hardware, 169 floppy discs, 1075 CDs,
15:58:12 14
            one laptop computer. Also in his possession is an image of a
15:58:13 15
            second hard drive and so forth.
                     MR. LAKE: Right, we produced all that.
15:58:15 16
15:58:27 17
                     THE COURT:
                                  Okay.
                                 And they're not claiming that we didn't.
15:58:27 18
                     MR. LAKE:
15:58:27 19
                     THE COURT: Okay. Now, what you're referring to is
15:58:27 20
            Plaintiff Ceglia's completeness of his declaration?
15:58:29 21
                     MR. LAKE:
                                 Right.
15:58:29 22
                     THE COURT:
                                  This is referenced by looking at something
15:58:33 23
            else?
15:58:34 24
                     MR. LAKE:
                                Yes. What they're --
15:58:35 25
                     THE COURT: And what it is that I should look at
```

1 15:58:38 15:58:38 2 15:58:44 3 15:58:47 4 15:58:53 5 15:58:53 6 7 15:58:56 15:59:01 8 15:59:06 9 15:59:11 10 15:59:16 11 15:59:22 12 15:59:22 13 15:59:28 14 15:59:35 15 15:59:39 16 15:59:42 17 15:59:45 18 15:59:48 19 15:59:53 20 15:59:57 21 15:59:57 22 16:00:00 23 16:00:04 24 16:00:06 25

there?

MR. LAKE: That would be the report that was originally drafted by Stroz that we turned into the privilege and confidential log. That lists 120 items that were produced.

And see, the trouble is --

THE COURT: What I'm trying to understand is if

Mr. Ceglia's conceded to you that there were these six or so

drives that he used in connection with -- I don't know how to

phrase it. Producing documents which have --

MR. LAKE: No. What is known to me is what was discovered by Stroz because I read the Stroz report and it lists several external hard drives, thumb drives, pen drives, whatever you want.

We had asked Mr. Ceglia and his family to produce all of the electronically-stored information they he had. They produced a thumb drive, it was a Maxtor 3200 USB device, laptops, computers, loose hard drives, floppy discs, CDs.

We asked them to compile everything and give them to us. They did. We produced them to Stroz, who then did their search, came up with the report and we produced that timely as we were supposed to.

In that report, there were items referenced, including one pen drive. They're calling it a pen drive because that's what it's referred to, but it's a USB device. That made reference to a file called Facebook that supposedly contained

16:00:12 1 TIFF scan 001 and scan TIFF 002. Presumably those are the --THE COURT: Did those references come off of the 16:00:15 2 16:00:18 3 parents' computers? 16:00:23 MR. LAKE: 4 THE COURT: Just one at a time. 16:00:24 5 16:00:25 MR. SNYDER: No, it was not off the parents' 6 7 computers. It was off one of the computers, I don't know which 16:00:27 8 one offhand because we don't have the expert's final report. 16:00:30 One of the Plaintiff's computers had a electronic 16:00:34 9 16:00:37 10 fingerprint that told us the computer transferred onto a pen device, a storage device, removable storage device, Zuckerberg 16:00:41 11 16:00:49 12 contract page one dot TIFF, Zuckerberg contract page two dot 16:00:49 13 TIFF. Those pen drives were not produced to us, not identified 16:00:53 14 by the Plaintiff. 16:00:53 15 So you can see what my question is. Maybe THE COURT: I'm not articulating it well enough, but based on what we just 16:00:55 16 heard and what I thought I was hearing over the past hour, these 16:01:00 17 pen drives don't associate with the parents' computer, they 16:01:03 18 16:01:07 19 associate with the computer that Mr. Ceglia has used. 16:01:10 20 apparently, according to their expert analysis, used in connection with I'll call it issues associated with this 16:01:14 21 16:01:19 22 lawsuit. 16:01:19 23 MR. LAKE: I don't know that. All I know --16:01:21 24 THE COURT: Well, you do know it because you just heard it and it's in the expert report, which maybe you haven't 16:01:23 25

1 had the benefit of seeing that. 16:01:27 16:01:29 2 MR. LAKE: I have not seen the expert reports. 16:01:32 3 THE COURT: But you can see the Court's view here is that I'm eleven age carefully to this and it sounds to me like 16:01:36 4 the Plaintiff is agreeing that such drives were connected to his 16:01:40 5 computer, which corroborates, I think, if I can use that term 16:01:44 6 7 with what the expert found. 16:01:50 And for the Plaintiff not to have in the certification 8 16:01:52 recall that such drives existed at some point in time, but have 16:01:55 9 16:02:00 10 since been lost or mislaid strikes me as withholding relevant information. Do you agree with that? 16:02:07 11 16:02:09 12 MR. LAKE: No, I don't. 16:02:09 13 THE COURT: Why not? 16:02:10 14 MR. LAKE: Because we produced everything we had in a 16:02:13 15 different form. 16:02:14 16 THE COURT: You, we, but not the Plaintiff. Well, no, the Plaintiff certified --16:02:16 17 MR. LAKE: THE COURT: You may have certified, but it sounds to 16:02:18 18 16:02:21 19 me that the Plaintiff is agreeing that he didn't. He couldn't 16:02:23 20 produce, according to what you just told us, because he doesn't 16:02:26 21 have it, but he didn't even identify it because he forgot about 16:02:30 22 it. 16:02:30 23 MR. LAKE: No, he -- well, I don't know. All I know 16:02:33 24 is that --16:02:33 25 THE COURT: He obviously didn't forget about it

because he acknowledged to you that he had lost or mislaid them 1 16:02:36 when you confronted him with the oversight. 16:02:40 2 16:02:43 3 MR. LAKE: I asked him. 16:02:43 THE COURT: Right, exactly the point. 4 At the time of the --16:02:45 5 MR. LAKE: 16:02:46 THE COURT: So how can it be said that he forgot about 6 7 it? 16:02:49 MR. LAKE: Because the certification was due on July 8 16:02:49 15th, that was according to the order. On July 15th we turned 16:02:52 9 16:02:56 10 over all the information to Stroz Friedberg, all of it, and we have not had an opportunity to review it because we were 16:02:59 11 16:03:02 12 precluded from reviewing it because we had to give it over to 16:03:06 13 Stroz Friedberg, which we did. And we submitted our 16:03:08 14 certification because I asked everybody what it was. 16:03:11 15 Then two weeks later, we get back what they found and we find that there's things that we didn't include and so the 16:03:13 16 16:03:17 17 certification at the time that it was made is completely accurate. Now, the question --16:03:20 18 16:03:21 19 It's not complete. THE COURT: 16:03:23 20 MR. LAKE: Well, no, because the order, the way that 16:03:25 21 we understood it, was --Let's put it this way, if he had 16:03:26 22 THE COURT: 16:03:28 23 remembered at the time that he made the certification that the 16:03:32 24 six drives existed and that he used them in connection with his 16:03:35 25 computer, would he have been obliged to disclose that in his

certification?

MR. LAKE: I'm not sure. I think if he did, he would have told me because I asked him that specific question.

If what you're getting to is that now that Stroz

Friedberg's identified these six drives, one was produced, if

you want a certification from Mr. Ceglia that says this is mine

or it isn't or I don't know what this one is or I did use that

or I didn't use that, I don't think that's difficult to get.

That's easy to get.

I don't think it's helpful because what I know is that whether he certifies it or not and whether or not we have one more declaration from the Plaintiff or the Defendant about whether or not they -- that he ever committed perjury, backdated or manipulated documents or had done anything that was unethical or questions their veracity, I think we are going to have an entire stack on both sides that are going to probably balance out.

 $\ensuremath{\mathbf{THE}}$ $\ensuremath{\mathbf{COURT}}\colon$ I'm looking at the stack that I have in front of me.

MR. LAKE: Well, that's because we haven't started our discovery yet.

THE COURT: I understand that. I am just trying to grasp how the Plaintiff could now recall that there were such drives.

On the one hand -- and they were used on this computer

1 16:03:40 16:03:40 2 16:03:52 3 16:03:52 4 16:03:52 5 16:03:53 6 7 16:03:57 8 16:03:59 16:04:03 9 16:04:04 10 16:04:07 11 16:04:11 12 16:04:14 13 16:04:17 14 16:04:21 15 16:04:27 16 16:04:30 17 16:04:31 18 16:04:33 19 16:04:34 20 16:04:37 21 16:04:37 22 16:04:40 23

16:04:43 24

16:04:44 25

16:04:46	1	apparently, but in the same breath recall, but only in response
16:04:50	2	to your question, that had he had since been, quote, mislaid or
16:04:54	3	lost.
16:04:55	4	MR. LAKE: Right.
16:04:56	5	THE COURT: How would he know?
16:04:57	6	MR. LAKE: Because I pointed them out to him and said
16:04:57	7	Stroz Friedberg
16:04:59	8	THE COURT: How would he know they were mislaid or
16:05:02	9	lost if he did not disclose them in the first place?
16:05:03	10	MR. LAKE: Because I asked him to search for anything.
16:05:06	11	He didn't produce them. I recognize them as a result of the
16:05:06	12	Stroz report. I said that.
16:05:10	13	THE COURT: When you asked him if he mislaid them, did
16:05:13	14	you ask him if he had searched for them?
16:05:13	15	MR. LAKE: Yes, and he said I searched for them the
16:05:28	16	first time you asked me. Here is what happened: We had an
16:05:29	17	order on July 1st. We were to produce all of the information
16:05:32	18	that we discussed. I asked for the information. What I was
16:05:37	19	given, I produced.
16:05:39	20	Stroz Friedberg then generated a report. When I got
16:05:42	21	the report, I noticed and was made aware by the Defendants via
16:05:48	22	letter and/or an email, I don't know which, that there were
16:05:52	23	items that were not produced, specifically the USB drives.
16:05:55	24	I then went back to Mr. Ceglia and said I know I asked
16:05:59	25	you to produce everything, you told me you didn't have it.

16:06:02	There are some specifics now that have been brought out. Do you
16:06:07	recall what these are and can you produce them, and he said
16:06:12	Jeff, I gave you everything I had and why are you asking me to
16:06:15	produce something I don't have. And I said because I've been
16:06:19	asked to follow up. We want to be in compliance with the order.
16:06:23	Do you have anything else for me.
16:06:24	THE COURT: Okay.
16:06:25	MR. LAKE: No, I do not. And that's where we are.
16:06:28	THE COURT: Okay.
16:06:28 10	MR. LAKE: That's why I think a certification is
16:06:31 13	accurate.
16:06:32 12	THE COURT: Okay.
16:06:32 13	MR. LAKE: So that's what happened with the USB
16:06:35 14	drives.
16:06:35 15	THE COURT: Can we move onto the other categories?
16:06:39 10	MR. LAKE: So that's the USB. Number two was no
16:06:41 1	7 native electronic emails.
16:06:45 18	THE COURT: Electronic version of the purported
16:06:48 19	contracts.
16:06:48 20	MR. LAKE: Oh, you want to do that one first? Okay.
16:06:48 23	The native contract, what they're talking about is when Stroz
16:06:57 22	did their search, they found on certain devices, whether it was
16:07:00 23	a hard drive, a CD or a floppy drive, several drafts of the
16:07:06 24	work-for-hire contract, the contract that was attached to the
16:07:10 25	complaint, the contract that we contend as a authentic contract

as opposed to the StreetFax contract, which we contend was not the authentic contract.

They asked us for any soft or native electronic versions of that contract. We said sure. And so in our search, we asked for the all the computers that could have been used and any storage devices that might have had that on it and we produced them.

Now, the Defendants are upset that although they claim there are seven drafts, none of those drafts are identical verbatim to the work-for-hire contract that was produced. And they want to know -- I think what they're asking us where is that.

And my answer would be the same and that is I gave you everything we had. Whether or not it's the final version or draft one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, I don't know. I have -- I have no other means to search for it.

We have provided all the computers and all the discs that were associated with them, other than the ones that we just discussed. And all they have are -- if it's a draft, it's a draft.

If it existed at some point in time, which certainly it did because there was a original of it made, that at this point does not exist. What does exist are the drafts and the drafts can be analyzed. They can be --

THE COURT: They should be there, but they're not

16:07:20 3
16:07:24 4
16:07:30 5
16:07:33 6

16:07:15

16:07:20

1

2

16:07:38 8 16:07:42 9 16:07:48 10

16:07:52 11

16:07:55 12 16:07:55 13

16:07:59 14 16:08:02 15

16:08:06 16

16:08:10 17 16:08:13 18

16:08:17 19

16:08:22 20

16:08:22 21

16:08:26 22 16:08:34 23

16:08:40 24

16:08:43 25

16:08:45 1 there? MR. LAKE: No, they are. They have them. We produced 16:08:46 2 16:08:49 3 them. 16:08:49 THE COURT: No, no. The seven drafts that you say you 4 don't have. 16:08:52 5 16:08:53 MR. LAKE: No, we do have and they were produced. 6 7 THE COURT: Oh, they were produced so the Defendants 16:08:56 are incorrect in saying that they weren't? 8 16:08:57 MR. LAKE: No, what they think is the final version of 16:09:00 9 16:09:03 10 the work-for-hire contract, that was signed by Mark Zuckerberg and Paul Ceglia that looks like this, I think what they're 16:09:20 11 16:09:20 12 saying is they haven't found one that's exactly in this form. 16:09:20 13 That the versions that we produced are not identical to this. They are similar. They are soft copy electronic versions. 16:09:22 14 16:09:28 15 THE COURT: Well, shouldn't there be one? 16:09:30 16 MR. LAKE: If there was one, I would have produced it. I produced everything that I found, whether it would be draft 16:09:33 17 one or draft seven, I gave over the computers and the discs and 16:09:37 18 16:09:40 19 everything. 16:09:40 20 THE COURT: If they're not lodged there, then somehow 16:09:44 21 it got lost or should there have been one in your estimation? MR. LAKE: Well, there had to have been one so it 16:09:47 22 16:09:50 23 could have been printed and signed. 16:09:51 24 THE COURT: That's the point that I'm interested in. 16:09:52 25 What conceivably could have happened to it?

I don't know. In 2003 it could have been 1 MR. LAKE: 16:09:54 deleted. It could have been -- and I think this is what 16:09:57 2 Mr. Snyder's point is that he thinks it was actually stored on 16:09:59 3 16:10:04 the thumb drive and the thumb drive is missing. I think that's 4 16:10:08 5 the argument he was making. My point is this: We turned over everything. 16:10:10 6 7 were many, many drafts and if they want to argue later that 16:10:13 those drafts are not the original contract, that is something 16:10:17 8 16:10:19 9 that is not before us today. What's before us today is whether or not I adequately 16:10:21 10 16:10:25 11 complied with the order. And I'm submitting that I did because 16:10:28 12 I produced all of the computers that have all of the soft copies 16:10:32 13 of all of the documents that were at issue with the expedited 16:10:35 14 discovery order. 16:10:35 15 THE COURT: Is that true, in the interest of time, of 16:10:37 16 the other areas of request, all electronic copies --16:10:40 17 MR. LAKE: The emails -- the point about the emails and there is actually --16:10:44 18 16:10:45 19 THE COURT: No, no. About the ones in possession of 16:10:47 20 his attorneys or his experts Mr. Osborn or Ms. Aginsky. MR. LAKE: Yeah, they were produced. They were as 16:10:53 21 item 5 and item 8. 16:10:55 22 16:11:01 23 MR. SNYDER: That's just wrong, Your Honor. 16:11:04 24 MR. LAKE: No. How could he know what's in the 16:11:06 25 possession Mr. Ceglia's attorneys? I mean, if he can explain

1 that, then maybe he could explain why I'm wrong. 16:11:11 16:11:14 Repeat what you just said. 2 THE COURT: He's somehow saying that he knows what's in 16:11:15 3 MR. LAKE: 16:11:19 the possession of Mr. Ceglia's attorneys. I want to know how he 4 knows that. 16:11:23 5 THE COURT: We'll find out. You're saying those were 16:11:24 6 produced. 7 Those are items 5 and 8 on the so-called privileged 16:11:25 What about the webmail accounts? 16:11:31 8 MR. LAKE: Okay. The webmail accounts are beyond the 16:11:32 16:11:34 10 scope of the order because the order asked for two things, to produce the original contract for forensic testing for 16:11:36 11 16:11:41 12 authenticity and information relating to the emails that were 16:11:43 13 attached to the first amended complaint. It did not ask for, nor were we required to produce, 16:11:45 14 16:11:50 15 every email account and everything on every email account that 16:11:53 16 may have been in existence. So the reason -- and Mr. Snyder's submitted this as a 16:11:56 17 new request. This is not anything that was contemplated at the 16:12:00 18 16:12:04 19 time of the July 1st order. 16:12:06 20 They have subsequently found that Mr. Ceglia had 16:12:08 21 different email accounts and now they want them, the same way that we want every one of Mr. Zuckerberg's emails and every one 16:12:12 22 16:12:17 23 of Mr. Zuckerberg's computers and every bit of code that was 16:12:18 24 written by Mr. Zuckerberg for Mr. Ceglia and every bit of code that was utilized to launch Facebook in 2004 and we'll be able

16:12:23 25

to answer the same questions.

But that was not what was contemplated in the discovery order so that's why that wasn't produced. This is a new request and we can address it when they produce all the things that I just asked for. We can consider that on a separate date.

Next is the native electronic emails and we have already submitted by Paul Ceglia an opposition to the motion for expedited discovery that there are no native electronic emails in his custody, possession and control regarding the email chain between him and Mark Zuckerberg at the end of 2003 through the end of July of 2004 because it was a Microsoft Outlook ISP account that he didn't have access to and it was his custom and practice, as was in 2003 of '04, that the way it worked was that in order for him to save his emails, he would copy them, put them on a Word document and then make a report, which we did supply.

They are no other native electronic emails because they were, as I mentioned and has already been declared, converted into a word document and saved on discs and those discs were produced. So I can't produce the native electronic emails.

THE COURT: Why would it be that there would be no electronic form of those emails?

MR. LAKE: The way I understand it, and this was

16:12:28 1 16:12:29 2 16:12:33 3 16:12:37 4 16:12:41 5 16:12:45 6 7 16:12:49 16:12:52 8 16:12:57 9 16:13:06 10 16:13:10 11 16:13:14 12 16:13:20 13 16:13:25 14 16:13:29 15 16:13:34 16 16:13:34 17 16:13:40 18 16:13:43 19 16:13:47 20 16:13:50 21 16:13:55 22

16:13:56 23 16:13:59 24 16:14:01 25

1 discussed before I became involved in the case, but reading the 16:14:04 declaration and talking with our computer expert, that in order 16:14:09 2 to save those emails, you would have to essentially copy them 16:14:13 3 16:14:16 and paste them onto a different document and save them. 4 16:14:20 5 what he did and we already got that declaration so I can't 16:14:24 produce those. 6 7 And as far as identifying what they are, they've been 16:14:25 identified again in our log that was produced. And then, I 16:14:30 8 think --16:14:37 9 16:14:53 10 THE COURT: What timeframe are we referring to with regard to those emails that you say could not be --16:14:56 11 16:14:58 12 MR. LAKE: April of 2003 though July of 2004. 16:15:26 13 THE COURT: Go ahead. And I'd be happy to submit that declaration 16:15:26 14 MR. LAKE: 16:15:26 15 to you. Quick rebuttal? 16:15:37 16 THE COURT: 16:15:37 17 MR. SNYDER: I mean, I'll just say --I mean, let me just say it sounds to me, 16:15:37 18 THE COURT: 16:15:37 19 just to help you, that perhaps the Plaintiff has a point that he 16:15:37 20 has disclosed, as best he could. 16:15:37 21 And the two items that strike me as being plausibly 16:15:42 22 out there, as far as knowing what happened to them or whether 16:15:45 23 they exist and what's on them are the drives, I'll shorthand 16:15:49 24 that, and the website -- webmail accounts, which he claims are 16:15:55 25 not within the four corners of the order. And just glancing

through it myself, it seems to me might be right. 1 16:15:58 MR. SNYDER: I respectfully --16:16:02 2 16:16:04 3 THE COURT: Unless you got something more specific to 16:16:06 show that he's just flat out wrong. 4 MR. SNYDER: Yes, he's flat out wrong. He did not get 16:16:09 5 any images of the signed purported contracts that they sent to 16:16:12 6 their experts for testing earlier in the case before we believed 7 16:16:17 they manipulated the original document and gave it to us. 16:16:24 8 So that in the possession of their experts are scanned 16:16:28 16:16:32 10 images of the purported contract bearing signatures. Those have 16:16:38 11 not been produced to us. They do not want to produce those to 16:16:42 12 us because our experts believe they will be different than the 16:16:46 13 other versions of the purported contract floating around in this 16:16:50 14 case. 16:16:51 15 THE COURT: Can we hear what the answer to that is? Ι 16:16:54 16 think he said that there is no such thing. MR. LAKE: No, I thought he was referring to the -- if 16:16:57 17 there had been a soft version of the contract emailed to an 16:17:00 18 16:17:04 19 attorney or expert, and we produced that. 16:17:08 20 We concede that there was an email that was sent and I 16:17:12 21 compared it and it had item 5 and item 8 on it. I saw the email 16:17:18 22 that was sent. I saw the attachment. I printed it out. 16:17:22 23 I printed out 5 and 8, laid them side by side. 16:17:26 24 were the same. If what he's trying to ask for now is that he 16:17:31 25 wants information and work product of undesignated expert --

1 THE COURT: No, no. He's saying that --16:17:36 MR. SNYDER: Let me be very clear. Their expert had 16:17:38 2 in their possession at one point the original ink contract. 16:17:40 3 experts took scans of them. They have those scans, we want to 16:17:46 4 16:17:51 5 see those scans. THE COURT: The three dimensional scans? 16:17:52 6 MR. SNYDER: 7 Yes. We want to see those scans because 16:17:55 we believe that when they scanned the original contract, it 8 16:17:56 looked one way and then when it was made available to us for 16:17:56 9 16:18:01 10 physical inspection more recently, it looked a different way and had been altered in different ways that we'll disclose to the 16:18:03 11 16:18:09 12 Court when the expert testing has been completed. 16:18:12 13 THE COURT: They were altered by the experts? MR. SNYDER: No, altered to the by the Plaintiff. 16:18:16 14 16:18:18 15 If they were turned over to the experts, THE COURT: how would he have continued access to it? 16:18:21 16 16:18:21 17 MR. SNYDER: He took physical custody of the original back and had it for some number of months before he made it 16:18:24 18 16:18:28 19 available to us over his objection pursuant to Your Honor's 16:18:31 20 order. But at an earlier point in time, he gave the original 16:18:31 21 contract, made it available to his experts, his experts took 16:18:35 22 16:18:38 23 pictures or scans of them. We want those pictures and scans. 16:18:42 24 They're not protected. They're not work product. They're 16:18:46 25 evidence in the case.

THE COURT: I thought you were talking about some 1 16:18:47 native version of the contract. 16:18:48 2 16:18:50 3 MR. SNYDER: That too. 16:18:52 I guess I'm a little confused about what 4 THE COURT: it is you're driving at. Electronic forms of the declaration of 16:18:55 5 the 12th or the original electronic emails? 16:19:01 6 7 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, there are three different 16:19:04 electronic categories of the contract. One, any electronic 8 16:19:09 versions of the original alleged contracts -- of the alleged 16:19:12 9 contract that resides in any of his computers or storage 16:19:17 10 devices, we have none and that's what's attached to the 16:19:20 11 16:19:24 12 complaint. Whether it's on a computer, a CD, a floppy disc or a 16:19:28 13 storage device. That's one. Two, any image of the original contract, meaning the 16:19:29 14 16:19:35 15 original one that was in the safe deposit box that was taken either by the Plaintiff or by the Plaintiff's experts at any 16:19:39 16 16:19:43 17 point in time. MR. LAKE: And, Your Honor, the order requires the 16:19:46 18 16:19:49 19 production of copies of the purported contract in hard copy form 16:19:53 20 created on or before June 30th, 2010. That's at the first page 16:19:58 21 of the order. It doesn't say all of the work product ever. MR. SNYDER: That's hard copy only, Your Honor, not 16:20:03 22 16:20:09 23 electronic. 16:20:09 24 MR. LAKE: Right. And we produced the electronic, 16:20:09 25 that's what I'm saying. Now, they're saying they want -- he

1 says he wants a scan of the hard copy that was taken after June 16:20:09 30th, 2010. That's outside of the scope of the order. 16:20:14 2 16:20:17 3 MR. SNYDER: No, it's not. It's an electronic. 16:20:18 THE COURT: Just a second. So it's not a native 4 electronic version, according to you? It's not a original 16:20:31 5 native file --16:20:34 6 7 MR. SNYDER: But it is an electronic copy, Your Honor. 16:20:36 It's an image that their experts took off the original contract 16:20:41 8 and we want those images. They're suppressing them because that 16:20:46 9 16:20:50 10 is --16:20:50 11 MR. LAKE: No, because it was not created on or before 16:20:53 12 June 30th, 2010. The order says created. If he's saying a scan 16:21:00 13 was created on or before June 30th, 2010, he's right, but there 16:21:06 14 aren't any. 16:21:06 15 If he wants our non-designated expert's work product, 16:21:13 16 he's not entitled to it. Rule 26 protects that and the order 16:21:17 17 itself says created. So if that scan would have been created before June 16:21:19 18 16:21:22 19 30th, 2010, he's right, but what he's asking for is a new 16:21:34 20 request. He's asking for us to divulge to the Court our 16:21:34 21 undesignated expert work product. 16:21:34 22 MR. SNYDER: Mr. Lake is mistaken. He's referring to 16:21:36 23 his hard copy assets. It's clear in document 83 the so-called 16:21:42 24 electronic asset order that he is directed to produce all 16:21:47 25 electronic copies of the purported contract in the possession,

1 custody and control of this Plaintiff. 16:21:49 And the expert's files are electronic copies of the 16:21:52 2 purported contract, which they imaged off of the original and 16:21:55 3 referenced in the various declarations to this Court. 16:21:59 4 They do not want us to see those images because those 16:22:03 5 16:22:08 images contain pictures that look different than the images 6 taken off the original contract today. 7 16:22:11 MR. LAKE: Electronic copies of the native electronic 16:22:15 8 copies, that was just debated. That's what was on the 16:22:19 9 16:22:22 10 computers. He's now trying to expand that into our expert work 16:22:25 11 product. 16:22:25 12 MR. SNYDER: No. 16:22:25 13 MR. LAKE: And that was contained in the order. THE COURT: Just a second. If I can make sure I'm 16:22:26 14 16:22:30 15 tracking down what you gentlemen are telling me. The order refers to turning over all original signed versions of the 16:22:32 16 purported contract attached to the complaint. That's not what 16:22:37 17 we're referring to. 16:22:41 18 16:22:42 19 Next, all copies of the purported contract in hard 16:22:45 20 copy form created on or before June 30th. That's not what we 16:22:50 21 are referring to. All copies of emails, not relevant. And then we go on in the second order paragraph on 16:22:54 22 16:22:58 23 page two. Required to produce the following electronic assets: Native electronic version of the purported contract. That's not 16:23:05 24

what we're referring to. There's no date of creation associated

16:23:09 25

16:23:15 1	with that. The original native electronic file consisting of or
16:23:22 2	containing the emails. That's not pertinent.
16:23:22 3	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, what
16:23:24 4	THE COURT: So what I'm trying to understand is how
16:23:27 5	this image of the original contract made by the Plaintiff or an
16:23:32 6	expert falls within these categories.
16:23:35 7	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, missed the actual operative
16:23:39 8	language. In the conjunctive, it says the native electronic
16:23:44 9	version of the purported contract and all electronic copies of
16:23:49 10	the purported contract.
16:23:50 11	THE COURT: Oh, I see. This image is an electronic
16:23:54 12	copy.
16:23:57 13	MR. SNYDER: That's exactly what it is.
16:23:57 14	MR. LAKE: No. An electronic copy, he's talking about
16:24:00 15	the native the stuff that's on the discs. What we just
16:24:03 16	covered, the seven drafts.
16:24:03 17	MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor.
16:24:04 18	MR. LAKE: That's why we have native electronic and
16:24:07 19	all electronic copies.
16:24:09 20	THE COURT: How is this image created?
16:24:13 21	MR. LAKE: Whatever images there are, it could have
16:24:17 22	been a photocopy, it could have been a scanner, could have been
16:24:21 23	a camera.
16:24:22 24	THE COURT: You're referring to the high-definition of
16:24:24 25	the scanned original?

1	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: The one that comes up in questions of
3	additional detailing?
4	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Okay. That's an electronic what's
6	construed to be an electronic copy?
7	MR. SNYDER: Sure.
8	THE COURT: You and
9	MR. SNYDER: And his experts have very expensive
10	high-resolution electronic equipment to produce those electronic
11	copes.
12	THE COURT: I'm not familiar with it. Does it come
13	out it it's created digitally and then it's produced in real
14	images.
15	MR. SNYDER: Yes. It's a high-resolution,
16	high-powered scan. Some of these machines cost thousands and
17	thousands of dollars.
18	THE COURT: But it scans and what's scanned is scanned
19	into a digital
20	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Digital signals.
22	MR. SNYDER: It's a digital file that's created
23	THE COURT: It's stored and then it's reproduced in
24	like a digital photograph?
25	MR. SNYDER: It's a digital file that's created by an
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8

electronic picture taken of the physical document. 1 16:25:19 MR. LAKE: Your Honor, that's not what was 16:25:22 2 16:25:24 3 contemplated when we made this order. That's not what this order says. They should have designated it under scan and what 16:25:27 4 they're asking for now is a work product of a non-designated 16:25:27 5 expert. 16:25:32 6 7 This was never made clear. It is not clear in the 16:25:33 order. This is not what was contemplated. We gave them the 8 16:25:36 electronic copies we discovered. Now, what they're trying to do 16:25:41 9 16:25:44 10 is conduct inappropriate discovery. THE COURT: I thought that scan was to be shared 16:25:44 11 16:25:47 12 between the parties. 16:25:49 13 MR. LAKE: No, we gave them the actual document. They 16:25:51 14 took this their own scans. 16:25:53 15 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, the reason this is so 16:25:55 16 critical and the reason they're getting so upset by this, two of 16:26:00 17 their experts, Aginsky and Osborn, provided this Court a sworn declaration and they talk about images they took of the original 16:26:05 18 16:26:09 19 contract. 16:26:10 20 When they took those images of the original contract, the contract looked one way. Our experts believed that in the 16:26:11 21 interim, this Plaintiff, and others, may be acting in concert 16:26:15 22 16:26:19 23 with him, altered the document in ways to perpetuate his fraud 16:26:22 24 on the Court.

We want to compare the image taken at a earlier date

16:26:22 25

by his experts, which they -- the dates they were taken, to the 1 16:26:27 image that was taken of the document today and we will present 16:26:34 2 that to Your Honor in the fullest of time. And we believe that 16:26:37 3 there will be further evidence of the --16:26:39 4 THE COURT: What's the answer to his argument that 16:26:41 5 16:26:43 it's undesignated work product of an expert that requires you to 6 show compelling need? 7 16:26:48 MR. SNYDER: It's a completely erroneous analysis. 16:26:50 8 These are two experts who have submitted affidavits to this 16:26:53 9 16:26:56 10 They have joined issues these two experts on this 16:27:01 11 central question on the so-called authenticity of the contract. 16:27:05 12 We're not asking to invade any work product. We're 16:27:08 13 not asking to invade any communications. We simply want the electronic image taken of the evidence that is an essential 16:27:12 14 16:27:16 15 piece of evidence in this case. They took a picture of a document. We want the picture. Under no case doctrine or 16:27:27 16 16:27:27 17 theory is it privileged. 16:27:27 18 THE COURT: It becomes a fact rather than an opinion 16:27:29 19 or something like that? Is that what you're saying is the 16:27:32 20 analysis that arguably would be --16:27:33 21 MR. SNYDER: It's not work product. It doesn't contain any mental impression, any legal analysis. It is 16:27:35 22 16:27:38 23 simply --16:27:38 24 THE COURT: It's not attorney work product, but why doesn't it fall within the provision under Rule 26 that prevents 16:27:42 25

16:27:47	1	you, in effect, from piggybacking on a adversary's expert?
16:27:52	2	MR. SNYDER: We don't want to invade the expert's
16:27:56	3	expertise or opinion. We want the physical evidence
16:27:57	4	THE COURT: You would pay for a copy if there was any
16:28:00	5	cost?
16:28:00	6	MR. SNYDER: We would pay for a copy and we want the
16:28:04	7	physical evidence.
16:28:05	8	THE COURT: Is it possible to make a copy of it or
16:28:05	9	MR. SNYDER: It existed, Your Honor. It exists in the
16:28:08 1	10	expert's file today.
16:28:09 1	11	THE COURT: I know that, but can it be in fact
16:28:12 1	12	technically printed? Can they make more prints of it?
16:28:15 1	13	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
16:28:17]	14	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, first of all, I didn't brief
16:28:19 1	15	this. Secondly, it's not in front of the Court. Thirdly, it's
16:28:22 1	16	improper. And fourth, it couldn't have been contemplated at the
16:28:26 1	17	time the order was drafted because they hadn't seen the contract
16:28:30 1	18	to come up with this theory that it could be different from the
16:28:34 1	19	time they saw it because they hadn't seen it. So they're
16:28:34 2	20	putting the cart way before the horse.
16:28:37 2	21	THE COURT: I've heard enough on this.
16:28:39 2	22	MR. SNYDER: And Your Honor, on the native emails, I
16:28:40 2	23	just want to point out the very obvious fact, which is that
16:28:45 2	24	Mr. Lake said that the reason that the so-called emails exist as
16:28:51 2	25	Word documents, cut and pasted onto a floppy disc, is because in

16:28:55 1 2003 and 2004, that's the way this Plaintiff did it. Of course that's false.

The way this Plaintiff did it is documented and confirmed scientifically in the native emails that we found on his computer, which he sent in 2004 to Sidley and Austin containing the authentic contract.

So when it comes time for the authentic contract to find the native emails on his computer, not cut and pasted into Word documents, that low and behold have a StreetFax contract that says nothing about Facebook.

When it comes time for him to discuss the so-called emails with Mark Zuckerberg, which are fraudulent and created by this Plaintiff as a faux pas, they don't exist on the native email files, we don't get the native email files because he says his custom and practice at the time was to cut and paste into Word documents.

That's a lie because we have his native emails from 2004, which isn't a cut and past into a Word document, which has the critical evidence in the case that shows that the contract attached to the complaint is a fraud.

And so when he doesn't produce to us native email files containing the alleged contract or containing his alleged emails with Mark Zuckerberg and tells this Court under oath that it's because it's his practice to cut and paste, not thinking we're going to find the native email with TIFF one and TIFF two

16:29:01 3
16:29:04 4
16:29:09 5
16:29:09 6
16:29:09 7
16:29:18 8

16:29:24

16:29:25 10

16:29:28 11

9

16:29:30 12 16:29:37 13 16:29:39 14 16:29:43 15

16:29:48 17 16:29:51 18

16:29:47 16

16:29:56 19 16:30:01 20

16:30:04 21 16:30:08 22

16:30:11 23

16:30:16 24

16:30:18 25

because he put it on his pen drive, which he no longer has, not thinking we'd fine it, is the height of cynicism.

And on that point, Your Honor, when I say authentic contract and the bogus contract and Your Honor says that's what we're going to get, I think it's critical to frame this whole discussion with the following: This Plaintiff, at the same time he was telling Your Honor that the authentic contract should be confidential, was telling the press apparently in rambling emails last night all about the so-called -- or the authentic contract, which he says we planted on his computers before he produced them to us.

We went in the clouds and we planted them into his computer by osmosis, a immaculate conception, we don't know he claims it, but he claims somehow we invaded, like martians, his computer and planted this contract and that he's going to prove that it's not authentic and Mr. Lake has the audacity to say that there's no foundation for that and there's no corroboration.

And he knows or should know because he has the Stroz Friedberg report that there's ample and substantial authentication corroboration proof-positive that the emails that he sent in 2004 to Sidley and Austin containing the authentic StreetFax contracts were sent in 2004, existed in 2004 and are true and authentic, and were not planted by us. And how he can say that to this Court is outrageous.

16:30:27 2
16:30:34 3
16:30:35 4
16:30:38 5
16:30:42 6
16:30:46 7
16:30:51 8

16:30:23

1

16:31:05 12

16:31:11 13

16:31:03 11

16:30:58 10

16:30:55

9

16:31:14 14

16:31:18 15

16:31:20 16

16:31:25 17

16:31:25 18

16:31:29 19

16:31:34 20 16:31:37 21

16:31:41 22

16:31:48 23

16:31:52 24

16:31:56 25

1 And let me tell Your Honor why: We not only have --16:31:58 He didn't say that. 16:32:02 2 THE COURT: 16:32:04 3 MR. SNYDER: Oh, yes, he did. 16:32:05 THE COURT: Mr. Lake did. 4 MR. SNYDER: Mr. Lake said that they were planted, 16:32:07 5 that we believe they were planted, that was the word he used, 16:32:08 6 7 meaning that somehow Facebook or its agents inserted into his 16:32:10 computer this alleged contract. 8 16:32:15 THE COURT: When did Mr. Lake say that? 16:32:15 16:32:17 10 MR. SNYDER: About 12 minutes ago because I wrote it down, planted in quotes. And it's absurd. His client said the 16:32:21 11 16:32:23 12 same thing and then he said there's no foundation and no basis 16:32:27 13 to believe that this authentic contract is authentic. He knows or should know that that's false because Stroz has told him that 16:32:32 14 16:32:32 15 in a variety of ways. 16:32:34 16 And let me tell Your Honor three things on that and 16:32:38 17 it's relevant to all of this: From day one, we made clear that the complaint attached to the -- the contract attached to the 16:32:42 18 16:32:44 19 complaint was a fraud. We now have the authentic contract 16:32:48 20 between Zuckerberg and StreetFax. It is exactly what Zuckerberg swore to under oath was the case. 16:32:53 21 Now, this was found on the hard drives of the 16:32:55 22 16:32:57 23 Plaintiff's computer. It was attached to an email sent to the 16:32:59 24 law firm of Sidley and Austin, an international law firm. 16:33:03 25 not only have the native email --

1 THE COURT: Is that where Mr. Cole is associated with? 16:33:15 Yes. But if I can approach, Your Honor, 16:33:15 2 MR. SNYDER: 16:33:15 3 we also have the metadata that was underlying that original 16:33:19 email. 4 And if there's any question, we also have a 16:33:20 5 photograph, which I'll give to Plaintiff's counsel, of the sent 16:33:23 6 7 outbox that Mr. Ceglia sent in 2004, which attached page one and 16:33:26 page two of the contract. 16:33:35 8 We also have a copy of the sent box that shows that it 16:33:37 existed and was sent in 2004. We also have has authenticating 16:33:42 10 evidence and corroborating evidence, other forensic evidence --16:33:49 11 16:33:54 12 THE COURT: Of what? 16:33:55 13 MR. SNYDER: Of the authenticity of this StreetFax contract in 2004 that Mr. Ceglia describes himself in in an 16:33:58 14 16:34:04 15 admission, page one and two of the StreetFax contract. 16:34:08 16 THE COURT: I'm trying to connect what you're saying 16:34:11 17 with the existence of this image that they claim --MR. SNYDER: Yes. I'll tell Your Honor. We contacted 16:34:14 18 16:34:15 19 Sidley and Austin. Sidley and Austin has confirmed, Your Honor, 16:34:19 20 that the emails and the authentic contract sent by the Plaintiff 16:34:24 21 to Sidley and Austin in March of 2004 have been on the Sidley 16:34:29 22 and Austin computer server for over seven years. 16:34:33 23 THE COURT: Say again. 16:34:34 24 MR. SNYDER: Sidley and Austin has confirmed that the 16:34:38 25 email sent to Mr. Ceglia sent to Sidley and Austin attaching

16:34:44	1	page one and page two of the StreetFax contract with Mark, the
16:34:48	2	authentic contract that says nothing about Facebook, was sent
16:34:54	3	contemporaneous, has been on their server since 2004.
16:34:58	4	And low and behold, it looks as exactly as it does on
16:35:02	5	Mr. Ceglia's computer, which is why the notion that it is
16:35:07	6	planted is outrageous and it's with not only no basis, but
16:35:09	7	reckless to even assert in open court.
16:35:12	8	This is the nail in the coffin on any fantastical
16:35:16	9	claim that somehow the authentic StreetFax contract
16:35:20	10	THE COURT: Maybe it was planted on Sidley and
16:35:24	11	Austin's computer too.
16:35:25	12	MR. SNYDER: Maybe.
16:35:26	13	THE COURT: And maybe they didn't know it because they
16:35:28	14	didn't look until now and it looked to them that it was always
16:35:32	15	there.
16:35:32	16	MR. SNYDER: But to believe Mr. Ceglia, you would have
16:35:34	17	to think there was a mass conspiracy among people that dates
16:35:40	18	back in time and it is
16:35:41	19	THE COURT: Okay. What does that have to do with this
16:35:45	20	image?
16:35:45	21	MR. SNYDER: It has to do with the image of the noose
16:35:48	22	is tightening up around the neck of this Plaintiff in this case
16:35:51	23	and he knows it.
16:35:52	24	And these scans are going to be further evidence of
16:35:55	25	the fraud because when his experts took pictures of the

16:35:58	1	contract, we believe it was before this Plaintiff got his hands
16:36:02	2	again on this original contract and started monkeying around
16:36:06	3	with it in ways that our experts will discloses more fully when
16:36:10	4	they conclude their tests. And so we want to see those scans
16:36:15	5	THE COURT: And the Plaintiff's expert would be
16:36:17	6	innocent of any knowledge of this, right?
16:36:19	7	MR. SNYDER: Presumably so.
16:36:20	8	THE COURT: But they did make this original scan,
16:36:23	9	which would give you a basis of comparison, right?
16:36:26	10	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
16:36:26	11	THE COURT: And as a basis of comparison, you think
16:36:29	12	it's not protected non-testifying expert work product under Rule
16:36:34	13	26?
16:36:34	14	MR. SNYDER: Yes. And I could put it at a finer
16:36:35	15	point
16:36:35	16	THE COURT: Because it's a fact rather than a
16:36:38	17	rather than the use of expertise, if you will, at Plaintiff's
16:36:42	18	cost.
16:36:42	19	MR. SNYDER: And this isn't mere speculation.
16:36:45	20	THE COURT: It's like an expert on accident
16:36:47	21	reconstruction taking a photograph of, say, an interest.
16:36:51	22	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
16:36:52	23	THE COURT: And the photograph arguably would not be
16:36:56	24	protected because anybody can take a photograph, it doesn't
16:36:59	25	require any expertise.

16:37:00	1	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
16:37:01	2	THE COURT: The analysis of it might be, but not the
16:37:01	3	photograph itself.
16:37:01	4	MR. SNYDER: Precisely.
16:37:03	5	THE COURT: Is that a fair statement? Maybe that's
16:37:05	6	not a bad
16:37:05	7	MR. SNYDER: That's precise, Your Honor. That's
16:37:08	8	precisely so. And this is not speculation in our part. Our
16:37:11	9	experts, who I think your Your Honor is aware are very
16:37:15	10	credentialed, among the best in the world
16:37:15	11	THE COURT: Well, his experts are pretty
16:37:19	12	well-credentialed too.
16:37:19	13	MR. SNYDER: That's for another day.
16:37:20	14	THE COURT: No, no. It's going to come up
16:37:24	15	momentarily.
16:37:24	16	MR. SNYDER: Our experts, who are among who are
16:37:27	17	used by the U.S. Government
16:37:28	18	THE COURT: I have your point.
16:37:29	19	MR. SNYDER: But the
16:37:30	20	THE COURT: The question is for purposes of the order
16:37:33	21	whether or not it's an electronic version of the original.
16:37:38	22	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
16:37:38	23	THE COURT: And even though Mr. Lake didn't think of
16:37:43	24	it that way, and maybe you didn't either
16:37:46	25	MR. SNYDER: We did. We found seven multiple letters

1 on this, Your Honor. 16:37:48 Well, before -- not during the time you 16:37:50 2 THE COURT: 16:37:53 3 were drafting --MR. SNYDER: When we were drafting it, it was uniquely 16:37:53 4 within our awareness and we were contemplated what --16:37:56 5 THE COURT: Why don't you say images --16:37:57 6 7 MR. SNYDER: Because an electronic copy is an image, 16:38:00 Your Honor. 8 16:38:08 Right. 16:38:08 9 MR. LAKE: Sure. 16:38:11 10 THE COURT: Pardon me. 16:38:11 11 MR. SNYDER: I think he said yeah, right. Sure. 16:38:12 12 And, Your Honor, this is not speculation on our part 16:38:14 13 that this document that was made available to us for physical inspection several weeks ago has undergone manipulation by the 16:38:18 14 16:38:23 15 plaintiff. 16:38:24 16 Our experts, and I could represent to the Court will elucidate this further, observed on the original document that 16:38:27 17 was made available to us, highly unusual attributes, which are 16:38:31 18 16:38:36 19 highly suggestive of manipulations in efforts to artificially 16:38:42 20 treat the document. And we believe --16:38:43 21 That is on their scan? 16:38:44 22 THE COURT: 16:38:45 23 MR. SNYDER: This is on our scan. 16:38:47 24 **THE COURT:** Your scan? 16:38:48 25 MR. SNYDER: And when we see the scan that was taken

16:39:01 1	at an earlier time, we believe that those scans may look
16:39:01 2	different.
16:39:01 3	THE COURT: So the trier of fact would conclude that
16:39:01 4	if these deviations exist and aren't otherwise explained, it
16:39:04 5	could inferentially be explained by some sort of manipulation of
16:39:08 6	the Plaintiff, even if the Plaintiff denied such?
16:39:11 7	MR. SNYDER: After the commencement of the lawsuit.
16:39:13 8	THE COURT: Concurrent?
16:39:14 9	MR. SNYDER: Correct.
16:39:16 10	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, this is a fantastic argument
16:39:19 11	and he's practicing for his motion for summary judgement. And
16:39:22 12	as soon as we're done with discovery and all of our experts have
16:39:26 13	produced their evidence and they have produced their evidence,
16:39:28 14	he can file a summary judgement, he can read the transcript back
16:39:32 15	to you again
16:39:33 16	THE COURT: Oh, I think he's intending to file
16:39:35 17	something other than a summary judgement motion.
16:39:38 18	MR. SNYDER: That's correct, Your Honor. We do intend
16:39:40 19	to file something other than a summary judgement motion.
16:39:40 20	THE COURT: I'm not encouraging it, but I can see it.
16:39:44 21	I can see it coming over Lake Erie as we know it, over the
16:39:47 22	Hudson.
16:39:47 23	MR. SNYDER: Over the Hudson to Lake Erie.
16:39:52 24	THE COURT: All right.
16:39:54 25	MR. LAKE: And when he brings his motion for summary

16:39:54	1	judgement or whatever motions he wants, we'll address them. And
16:39:57	2	in the meantime
16:39:58	3	THE COURT: In the interest of time, we still have
16:40:00	4	what other issues? I'm about to resolve this first issue about
16:40:04	5	the sequential production slash adequacy of this Plaintiff's
16:40:09	6	certification slash production. We still have to deal with the
16:40:16	7	issue of the additional testing on the ink tests.
16:40:21	8	MR. SNYDER: The ink testing and the Rule 11
16:40:24	9	certification.
16:40:25	10	MR. LAKE: And mediation.
16:40:29	11	MR. SNYDER: Mediation, Your Honor, there is no
16:40:31	12	mediation.
16:40:33	13	THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you.
16:40:36	14	On the Plaintiff's request for production, the motion
16:40:39	15	is denied. The Court's order clearly contemplates sequential
16:40:45	16	production, after the adequacy of the Plaintiff's production per
16:40:49	17	the order.
16:40:50	18	I find that based on the arguments presented by the
16:40:55	19	Defendant and the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff owes the
16:41:01	20	defendant a further certification and/or production relative to
16 41 00	21	the USB drives, the additional drives, the
16:41:07		
16:41:07	22	Well, actually, I'm persuaded that the Plaintiff needs
		Well, actually, I'm persuaded that the Plaintiff needs to provide a supplemental certification either explaining why
16:41:20	23	

16:41:39 1 copies of the purported contract, including those in the possession of his attorneys or experts.

16:41:50 3 I am also ruling that the image of the original

I am also ruling that the image of the original contract in the possession of Plaintiff's expert is also within the disclosure and the production requirement of the order at page two, first -- second ordering paragraph, native electronic version of the contract attached to the complaint and all electronic copies of the purported contract, including the forms described in paragraph A of Mr. Ceglia's declaration.

I'm overruling any objection that this is expert work product pursuant to Rule 26 of the non-testifying Plaintiff's experts.

As to the webmail, it is not within the four corners of the electronic asset production. However, based on the presentation and without -- and in a need to accelerate resolution of this phase of discovery, I am requiring the Plaintiff to -- what is it we want to do here? We want to consent to the acquisition and inspection of his webmail accounts by the Defendants' experts pursuant to the protocol, Mr. Snyder?

MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That is so ordered. That production -- all of this production will be provided within 10 days. What haven't I covered here?

Electronic forms described in his June 12th

16:42:42 14 16:42:47 15 16:42:52 16 16:42:56 17 16:43:00 18 16:43:05 19

16:43:10 20

16:43:10 21

16:43:11 22

16:43:14 23

16:43:21 24

16:43:23 25

16:41:59

16:42:04

16:42:09

16:42:17

16:42:18

16:42:21

16:42:26 10

16:42:30 11

16:42:36 12

16:42:37 13

4

5

6

7

8

9

16:43:29 1	declaration, Mr and the native electronic files consisting
16:43:32 2	of or containing the purported emails and all electronic copies
16:43:36 3	of all such emails.
16:43:38 4	Now, Mr. Lake says there are none in the possession of
16:43:41 5	the Plaintiff. What are we going to do with that?
16:43:42 6	MR. SNYDER: You know, I think that in the end his
16:43:45 7	client will swear to whatever his truth is about the subject and
16:43:49 8	then we'll evaluate it from there.
16:43:51 9	THE COURT: Shall we require a supplemental
16:43:53 10	declaration identifying and/or producing those items as well?
16:43:58 11	If he has explanations that he wants to put forth
16:44:02 12	under oath, Mr. Lake, we will obviously that's what will be
16:44:08 13	forthcoming.
16:44:09 14	But I'm satisfied that we need another round of the
16:44:14 15	Plaintiff to reflect on these issues and to make a very explicit
16:44:20 16	declaration responding to these additional requests. And that
16:44:24 17	will be within 10 days.
16:44:28 18	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, if we may. Can we have it
16:44:30 19	written up in an order so I can provide it to
16:44:32 20	THE COURT: Yes.
16:44:33 21	MR. SNYDER: Thank you.
16:44:33 22	THE COURT: My intention here is that upon receipt of
16:44:39 23	these supplemental certifications and/or productions, that the
16:44:45 24	we need the webmail, don't we? Do you want the webmail
16:44:49 25	before you produce the Harvard emails?

16:44:53	1	MR. SNYDER: For sure, Your Honor.
16:44:54	2	THE COURT: For sure.
16:44:54	3	MR. SNYDER: And so Your Honor is aware, yes, because
16:44:58	4	we believe that he
16:44:59	5	THE COURT: I'm just trying to get off on the
16:45:02	6	production. Your production was required within what was it
16:45:04	7	again?
16:45:04	8	MR. SNYDER: Five days, Your Honor.
16:45:06	9	THE COURT: Within five days of the later now court
16:45:11	10	ordered supplemental certification and/or production, as well as
16:45:17	11	the acquisition and inception of the webmail accounts.
16:45:22	12	Upon completion of those tasks, the Defendants'
16:45:27	13	obligations to provide the disc containing all of the so-called
16:45:40	14	Harvard emails will be triggered. Is that correct, Mr. Snyder?
16:45:40	15	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
16:45:40	16	THE COURT: Thank you. Now, as far as a written order
16:45:40	17	is concerned, because the Defendant is the prevailing party on
16:45:43	18	this issue, I'm going to direct the Defendant to draft the
16:45:47	19	Court's order in written form, much as we did with the original
16:45:52	20	order, present it to Mr. Lake.
16:45:54	21	If there's disagreement over text, the Court will be
16:45:59	22	available at 10:00 tomorrow to deal with the issue. And we
16:46:04	23	haven't gotten to the ink testing issue, which I think I'm about
16:46:09	24	to tackle. And that is so ordered.
16:46:12	25	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, if I may be heard briefly.

1 One, if it can be 10 days from the actual order as opposed to 16:46:14 today, even that extra day will help me so we that we can get to 16:46:19 2 16:46:24 3 work. 16:46:24 THE COURT: Yeah, 10 days from the filing of the 4 actual order. 16:46:26 5 16:46:27 MR. LAKE: Thank you. And then secondly, and this 6 7 came up before just so it's clear, the way we interpreted the 16:46:29 protocol for the electronically-stored information was we were 16:46:34 8 entitled to the emails five days after producing that 16:46:40 9 16:46:44 10 information to Stroz because once that information left our hands and was in Stroz's possession, the clock should start 16:46:47 11 16:46:52 12 ticking and we should be able to get the emails within five days 16:46:55 13 of production to Stroz, not five days from Stroz because Stroz is going have to go through it again, to a relevancy search, 16:47:00 14 16:47:04 15 produce another log. 16:47:04 16 We're going to have our five days to review it for privilege and confidentiality. I don't know how much 16:47:08 17 16:47:11 18 information is in these email accounts. I don't know what they

We're going to have our five days to review it for privilege and confidentiality. I don't know how much information is in these email accounts. I don't know what they are, but Stroz is going to have to go through the same procedure as last time. That could take up to -- it took them about a week before. It could take another week or more or less. I don't know since I have never seen any of this information. So I want some clarification as to --

16:47:14 19

16:47:18 20

16:47:21 21

16:47:25 22

16:47:28 23

16:47:31 24

16:47:34 25

THE COURT: Production according to the order is -
I'm not sure I can find the object of the sentence. Production

```
1
            to whom, Mr. Snyder?
16:47:40
                                  It's silent. I think.
16:47:41
        2
                     MR. SNYDER:
                     THE COURT: Yeah, that's what I thought.
16:47:44
        3
                     MR. SNYDER: I think under the circumstances that it
16:47:45
        4
            is fair and prudent to trigger our production obligations upon
16:47:47
        5
            five days upon our receipt of the findings because until such
16:47:54
        6
            time we will have no way of knowing if the Plaintiff is
        7
16:48:00
            compliant.
        8
16:48:03
                     THE COURT: He's saying five days after this Stroz and
16:48:03
16:48:07 10
            Friedberg --
                     MR. SNYDER: Right. And we think that it should be
16:48:07 11
16:48:11 12
            five days after we have the results of Stroz Friedberg because
16:48:15 13
            until that time, we'll have no way of knowing if the Plaintiff
            is continuing to play games or incompliant.
16:48:16 14
16:48:19 15
                     And to be clear, the emails, Your Honor, the Harvard
            emails are ready to be produced. They're on a disc.
16:48:22 16
16:48:26 17
                                 I know you said that, but I'm focussing on
            this webmail account issue. Your request is that Stroz and
16:48:29 18
16:48:36 19
            Friedberg inspect it.
16:48:36 20
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes.
16:48:37 21
                     THE COURT:
                                  Well, I mean, if that's the last thing,
            then that right there has to be five days after they look at it.
16:48:40 22
16:48:44 23
                     MR. SNYDER: Right, five days after they report to us
16:48:44 24
16:48:48 25
                     THE COURT:
                                  You're not going to look at it?
```

16:48:49	1	MR. SNYDER: No, but they'll report to us that it is
16:48:52	2	in compliance. He has given them proper access, that they have
16:48:57	3	been able to conduct the searches.
16:48:57	4	THE COURT: How about that, Mr. Lake?
16:48:59	5	MR. LAKE: Well, what's left in our possession, they
16:49:03	6	are going to have a complete copy of it. If anything has
16:49:06	7	changed, they'll know.
16:49:08	8	MR. SNYDER: I think Stroz Friedberg could act
16:49:14	9	expeditiously and we could say five days after Stroz Friedberg
16:49:18	10	gives us the results, but in no event say later than, say
16:49:26	11	MR. LAKE: Why not the day? The day that Stroz
16:49:30	12	Friedberg turns it over then it's done.
16:49:31	13	THE COURT: I know you're anxious and we want you to
16:49:35	14	have them. That is obviously a major point. But the other
16:49:37	15	major point is there's no question in my mind that the reason
16:49:40	16	for the sequential was because of the concern of potential
16:49:43	17	manipulation.
16:49:45	18	Whether well-founded or not, it's besides the point.
16:49:49	19	That was our judgement at the time of this so I'm just not quite
16:49:52	20	sure how to frame the triggering mechanism that
16:49:55	21	MR. SNYDER: We think that be should five days. We
16:49:58	22	will produce the Harvard emails five days after Stroz Friedberg
16:50:03	23	reports that the Plaintiff has complied with the order with
16:50:05	24	respect to the webmail-based account.
	٦ -	THE COURT Who smalls at Harmand are all the

THE COURT: The emails at Harvard are already set in

16:50:10 25

```
1
            stone, so to speak?
16:50:13
16:50:14
        2
                     MR. SNYDER:
                                  Yes.
                     MR. LAKE: We don't know that.
16:50:14
        3
16:50:15
                     MR. SNYDER: Harvard University has preserved them.
        4
                                 No one is suggesting that Mr. Zuckerberg
16:50:19
        5
                     THE COURT:
            can go back and plant or manipulate those --
16:50:23
        6
        7
                     MR. SNYDER: The Plaintiff has suggested that.
16:50:27
                     MR. LAKE: Of course he's suggested that.
16:50:29
        8
                                 We have seen no evidence of that?
16:50:31
        9
                     THE COURT:
16:50:33 10
                     MR. SNYDER: No evidence whatsoever.
                     MR. LAKE: Because we haven't propounded discovery
16:50:33 11
16:50:36 12
            yet.
16:50:36 13
                     THE COURT: Well, you know, you play the hand that's
            dealt to you in this business.
16:50:43 14
16:50:44 15
                     MR. LAKE: Understood.
                     THE COURT: So it's five days after Stroz -- draft the
16:50:46 16
16:50:49 17
            order this way. I see you have Ms. Aycock's able assistance in
            that department. So five days after they report to Defendants'
16:51:04 18
16:51:04 19
            attorney.
16:51:08 20
                     Next issue is the -- in the interest of time, why do
16:51:08 21
            you need -- let's take a five minute break.
16:57:24 22
                      (A recess was then taken.)
16:57:24 23
                     MR. SNYDER: Should I address the sampling?
16:57:35 24
                     THE COURT: No, I think I can move through that more
16:57:35 25
            quickly. I read all of the papers on that and the question I
```

16:57:35 1	have is why does your expert need the additional samples? I
16:57:38 2	don't think that's explained.
16:57:39 3	MR. SNYDER: That's an excellent question, Your Honor,
16:57:41 4	and I can give you an explanation. We didn't explain it for a
16:57:45 5	particular reason.
16:57:46 6	THE COURT: You can remain seated. If you really feel
16:57:48 7	you need to stand, come to the podium.
16:57:52 8	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, our experts observed on the
16:57:54 9	original document that was taken out of the safe deposit box
16:58:01 10	that Mr. Argentieri has custody of an incredibly unusual
16:58:05 11	document, unlike any our experts have ever seen and these are
16:58:09 12	the leading forensic experts
16:58:12 13	THE COURT: You're talking about the original alleged
16:58:14 14	contract that gives rise to Mr. Ceglia's 50 percent interest in
16:58:19 15	the
16:58:19 16	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. It is a highly unusual
16:58:23 17	irregular document. It is a faded goldish-brown ink that has an
16:58:30 18	odd ecru tinge on the front of page one. It is highly
16:58:34 19	suggestive of having undergone artificial
16:58:39 20	THE COURT: My question is I mean, they've taken a
16:58:44 21	number of samples.
16:58:45 22	MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor. Let me explain the basis
16:58:48 23	of our request.
16:58:50 24	THE COURT: What is all these pictures I have in front
16:58:53 25	of me and all the little black dots

16:58:53	1	MR. SNYDER: I will explain. First, Your Honor, in an
16:58:57	2	attempt to accommodate Plaintiff's counsel, we agreed in the
16:59:01	3	first instance to limit the number of initial ink samples that
16:59:07	4	our experts would take on the understanding, clear
16:59:10	5	understanding, which I don't think Mr. Lake would dispute, that
16:59:14	6	we would be permitted the opportunity to take additional samples
16:59:19	7	later. Mr. Lake agreed.
16:59:20	8	He said if there are sufficient ink samples available,
16:59:24	9	after Plaintiff's experts had done their ink sampling, then he
16:59:28	10	would consent to and not object to our experts extracting
16:59:33	11	additional samples.
16:59:34	12	THE COURT: They changed their mind.
16:59:35	13	MR. SNYDER: Right.
16:59:36	14	THE COURT: So tell me why your expert needs the
16:59:39	15	initial samples.
16:59:40	16	MR. SNYDER: Because we did not take as many samples
16:59:43	17	as we would have to accommodate Mr. Lake who wanted to take his
16:59:48	18	samples.
16:59:50	19	THE COURT: Why didn't they take.
16:59:52	20	MR. SNYDER: It would have taken more time.
16:59:54	21	THE COURT: Who cares.
16:59:55	22	MR. SNYDER: Hindsight being 20/20, we shouldn't have
16:59:57	23	accommodated Mr. Lake and we should have taken all our samples.
17:00:02	24	THE COURT: You're telling me that your expert, when
17:00:04	25	they had the opportunity to take critical samples of the

17:00:08 1	document, didn't take all the samples that their expertise told
17:00:12 2	them to take because they actually acquiesced to some arm waving
17:00:17 3	by the Plaintiff that they wanted to stop that process in order
17:00:21 4	to commence their own process
17:00:23 5	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Mr. Lake
17:00:24 6	THE COURT: risking that we would end up in a
17:00:27 7	courtroom arguing over whether or not those additional
17:00:29 8	MR. SNYDER: No, not thinking
17:00:29 9	THE COURT: Just a second. Those additional samples
17:00:33 10	are critical to your ability to analyze the authenticity of the
17:00:38 11	document?
17:00:38 12	MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor, I'm not say saying that.
17:00:41 13	THE COURT: What are you telling me?
17:00:41 14	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Lake threatened that if we did not
17:00:45 15	stop testing, he would go to court and pull the document. And
17:00:47 16	Mr. Flynn was there and Mr. Southwell was there and we never
17:00:53 17	THE COURT: How could he take the testing?
17:00:55 18	MR. SNYDER: How would take physically take the
17:00:55 19	document.
17:00:56 20	THE COURT: How could he do such a thing?
17:00:58 21	MR. SNYDER: He threatened it. And we said in
17:00:58 22	accomodation
17:01:00 23	THE COURT: He'd be guilty of interfering with the
17:01:01 24	administration of the court order.
17:01:05 25	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Flynn can talk to the Court about

17:01:07	1	credibility.
17:01:08	2	THE COURT: He threatened to run away with the
17:01:11	3	document and I wasn't consulted at that time?
17:01:15	4	MR. FLYNN: May I, Your Honor?
17:01:16	5	THE COURT: Just a second. I want to understand the
17:01:17	6	logic behind that.
17:01:17	7	MR. SNYDER: I was not present so I feel more
17:01:24	8	comfortable asking Mr. Flynn to address the Court.
17:01:24	9	THE COURT: So after this procedure was done, it was
17:01:26 1	LO	always the Defendants' need to ask for another round of samples?
17:01:33 1	L1	MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor.
17:01:35 1	L2	THE COURT: No?
17:01:35 1	L3	MR. SNYDER: Because we believe consistent with
17:01:37 1	L 4	Mr. Lake's representation to us that he would give us the
17:01:41 1	L5	document back to complete our sampling and there is more than
17:01:44 1	L 6	enough ink left
17:01:46 1	L7	THE COURT: At that time?
17:01:46 1	L 8	MR. SNYDER: When his expert was done. That was his
17:01:48 1	L 9	request and we said no harm no foul. If you want to test it and
17:01:52 2	20	give it back to us and then we
17:01:53 2	21	THE COURT: Running the risk that we would end up in
17:01:56 2	22	this situation?
17:01:57 2	23	MR. SNYDER: We never dreamt that he would pull the
17:02:00 2	24	charade of suggesting that there's not enough ink to test
17:02:03 2	25	THE COURT: Did you or your expert memorialize this

17:02:07	1	insufficient testing at the time? Did you advise the Court of
17:02:13	2	it?
17:02:13	3	MR. SNYDER: I would have to ask Mr. Flynn. I wasn't
17:02:16	4	present.
17:02:16	5	THE COURT: Why should the Court although I'm
17:02:20	6	making the Plaintiff's argument. Why shouldn't Mr. Lake say
17:02:27	7	this is a recent concoction that the Plaintiff the that the
17:02:32	8	Defendants had dreamed up here because their expert botched the
17:02:35	9	first round
17:02:35	10	MR. SNYDER: No, our expert did it perfectly.
17:02:38	11	THE COURT: Or they're really not expert or they want
17:02:41	12	to destroy the document.
17:02:42	13	MR. SNYDER: Okay. Your Honor, there are three ways
17:02:42	14	to respond to this. One, the order has no
17:02:44	15	THE COURT: These are fair questions, aren't they?
17:02:46	16	You might not like them.
17:02:47	17	MR. SNYDER: With all due respect, I don't think they
17:02:50	18	are and I'll tell Your Honor why.
17:02:51	19	THE COURT: Okay.
17:02:52	20	MR. SNYDER: The protocol does not restrict our
17:02:55	21	ability to take ink samples or say how and in what order they
17:02:59	22	should be taken.
17:02:59	23	We were in a cooperative group process in terms of how
17:03:10	24	these documents would be tested, whose expert would to be where,
17:03:10	25	these people were in a room for days and days and days

```
1
            accommodating in a way --
17:03:11
17:03:12
        2
                     THE COURT: Excuse me. Referring to representatives
17:03:14
        3
            of the Defendants?
17:03:15
                     MR. SNYDER: Counsel for the Defendants, counsel for
        4
            Plaintiffs were in Mr. Flynn's office for a period of days.
17:03:18
        5
            Ms. Aycock was there, Mr. Southwell, Mr. Benjamin was there and
17:03:22
            Mr. Lake was there, Mr. Argentieri was there, the experts were
        7
17:03:25
            there.
17:03:30
        8
                     It was a cooperative back and forth, during which
17:03:30
            Mr. Lake said can you guys stop -- don't -- can you limit the
17:03:33 10
            number of ink test samples you're going to take, let my experts
17:03:39 11
            take some ink and then we'll give the document back to you and
17:03:40 12
17:03:40 13
            your experts can continue.
                     THE COURT: Didn't your experts challenge that --
17:03:43 14
17:03:43 15
                     MR. SNYDER: No.
17:03:45 16
                     THE COURT: -- and say why do we need to do that?
17:03:46 17
                     MR. SNYDER: Nope, we didn't do that. It wasn't a big
            deal to us. We were getting the document back and there's more
17:03:48 18
17:03:49 19
            than enough ink to go around.
17:03:52 20
                     THE COURT: That's not the point. It doesn't
17:03:55 21
            interfere with the integrity of the testing process?
                     MR. SNYDER: Absolutely not because all we --
17:03:57 22
17:03:58 23
                     THE COURT:
                                  It doesn't subject the expert's
17:04:02 24
            examination as to the validity of the process?
17:04:02 25
                     MR. SNYDER: Absolutely not because the expert can
```

```
1
            document --
17:04:05
                     THE COURT: Famous last words.
17:04:05
        2
17:04:07
        3
                     MR. SNYDER:
                                  No. We're very confident that our expert
            can and will document following to the letter the procedures
17:04:10
        4
            that --
17:04:13
        5
                     THE COURT:
                                  I'm just trying to move this along.
17:04:14
        6
            was an unexpected request coming from Mr. Lake and rather than
       7
17:04:17
            to contest it and play hardball by calling the Court for
        8
17:04:21
            assistance --
17:04:25
        9
17:04:26 10
                     MR. SNYDER: Right.
17:04:26 11
                     THE COURT: -- you just accommodated him?
17:04:29 12
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes, because Dr. Lyter, our expert, said
17:04:33 13
            there is more than enough ink to go around. When we get the
            document back, we'll finish our testing.
17:04:36 14
17:04:36 15
                     THE COURT: And Mr. Lake seemed to acquiesce in that
17:04:40 16
            statement? Was that representation made at that time.
17:04:45 17
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes, that representation was made to
            Mr. Southwell by Mr. Lake and the reason they don't want --
17:04:46 18
17:04:48 19
                     THE COURT: But none of that is in any of the papers.
17:04:51 20
            There's no affidavit submitted.
17:04:51 21
                     MR. SNYDER: Well, Mr. Southwell does put in a
            affidavit swearing to all of that.
17:04:53 22
17:04:56 23
                     THE COURT: Oh, really? Where is that?
17:04:57 24
                     MR. SNYDER: And un-objected to. Mr. Lake has not
17:05:02 25
            sworn to the contrary.
```

17:05:27	1	THE COURT: Where is that?
17:05:27	2	MR. SNYDER: This will be number 97, Your Honor. And
17:05:50	3	in his affidavit, Mr. Southwell describes
17:05:52	4	THE COURT: What paragraph?
17:05:53	5	MR. SNYDER: Paragraphs 29 through 34 and 34 is the
17:05:58	6	relevant paragraph where he describes, Mr. Southwell, his
17:06:04	7	conversation with Mr. Lake and Mr. Lake does not put in any
17:06:12	8	affidavit to the contrary, nor could he.
17:06:24	9	THE COURT: Well, you act like Lake demanded that
17:06:28	10	Zuckerberg produce handwriting samples. I don't understand what
17:06:32	11	that has to do with what we're discussing.
17:06:42	12	MR. SNYDER: No, I think paragraph 34 of document 97,
17:06:45	13	it's a August 4th declaration
17:06:47	14	THE COURT: Maybe it's a wrong one. We have
17:06:51	15	Southwell. We unfortunately don't have a document on here
17:06:55	16	it's 40-some paragraphs, is that it?
17:06:58	17	MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. It's 49 paragraphs.
17:07:01	18	THE COURT: Just tell me which one.
17:07:04	19	MR. SNYDER: Paragraph 34.
17:07:09	20	THE COURT: At the conclusion of that day, I then
17:07:12	21	discussed with Mr. Lake something about taking additional
17:07:17	22	samples. That's not the scenario that you've given me based on
17:07:22	23	the request of the Defendants' experts.
17:07:27	24	Impart because the Plaintiff's expert had already left
17:07:30	25	for the airport, Lake indicated we should wait to discuss this

1 problem, which was scheduled to occur after the Plaintiff's 17:07:34 experts took samples. That doesn't sound exactly like what 17:07:37 2 17:07:41 3 you're saying. 17:07:41 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, if you read the last 4 17:07:41 5 paragraph --THE COURT: Paragraph? 17:07:44 6 7 MR. SNYDER: Sentence. Mr. Lake agreed if there is 17:07:44 sufficient ink available after Plaintiff's experts also sample, 8 17:07:46 then he would allow Defendants' experts to extract more ink 17:07:50 9 17:07:55 10 samples. THE COURT: I see that, but what I'm trying to point 17:07:55 11 out is the actual interruption of the -- the expert wanted to 17:07:58 12 17:08:01 13 take more so Mr. Lake suddenly jumped and said, well, no. 17:08:02 14 need for us to have our person look at it and then your expert 17:08:07 15 said okay. So that's not exactly what's coming through here. 17:08:11 16 But I don't want to quibble over it. 17:08:13 17 The point is that your view is that you accommodated Mr. Lake and to your chagrin you now find out that that was a 17:08:16 18 17:08:20 19 mistake. 17:08:20 20 MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. And the order does not restrict our ability to take ink samples and there's more than 17:08:22 21 sufficient ink. 17:08:27 22 17:08:27 23 THE COURT: So I'm trying to understand something 17:08:28 24 that's not revealed in the papers as far as I can tell and that 17:08:32 25 is why does your expert feel at this point that the additional

```
1
            samples are necessary.
17:08:37
                     MR. SNYDER: Because it is our expert's preliminary
17:08:40
        2
17:08:44
        3
            belief, based on his initial samples --
                     THE COURT: No, no. You're not getting the drift
17:08:46
        4
            here. If he took five samples --
17:08:49
        5
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes.
17:08:52
        6
        7
                     THE COURT: -- and needed 10, then his position would
17:08:52
            be well I'm not done.
        8
17:08:55
                     MR. SNYDER: Correct.
17:08:57
        9
17:08:57 10
                     THE COURT: He's knows I have to get an additional
            five samples.
17:09:00 11
17:09:01 12
                     MR. SNYDER: That's correct.
17:09:02 13
                     THE COURT:
                                  What I'm trying to understand is why.
                     MR. SNYDER: I'll telling Your Honor right now.
17:09:04 14
17:09:04 15
                     THE COURT: Okav.
17:09:07 16
                     MR. SNYDER: Because based on his initial sample,
            whether it's five or four or nine, whatever the number is --
17:09:10 17
                     THE COURT: He wouldn't have known that at the time.
17:09:13 18
17:09:15 19
                     MR. SNYDER: No. Based on the initial sampling --
17:09:19 20
                     THE COURT: He wouldn't have known what his initial --
17:09:22 21
                     MR. SNYDER: Well, he would have known generally he
            needed to take more than he took.
17:09:24 22
17:09:26 23
                     THE COURT:
                                  That's my point. What is the reason for
17:09:28 24
            the need?
17:09:29 25
                     MR. SNYDER: I'm not an ink expert, but I'm told you
```

1 need more samples than he took to conduct the chemical testing 17:09:32 to determine whether the ink dates from 2003 or not. 17:09:37 2 THE COURT: I read that in his affidavit. 17:09:39 3 MR. SNYDER: Yes. 17:09:41 4 I understand that, but what's not in his 17:09:42 5 THE COURT: affidavit is what you're now trying to tell me which is that he 17:09:45 6 7 couldn't make any definitive estimations of the dating of the 17:09:59 ink because he didn't take enough samples in the first place. 8 17:09:59 17:09:59 9 MR. SNYDER: Because we accommodated the Plaintiff. 17:10:01 10 THE COURT: Exactly. 17:10:01 11 MR. SNYDER: Correct. 17:10:02 12 THE COURT: Whether he would have taken ill or whether 17:10:04 13 the power would have gone out and he would have to evacuate the 17:10:07 14 building, the fact of the matter is what you're telling me is 17:10:10 15 that he then knew and has always known that he needed X number 17:10:16 16 of samples, but he only took Y. 17:10:21 17 MR. SNYDER: Yes. And he only took Y because he accommodated 17:10:21 18 THE COURT: 17:10:26 19 Mr. Lake. 17:10:27 20 MR. SNYDER: Given the condition of the document also, 17:10:31 21 because it's been treated in a variety of ways that are highly suspicious with light and perhaps chemicals, he did not know 17:10:38 22 17:10:40 23 that a certain test would be useful until he was able to further 17:10:45 24 evaluate the treatment of the paper as well.

THE COURT: So I'm fine with whatever his rational is

17:10:48 25

```
1
            and if the real truth of the matter is that he took 10 samples,
17:10:52
17:10:57
        2
            say, and he then tested and found out that he needed 15, then
17:11:01
        3
            just tell me --
17:11:02
                     MR. SNYDER: That's not the case.
        4
                     THE COURT: -- he always needed 15. He only took 10,
17:11:03
        5
            he took the test, he then evaluated the result and he said
17:11:07
            ah-ha, I do need the additional five just as I knew I did when I
        7
17:11:12
            first started.
17:11:17
        8
                     MR. SNYDER: It's actually both. It's both that he
17:11:17
        9
17:11:20 10
            needed more when he stopped testing and we on accommodated their
            request to limit the number of --
17:11:25 11
17:11:26 12
                     THE COURT: And then he tested --
17:11:26 13
                     MR. SNYDER: And he was said I was right, I need more.
17:11:29 14
                     THE COURT: Okay, fine. Thank you. And it's because,
17:11:32 15
            which is not in an affidavit, you have to represent hearsay here
17:11:36 16
            to me, right?
17:11:36 17
                     He's telling you that in his scientific opinion is
            this for the record because I really don't know the answer and
17:11:41 18
17:11:44 19
            I'm sure that Mr. Lake is finding this of interest as well, his
17:11:49 20
            preliminary testing confirmed that original judgement that I
17:11:52 21
            just can't make a definitive determination without the
17:11:57 22
            additional samples.
17:11:57 23
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes, he needs additional samples to --
17:12:00 24
                     THE COURT: Even though it wouldn't be clear to you or
17:12:04 25
            I as to why the additional samples would be potentially
```

17:12:07	1	definitive upon dating the actual ink.
17:12:07	2	MR. SNYDER: I represent that to Your Honor and
17:12:10	3	Dr. Lyter represented it to me in person.
17:12:13	4	THE COURT: So we have to rely to the expert.
17:12:15	5	MR. SNYDER: And let me just say in terms of the
17:12:17	6	availability of ink samples, their expert
17:12:20	7	THE COURT: Availability is beside the point. I'll
17:12:23	8	get to availability because I read all about availability.
17:12:28	9	Mr. Lake can respond to this, I just want to get this out.
17:12:31	10	As I read Mr. Stewart's affidavit, Mr. Stewart does
17:12:36	11	not in terms negate what we just discussed, that as if
17:12:45	12	MR. SNYDER: We don't know if Mr. Stewart has
17:12:49	13	concluded about the ink, whether the ink is dry enough quote
17:12:52	14	unquote to be from 2003.
17:12:54	15	THE COURT: But there is nothing in his affidavit that
17:12:57	16	contradicts his representation to me about Mr. Lyter's opinion
17:13:03	17	that he needs the his focus, the Plaintiff's focus, is you're
17:13:08	18	going to destroy the document if you allow anymore samples.
17:13:12	19	MR. SNYDER: I would respectfully say, Mr. Stewart
17:13:15	20	does not say destroy.
17:13:17	21	THE COURT: And even though it is starting to
17:13:19	22	clarify in my mind what this is coming down to. Even though
17:13:23	23	was Mr. Stewart present during this? Mr. Stewart never piped up
17:13:29	24	apparently during the process and said time-out. If you take
17:13:32	25	another attempt to take one more punch at this thing, you'll

```
1
            destroy the integrity of the document.
17:13:36
                     MR. SNYDER: No, never. And he doesn't say destroy in
17:13:38
        2
            the affidavit.
17:13:42
        3
17:13:42
                     THE COURT: Well, he is saying it now.
        4
                     MR. SNYDER: He doesn't, Your Honor. It's actually
17:13:42
        5
            interesting, Mr. Stewart doesn't say that. It says something
17:13:43
        6
        7
            that is so general that to repeat right now would be
17:13:43
            meaningless.
        8
17:13:43
                     He says that -- he doesn't say there's not sufficient
17:13:49
        9
17:13:52 10
            ink.
                  There's tons of ink. He says that it will compromise the
            physical integrity of the contract.
17:13:57 11
17:14:00 12
                     We have no idea what that means. It doesn't say there
17:14:03 13
            is insufficient ink or anything like that. And during the
            examination --
17:14:05 14
17:14:05 15
                     THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lake, what's the answer to
17:14:08 16
            that?
17:14:08 17
                     MR. LAKE: Your Honor, if you're going to deny them
            anymore ink samples, I won't --
17:14:11 18
17:14:13 19
                     THE COURT: Well, I want to hear why there's a big
17:14:16 20
            issue about it. Because if you look at Mr. Lyter's affidavit,
17:14:21 21
            there surely does seem to be enough ink available without
            compromising the physical integrity of the document.
17:14:27 22
17:14:31 23
                     And the other point I made is that in terms of getting
            the correct samples in order for either expert to make a
17:14:34 24
17:14:39 25
            scientific appraisal of the authenticity of the document based
```

1 on the age of the ink, Mr. Stewart does not in terms contradict 17:14:41 Mr. Lyter's assertion that -- well as reported to us now, I 17:14:47 2 guess in fairness to your -- to Mr. Stewart, he can't -- he 17:14:51 3 would not -- he's not here so it's probably not fair to ask you 17:14:54 4 that question. And I don't ask you that question. 17:14:59 5 But interestingly, he does not, and you did not 17:15:03 6 quarrel with the possibility of taking additional ink samples. 7 17:15:07 It must have been apparent to you that but for your request that 17:15:11 8 Lyter would have continued to draw additional ink samples at 17:15:14 9 Is that not a fair reconstruction of the scenario? 17:15:18 10 17:15:30 11 MR. LAKE: No. 17:15:30 12 THE COURT: No? 17:15:30 13 MR. LAKE: Allow me to reconstruct it because actually I was there and I participated in this. And I can speak for 17:15:30 14 17:15:30 15 myself, thank you. 17:15:31 16 What happened was we negotiated the physical hard copy 17:15:38 17 inspection to protocol. There was not a negotiation as to how many ink samples could be taken or where for the simple reason 17:15:43 18 17:15:47 19 that we didn't have the original document. 17:15:48 20 And so after our meeting, we concluded that we would 17:15:52 21 try to meet and confer between the experts once they saw the 17:15:57 22 ink. 17:15:58 23 We went to Harris Beach, we had the experts meet and 17:16:02 24 confer. I was asked to provide a ink sample protocol, which 17:16:08 25 included the number -- and this was also true for the paper and

taken and their locations.

I met with my experts and asked them what would be

necessary for them to conduct their tests. And therefore to double that number so that the other side could have the same number of samples and find places on the document where they could take those samples. These are the black dots you've seen.

We wrote it up. We gave it to them. We had Mr. Flynn and the other defense lawyers and their experts look at it.

They said this isn't enough. We want more.

And we said how much more do we want. And they came back with a number and our experts says that's too much. We're not going to be able to take the ink samples that we need if all of these samples are taken.

We tried to negotiate a number. At that point we couldn't agree. And I said okay. Well, fine at this point we need to go see the Judge. Let's go see Judge Foschio. We can present this to him and he can give us a ruling.

I did that, not because they were accommodating me, but because I was concerned about the document itself. We continued our meet and confer and came to the conclusion that we would -- we wrote it up and we signed it.

It said we'll take this many samples because remember, the Defendants were adamant that we couldn't touch our own document until they were done with it. We weren't allowed to

17:16:14 2
17:16:16 3
17:16:19 4
17:16:24 5
17:16:28 6
17:16:32 7
17:16:36 8
17:16:41 9

17:16:46 11 17:16:50 12 17:16:54 13 17:16:59 14

17:16:41 10

17:17:01 15
17:17:05 16
17:17:08 17
17:17:13 18

17:17:28 22

17:17:32 23

17:17:36 24 17:17:40 25 test it. We weren't even allowed to watch them do their
testing. If we looked over that shoulder, they shooed us away.

If we were going to determine what they were going to do, that
was not going to happen.

I said either we need to go see the Judge right now and get this sorted out or alternatively if you want to go forward under the protocol that we devised and agreed to, if after our experts have had a chance to take their ink samples, which occurred days later in Chicago, if my experts agreed, then I will allow it. That part is true.

In Chicago, we took our samples. The document looks like Swiss cheese. As you can see, there is very little ink left. That have had plenty to do it. They said we want to take more. Mr. Argentieri was there. He got on the phone, talked to our expert. Our expert says we have plenty, they have plenty. The document is being --

MR. LAKE: No, we have the exact amount. And the reason we didn't address some of the issues that Mr. Snyder just brought up in our papers is because in their opposition and reply, they never gave any good reason why they wanted more. They just said there is more, therefore we want it.

THE COURT: Does your expert have more than they have?

They never said this is the test we want, this is why we need it, this is what we're going to conduct, this is why we don't have enough.

17:17:44 17:17:45 17:17:49 17:17:51 17:17:51 5 17:17:54 6 7 17:17:58 17:18:03 8 17:18:07 9 17:18:14 10 17:18:16 11 17:18:20 12 17:18:25 13 17:18:30 14 17:18:32 15 17:18:35 16 17:18:41 17 17:18:43 18 17:18:46 19 17:18:50 20 17:18:53 21 17:18:57 22 17:19:00 23 17:19:02 24

17:19:04 25

And the other thing they didn't mention is they have 1 17:19:06 two ink experts and they have not declared whether or not they 17:19:09 2 17:19:13 3 split the samples. 17:19:14 So if 10 ink samples were taken from one signature, at 4 this point I don't know if they have one person doing all their 17:19:18 5 ink testing or if they divided it to five and five and the 17:19:20 6 7 reason they want more is because they want 10 and 10. 17:19:22 All I know is that when we, to accommodate them, said 17:19:26 8 we either talk to the judge right now and get this sorted out or 17:19:31 9 17:19:36 10 you can take the amounts we agreed to and if our experts say more, fine. If they don't, no. Our expert said no, so I said 17:19:37 11 17:19:40 12 no, which is exactly what I had maintained all along. 17:19:45 13 And then in their motion, all they basically said is we want more. They didn't say if they were going to divide them 17:19:48 14 17:19:50 15 up, they didn't say what the tests were. They didn't say 17:19:50 16 anything so that's why I didn't respond to the arguments that 17:19:54 17 Mr. Snyder just made because they were never presented to us even-keeled. 17:19:57 18 17:19:57 19 THE COURT: I realize it and that's why I am because I 17:19:59 20 couldn't tell either. But your expert is satisfied with the 17:20:03 21 number of samples they have? MR. LAKE: Yeah, they've taken a ton. 17:20:06 22 They've taken 17:20:10 23 dozens. I mean, there's ink samples taken all over the place. 17:20:15 24 And I don't understand what the good cause is for

taking more, other than they're not satisfied with the tests

17:20:18 25

17:20:22 1	that they conducted so far and they want to do more testing to
17:20:26 2	try to get different results. That's all I can think of.
17:20:30 3	MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, may I hand a document up to
17:20:44 4	Your Honor, which I think will clarify the question and I can
17:20:44 5	show Your Honor why.
17:20:44 6	I don't know if Your Honor is at all focused or
17:20:44 7	concerned about availability of ink, but that is a non-issue and
17:20:44 8	it really is and I'll show Your Honor why.
17:20:47 9	THE COURT: That's your expert's.
17:20:52 10	MR. SNYDER: If I can approach, Your Honor, I want to
17:20:55 11	give your Your Honor a different high-resolution copy of that,
17:20:58 12	which will show dramatically in color, and we'll give one to the
17:21:08 13	Plaintiff, just how much ink is left.
17:21:10 14	Those dots indicate where the ink was extracted. Your
17:21:14 15	Honor can see just how much ink is available.
17:21:17 16	THE COURT: How many more do they want to take and
17:21:20 17	where are they going to focus their pin prints?
17:21:24 18	MR. SNYDER: It is spelled out in Mr. Lyter's
17:21:29 19	declaration. And I will point out to the Court as well that we
17:21:29 20	have high-resolution scan of this document taken before any
17:21:37 21	testing was done. And so on paragraph
17:21:43 22	THE COURT: Two more from the probably more critical
17:21:47 23	authenticity is of the initialing of the alleged
17:21:51 24	Mr. Zuckerberg's MZ and only one from the M and one from the Z.
17:21:56 25	MR. SNYDER: Yes. As you see from the authentic

17:21:59 1 contract found on the Plaintiff's email account in 2004, the actual inter-lineage in the authentic contract is not the bogus 17:22:01 2 inter-lineage that is found on the document attached to the 17:22:07 3 complaint. And paragraph nine explains why we --17:22:10 4 THE COURT: Say that again. 17:22:15 5 17:22:16 MR. SNYDER: If Your Honor looks at the authentic 6 contract that we found on the Plaintiff's hard drive on the 7 17:22:19 Seagate computer, Your Honor will see that the inter-lineation 17:22:22 8 there in handwriting on the actual authentic contract that's 17:22:26 9 17:22:31 10 been on Sidley and Austin's computer for seven years, having been sent by the Plaintiff, is different than the handwriting 17:22:36 11 17:22:39 12 than appears on the fraudulent contract at the heart of this lawsuit. 17:22:43 13 THE COURT: And I'm not going to attempt to make that 17:22:43 14 17:22:46 15 That would be the one that I would be most comparison. concerned about is that that's such a small, relatively 17:22:51 16 17:22:55 17 speaking, lettering and it seems to be a major target. MR. SNYDER: But, A, there is plenty of ink to test 17:22:59 18 17:23:04 19

and, B, there are high-resolution scans and there's no question about --

17:23:09 20

17:23:09 21

17:23:10 22

17:23:15 23

17:23:19 24

17:23:23 25

THE COURT: I didn't ask that question. I come back to the document. You know, Mr. Lake, if you look at the MZ over here, have you seen this document? I'm pointing to the high-resolution document which highlights that portion of the contract dealing with a -- I can't even read what it says, but

17:23:27 1	it looks like initially PC and MZ, that doesn't seen like, does
17:23:34 2	it, if you took two more red dots on it that there's going to be
17:23:38 3	any physical serious impairment. Do you see what I'm getting
17:23:45 4	at?
17:23:45 5	MR. LAKE: I do, but keep in mind that for every
17:23:49 6	sample they take our experts are going to want to take
17:23:52 7	MR. SNYDER: I thought that he didn't need more
17:23:56 8	samples.
17:23:56 9	THE COURT: I thought your experts were quite
17:24:00 10	satisfied, with your powerful argument, and they didn't need
17:24:01 11	more.
17:24:01 12	MR. LAKE: Yes.
17:24:01 13	THE COURT: You're now saying that your experts maybe
17:24:03 14	are suggesting there is more valid scientific proof to having
17:24:05 15	more samples?
17:24:05 16	MR. LAKE: No. So my choices are there's and ink and
17:24:09 17	they get to take it or you've had enough and they get to take
17:24:13 18	it.
17:24:13 19	THE COURT: Look, you know, I've been thinking about
17:24:15 20	this right along and since I first saw the issue, one
17:24:20 21	alternative would be for me to retain my own expert, at your
17:24:26 22	expense, I was hoping to avoid that, or to call the experts
17:24:29 23	tomorrow and let them be examined on the witness stand, and I
17:24:33 24	was hoping to avoid that by propounding the questions I
17:24:38 25	propounded to Mr. Snyder to get to the bottom of why these

additional samples are necessary.

On the one hand, if I -- if I error on your side, I'm potentially compromising -- I've been asked to throw a dart in the closet. You're compromising the Defendants' ability to defend. And looking for the prejudice to your side from the comment I just made in terms of seeing whether you -- it's hard as a non-expert to see how there would be any compromising if two more dots were made, but as you said, then your people would need more if you're getting more.

But against that, you do have this whole high-profile image that was done of this document to preserves ultimately for the trier of facts the ability to assess what this looks like.

And I understand there's nothing like the best evidence of the document itself. Arguably under the best evidence rule, I don't know what will happen. You've got the burden.

I don't know whether they'll stipulate weight that if for some reason additional tests, if you will, would make this -- potentially make it difficult for the trier of fact to examine the physical document itself and assess it's authenticity versus use of a copy of an image copy. I don't know what the answer to that is, I'm trying to be fair.

In the absence of a -- well, of course in fairness you didn't know what your position was going to be. Your expert really hasn't had a chance to say whether he agrees or disagrees

17:24:43 1 17:24:44 2 17:24:52 3 17:24:55 4 17:24:59 5 17:25:03 6 7 17:25:09 17:25:14 8 17:25:17 9 17:25:20 10 17:25:24 11 17:25:28 12

17:25:31 13 17:25:34 14 17:25:38 15 17:25:41 16

17:25:41 17

17:25:45 18 17:25:54 19 17:25:56 20 17:26:00 21 17:26:10 22

17:26:21 24 17:26:25 25

17:26:16 23

17:26:27 1	with that and conceivably would need more samples.
17:26:28 2	MR. LAKE: We don't even know what tests the only
17:26:31 3	test that we know that they're planning on taking is a extremely
17:26:38 4	sensitive and precise chemical testing.
17:26:40 5	THE COURT: I assume you have to draw out a piece of
17:26:44 6	the paper with the ink for that.
17:26:46 7	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Stewart
17:26:47 8	THE COURT: Although, all you're doing is putting some
17:26:50 9	sort of a, you know, magic x-ray on it or laser beam on it or
17:26:55 10	something.
17:26:56 11	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Stewart knows full-well what
17:27:06 12	testing
17:27:06 13	THE COURT: Then you wouldn't compare the document at
17:27:06 14	all.
17:27:06 15	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Stewart knows full-well several
17:27:07 16	things because Mr. Lyter attests to it and Mr. Stewart doesn't
17:27:12 17	contest it.
17:27:13 18	He knows, first of all, that there are there is the
17:27:17 19	high-resolution scanned image. Second, forensic document
17:27:24 20	examiner often and commonly extract a great percentage of ink
17:27:25 21	available in the document than what we're proposing here.
17:27:29 22	And finally, in terms of burden, we've given and he
17:27:32 23	also knows full-well what chemical testing we want to conduct
17:27:35 24	because experts in this field know that there are certain
17:27:39 25	chemical tests that you do, that you perform, to test and date

ink and the concentration of various chemicals in the ink. 17:27:44 1 So he knows what tests we're going to conduct and he 17:27:50 2 knows that those are commonly performed and he knows that 17:27:54 3 17:27:57 document examiners often take much more ink than would be taken 4 here. 17:28:01 5 And if you look at our showing, it's specific and 17:28:02 6 focused and all he says is that it will compromise the physical 7 17:28:05 integrity of the document, which is meaningless. 17:28:10 8 We don't know what he means. Does that mean you're 17:28:13 17:28:16 10 not going to be read the writing? Does that mean -- it's a meaningless verbiage. 17:28:19 11 17:28:20 12 THE COURT: Fine. Fine. Anything further? 17:28:22 13 MR. LAKE: Yes, Your Honor, a couple things. First, just because they think that my expert may know what kind of 17:28:26 14 17:28:30 15 test they're conducting is not a good reason too tell us what 17:28:35 16 testing so we can respond this. They do this a lot. They come back for a second bite 17:28:38 17 of the apple. They don't ask for a Gmail account and then they 17:28:42 18 17:28:42 19 come back and ask for it. 17:28:44 20 They -- we say we can come to the Court and come up with a protocol for ink samples, but they'd rather do their test 17:28:46 21 and come back for more. We've seen this pattern over and over 17:28:51 22 17:28:53 23 so far they have been very successful with it. 17:28:57 24 Here's my concern: They're supposed to have their

reports out September 6th. If their expert report comes out

17:28:59 25

September 6th and says I didn't have enough ink --1 17:29:04 THE COURT: Where does that date come from? 17:29:05 2 MR. SNYDER: That's in the old order. We're going to 17:29:07 3 17:29:10 need to address the date. 4 THE COURT: The July 1st order. 17:29:12 5 MR. LAKE: That's when their reports come out. 17:29:14 6 7 MR. SNYDER: September 9th is when, assuming 17:29:14 compliance, we were required to give our report. 8 17:29:19 THE COURT: Go ahead. 17:29:21 9 17:29:22 10 MR. LAKE: Anyway, they haven't shown to me any reason to take it with specificity. They haven't shown any reason for 17:29:29 11 17:29:35 12 urgency. They haven't given any reason why they can't come back 17:29:39 13 after their report is issued and we can see what their experts are actually saying instead of a declaration saying I want more 17:29:41 14 17:29:45 15 because I want more ink and I want to do some sort extremely 17:29:48 16 sensitive testing. They have had an opportunity to come before this Court 17:29:50 17 before and they didn't. They had an opportunity to negotiate 17:29:52 18 17:29:56 19 protocol with our experts and they did. They had a opportunity 17:29:58 20 to take a lot of ink samples and they did. They had a chance to conduct whatever tests they wanted on that ink and presumably 17:30:03 21 17:30:06 22 they did. 17:30:06 23 They are obligated to come up with their findings and 17:30:09 24 if their findings are that the tests that they did are

inconclusive or that the amount ink that they were able to

17:30:14 25

17:30:16 1 take --THE COURT: Well, you should be actually heartened by 17:30:17 2 17:30:19 3 the fact that they are not conclusive. 17:30:21 MR. LAKE: We can infer that. 4 THE COURT: I think if they felt they had established 17:30:22 5 that these signatures and initialings are refabrications, they 17:30:25 6 7 would be done. They wouldn't be asking for additional samples. 17:30:30 But the fact that they feel the need for additional 8 17:30:33 samples, somebody might infer that they are having difficulty 17:30:35 9 17:30:38 10 reaching the conclusion that the Defendants would like them to reach. 17:30:41 11 17:30:42 12 MR. LAKE: They've already admitted that the ink on 17:30:44 13 page two is from 2003. We know that because they're claiming that the scan TIFF page two is what they like to call the 17:30:51 14 17:30:55 15 authentic contract --MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, just to highlight a point --17:30:56 16 That's why I focused on the MZ initials --17:30:59 17 THE COURT: Your Honor, if I could focus on this and 17:31:02 18 MR. SNYDER: 17:31:05 19 it's critical. What our experts have no concluded without any 17:31:09 20 question of clarity is that this document, they speak in terms 17:31:13 21 of likely, likely underwent artificial treatment, light, heat 17:31:19 22 and chemicals to create the appearance of a document that is 17:31:23 23 older than it is --17:31:25 24 THE COURT: A document --17:31:26 25 MR. SNYDER: -- to dry ink and to do other things.

17:31:30	1	That's why the ink testing is critical because it has to be seen
17:31:34	2	our request in the context of the other findings about what was
17:31:38	3	done to this document that creates this suspicious
17:31:46	4	golden-brownish ink and discoloration and all sorts of other
17:31:50	5	things
17:31:50	6	THE COURT: So these additional things are focused on
17:31:54	7	that.
17:31:55	8	MR. SNYDER: No, it's focused on the ink.
17:31:55	9	MR. LAKE: They haven't presented that in any of their
17:31:57	10	motions or declarations or anything. How do I respond to that?
17:32:05	11	THE COURT: Do you think Mr. Stewart can rebut what he
17:32:08	12	just said if he's given a chance to?
17:32:10	13	MR. LAKE: He's talking about artificial aging. He's
17:32:14	14	not talking about why they're going to take ink samples.
17:32:22	15	THE COURT: I meant to ask this question about the age
17:32:25	16	of the documents. What's the name of the law firm that he
17:32:28	17	mailed this original document to?
17:32:30	18	MR. SNYDER: He emailed it to Sidley and Austin, which
17:32:33	19	is an international firm based in Chicago, in March of 2004.
17:32:39	20	THE COURT: That's Mr. Cole?
17:32:41 2	21	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Cole. He emailed the authentic
17:32:47	22	contract. Mr. Cole was actually a member of StreetFax, LLC and
17:33:01 2	23	it's unclear
17:33:01 2	24	THE COURT: Whether he was even being consulted as an
17:33:01 2	25	attorney.

17:33:01	1	MR. SNYDER: What we do know
17:33:01	2	THE COURT: Well, he was, but he wasn't being
17:33:02	3	consulted as an attorney.
17:33:04	4	MR. SNYDER: At least on the face of the email he
17:33:06	5	certainly wasn't.
17:33:07	6	THE COURT: So it wasn't as if Mr. Ceglia didn't have
17:33:10	7	a professional relationship with Sidley and Austin.
17:33:14	8	MR. SNYDER: He had a professional relationship with
17:33:17	9	Mr. Cole. We're not aware
17:33:18	10	THE COURT: A business relationship.
17:33:19	11	MR. SNYDER: We're not aware of what the relationship
17:33:23	12	was or wasn't. We're aware that Sidley and Austin has the
17:33:24	13	authentic contract on its email server and it's been sitting
17:33:27	14	there since 2004. That we are aware of. A fact that
17:33:31	15	Mr. Ceglia
17:33:31	16	THE COURT: Mr. Cole was operating as a business
17:33:34	17	person, but using law firm facilities?
17:33:36	18	MR. SNYDER: We don't know.
17:33:36	19	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, all of these assertions are
17:33:41	20	being made by Mr. Snyder today. We have not seen any
17:33:44	21	declarations along these lines. We have not taken any
17:33:48	22	depositions. We have not had any documents produced. All we
17:33:51	23	have had is whatever Mr. Snyder has
17:33:51	24	THE COURT: One of the reasons for the accelerated
17:33:54	25	discovery in the first place was to get at the bottom of the

```
1
            allegation that this is a fraud and that's what we're going to
17:33:57
17:34:00
        2
            do.
17:34:00
        3
                     MR. SNYDER: And on that point, Your Honor, there is
            something --
17:34:03
        4
                      THE COURT: Or not. There is a reasonable question of
17:34:03
        5
            fact about it.
17:34:04
        6
                                  There is something about the Sidley and
        7
                     MR. SNYDER:
17:34:05
            Austin question that we want to address to Your Honor, which we
17:34:09
        8
            think is highly pertinent --
17:34:14
        9
17:34:15 10
                     THE COURT: Can I rule first?
17:34:15 11
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes.
17:34:16 12
                     THE COURT:
                                  I'm granting the Defendants' request for
17:34:18 13
            the reasons stated, put that in your order as well, per
            Mr. Lyter's request -- limited to Mr. Lyter's request.
17:34:25 14
17:34:29 15
                     MR. SNYDER: Three brief things, Your Honor. First,
17:34:32 16
            on the Rule 11 certification, that's been unopposed --
17:34:33 17
                     THE COURT: No, no. Are you able to draft some
            language in the order agreeing to that?
17:34:36 18
17:34:37 19
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes.
17:34:38 20
                     THE COURT: When are you going to do that?
                     MR. SNYDER: We'll get that to you by 5:00 p.m.
17:34:40 21
17:34:45 22
            tomorrow.
17:34:45 23
                     THE COURT:
                                  10:00 a.m.
17:34:46 24
                     MR. SNYDER: 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.
17:34:46 25
                     THE COURT:
                                  Right.
```

17:34:47 1	MR. SNYDER: Whatever Your Honor says.
17:34:50 2	THE COURT: And what about the date for the ultimate
17:34:54 3	disclosure?
17:34:54 4	MR. SNYDER: There are two things, Your Honor. We
17:34:56 5	would say that right now under the old order that assumed
17:35:03 6	compliance
17:35:03 7	THE COURT: Just tell me what the new date is.
17:35:05 8	MR. SNYDER: We could put that in the order. Sometime
17:35:09 9	later in September.
17:35:17 10	THE COURT: The order calls for you advising the Court
17:35:21 11	the results of the report, all reports documenting the
17:35:26 12	examination of the hard copy documents and electronic access.
17:35:32 13	MR. SNYDER: We would like to submit the report which
17:35:35 14	will likely be a motion.
17:35:36 15	THE COURT: I'm not inviting your motion.
17:35:39 16	MR. SNYDER: 30 days after the Plaintiff complies with
17:35:42 17	the order, which we anticipate will be sometime later in
17:35:45 18	September.
17:35:46 19	THE COURT: 30 days after they comply?
17:35:48 20	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
17:35:48 21	THE COURT: Now, how are those going to physically
17:35:51 22	comply? They have to get the document out of the safety deposit
17:35:56 23	bank and meet you somewhere?
17:35:56 24	MR. ARGENTIERI: I believe Dr. Lyter can come to
17:36:02 25	Hornell. He brought the equipment to Buffalo.

17:36:04	1	THE COURT: Well, whatever you can work out.
17:36:04	2	MR. FLYNN: We did all the testing at Harris Beach, we
17:36:10	3	can do it there again.
17:36:11	4	MR. LAKE: We did that to accommodate them. If they
17:36:16	5	want to take more testing, the documents in Hornell.
17:36:18	6	MR. ARGENTIERI: It's not going to take very long,
17:36:21	7	Judge. It's just going to take maybe an hour to take these
17:36:24	8	samples.
17:36:24	9	MR. FLYNN: You accommodated us
17:36:27	10	THE COURT: Somebody's going to have to drive.
17:36:29	11	MR. ARGENTIERI: I just said Dr. Lyter.
17:36:29	12	MR. SNYDER: This Plaintiff had filed a lawsuit in
17:36:37	13	this district, it's in this district
17:36:37	14	MR. ARGENTIERI: It is in the district.
17:36:39	15	THE COURT: Wherever you do it, where did you do it
17:36:44	16	at Harris and Beach just like you did the other testing. Put
17:36:50	17	that in the order.
17:36:50	18	Now, quickly because
17:37:02	19	MR. SNYDER: Two things quickly. To Rule 11
17:37:06	20	certification is unopposed and we're going to put that in the
17:37:10	21	order
17:37:10	22	THE COURT: I don't understand that. Why don't you
17:37:12	23	just make a motion, if you feel so inclined? And can under
17:37:15	24	second circuit law there be a dismissal be of a sanction?
17:37:18	25	MR. SNYDER: Yes, under this Court's inherent power

17:37:23 1	THE COURT: Well, no, I'm talking about Rule 11.
17:37:23 2	MR. SNYDER: Rule 11 we believe these two attorneys
17:37:23 3	who are appearing in this case and have not yet signed a
17:37:28 4	pleading should be required to certify pursuant to Rule 11
17:37:29 5	THE COURT: Look, I understand what Rule 11 says. I'm
17:37:32 6	just trying to get at this.
17:37:33 7	MR. SNYDER: They could be personally sanctioned for
17:37:36 8	maintaining
17:37:37 9	THE COURT: And the Plaintiff can be sanctioned in
17:37:40 10	effect by having the case dismissed.
17:37:43 11	MR. SNYDER: Correct, but he can also be personally
17:37:46 12	sanctioned under other rules of the Court.
17:37:46 13	THE COURT: I just want to focus on the Rule 11. Why
17:37:51 14	can't you simply why do you need me to direct them to show
17:37:54 15	cause of why they shouldn't be held in violation of Rule 11 when
17:37:59 16	Rule 11 has its own very discreet procedural requirements? I
17:38:09 17	just want to understand why it's part of this motion.
17:38:09 18	MR. SNYDER: Because we believe
17:38:09 19	THE COURT: You can make the motion on your own. You
17:38:16 20	don't need my permission
17:38:16 21	MR. SNYDER: If these gentlemen would agree that they
17:38:18 22	would not oppose the Rule 11 motion on the basis that they have
17:38:23 23	not signed a plea, then we would not require a Rule 11
17:38:27 24	certification.
17:38:28 25	But we believe that having not signed the amended

1 complaint, Mr. Argentieri did not sign it, that these men may 17:38:33 have as a defense if we move for sanctions under Rule 11, that 17:38:37 2 17:38:41 3 they didn't sign a plea --THE COURT: I thought you cited case law that the Rule 17:38:41 4 11 breaches subsequently appearing counsel who is relying on an 17:38:48 5 advocate -- who advocates on and relies on from a previously 17:38:58 6 7 filed document. I thought you told me that was prevailing case 17:39:01 17:39:13 8 law. MR. SNYDER: We did. 17:39:13 If that's true, why couldn't you just make 17:39:13 10 THE COURT: a motion? Why do you have to get me involved at this point? 17:39:13 11 17:39:13 12 MR. SNYDER: Because we believe having consulted civil 17:39:15 13 procedure experts that the better practice, and many judges require that subsequently appearing attorneys certify under Rule 17:39:19 14 17:39:24 15 11 that they have a reasonable basis to prosecute a complaint 17:39:28 16 that they haven't signed. And we would have no request for this if they would 17:39:30 17 simply in open court represent to Your Honor that they would not 17:39:32 18 17:39:37 19 oppose Rule 11 motions on the grounds that they didn't 17:39:40 20 physically sign the amendment. But I can assure, Your Honor --17:39:42 21 If they say that on the record, then you 17:39:42 22 THE COURT: 17:39:42 23 won't make the ruling? 17:39:45 24 MR. SNYDER: Correct. I can assure they won't say it 17:39:47 25 on the record though.

17:39:49	1	THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that?
17:39:51	2	MR. LAKE: All I can say
17:39:53	3	THE COURT: Excuse me. I'm not going to force an
17:39:56	4	officer of the Court to say things that they don't want to say.
17:39:59	5	You heard me. If he wants me make a motion, it's just one more
17:40:05	6	motion. If you want to avoid that by making some statements on
17:40:10	7	the record, feel free, but I'm not directing you to.
17:40:11	8	MR. LAKE: Your Honor, I've tried to avoid being here
17:40:14	9	today. I've tried to comply with everything they've asked for.
17:40:18	10	So far, everything that I've done has been rejected and there's
17:40:22	11	been motions filed all along the way.
17:40:22	12	If they're filing a Rule 11 motion, they're going to
17:40:25	13	do it anyway. They might as well just file their motions just
17:40:28	14	like they've filed everything else.
17:40:28	15	THE COURT: All right. That request is denied without
17:40:32	16	prejudice.
17:40:32	17	MR. SNYDER: The final thing, Your Honor, is that we
17:40:35	18	would request that Your Honor permit us to issue a subpoena to
17:40:40	19	Sidley and Austin tomorrow.
17:40:41	20	THE COURT: Is that in the papers?
17:40:43	21	MR. LAKE: No.
17:40:43	22	MR. SNYDER: No, this is a new request, Your Honor.
17:40:46	23	But it is because we just discovered on the Sidley and Austin
17:40:51	24	email severer the authentic complaint.
17:40:54	25	Your Honor has overruled any privileged objections to

that, those emails, and the attachments, any confidentiality 1 17:40:59 I spoke to Sidley and Austin --17:41:01 2 objections. THE COURT: Can we take the ADR issue first? I was 17:41:04 3 waiting for you to tell me that you're moving for me to --17:41:07 4 17:41:13 5 excuse me. No, that's their motion. I'm sorry. It is your I apologize. 17:41:18 6 turn. So sitting on the Sidley and Austin sever 7 MR. SNYDER: 17:41:19 is the authentic contract and the two emails to that attachment. 17:41:22 8 17:41:25 9 THE COURT: Well, it's a document that you claim is 17:41:28 10 the authentic document. 17:41:29 11 MR. SNYDER: Sidley and Austin is prepared to --17:41:32 12 THE COURT: Why don't they? 17:41:33 13 MR. SNYDER: Because they want a subpoena, they're a law firm. And there was litigation about its confidentially and 17:41:35 14 17:41:39 15 the privileged nature so we either want an order permitting them 17:41:44 16 to turn over in light of the overruling of the privilege and confidentiality objection to --17:41:50 17 **THE COURT:** What about Rule 45? 17:41:52 18 17:41:53 19 MR. SNYDER: We would like to issue a subpoena, but 17:41:55 20 there is a stay of discovery, except as ordered by this Court so 17:41:58 21 we would civilly request that we be permitted to issue a 17:42:02 22 subpoena. 17:42:02 23 THE COURT: Pursuant to Rule 45. 17:42:03 24 MR. SNYDER: Pursuant to Rule 45. They will produce 17:42:04 25 to the Plaintiff and the to Defendant the emails and attachments

17:42:09 1	which the Plaintiff already produced on his computers to us so
17:42:15 2	we can
17:42:15 3	THE COURT: Does Mr. Lake know about this?
17:42:18 4	MR. SNYDER: Yes, he does because he called Sidley and
17:42:22 5	Austin and was trying to interfere with their giving us that
17:42:25 6	document.
17:42:26 7	MR. LAKE: Oh, come on. Are you kidding?
17:42:28 8	MR. SNYDER: I'm not kidding.
17:42:31 9	MR. LAKE: I got a call from somebody I've never met
17:42:34 10	and I returned a call. That's all I've done. I haven't talked
17:42:35 11	to anyone.
17:42:35 12	THE COURT: So you deny that you interfered?
17:42:38 13	MR. LAKE: Yeah.
17:42:39 14	THE COURT: So you oppose the request?
17:42:41 15	MR. LAKE: Of course.
17:42:42 16	THE COURT: Because?
17:42:43 17	MR. LAKE: Because we have a stay on discovery because
17:42:43 18	we're trying to get through the expedited discovery and when
17:42:46 19	that's done, if they want to file a subpoena then they can.
17:42:49 20	THE COURT: Why do you need it as part of expedited
17:42:52 21	discovery on the purpose of whether this is a fabrication or
17:42:56 22	not?
17:42:56 23	MR. SNYDER: Because sitting on the Sidley and Austin
17:43:00 24	computer server since 2004 is the StreetFax contract which is
17:43:00 25	the authentic and completely dissimilar to the contract attached

17:43:06	1 to the complaint.
17:43:06	2 THE COURT: Well, how does getting that help you to
17:43:09	3 prove fabrication?
17:43:10	4 MR. SNYDER: It's proof positive that the Plaintiff in
17:43:15	5 2004 described his contract with Mark Zuckerberg to be a
17:43:20	6 StreetFax contract, the copy of which we have says nothing
17:43:23	7 about
17:43:23	8 THE COURT: You already know that this document that's
17:43:26	9 on their can the computer storage system is what is it is. The
17:43:30 1	O Plaintiff's saying
17:43:30 1	1 MR. SNYDER: The Plaintiff says.
17:43:31 1	THE COURT: They disclosed and it's not privileged per
17:43:35 1	3 my order. And Mr. Lake has not able to or not pursuing this
17:43:42 1	4 issue. And Judge Arcara
17:43:43 1	5 MR. SNYDER: Mr. Lake has said to Your Honor
17:43:45 1	6 THE COURT: So I'm not sure what
17:43:46 1	7 MR. SNYDER: and the Plaintiff has said to the
17:43:49 1	8 world that we planted that on their computer. Getting it from
17:43:53 1	9 Sidley and Austin is the death nail in the argument because it's
17:44:00 2	0 been on their computer for seven years.
17:44:03 2	1 MR. LAKE: How do we know that?
17:44:04 2	THE COURT: How do we know that? Well, I suppose
17:44:06 2	3 that's a fair question, but it doesn't really answer whether he
17:44:10 2	4 should be entitled to get whatever is out there at this time and
17:44:14 2	5 make whatever arguments he wants to make about it.

17:44:16	1	If Sidley and Austin want to pursue a cross motion in
17:44:22	2	the district of Chicago, we can issue a subpoena out of that
17:44:24	3	district under Rule 45, I believe.
17:44:27	4	MR. SNYDER: Or this one. We can issue it here or
17:44:38	5	there. 100 miles.
17:44:38	6	THE COURT: Well, Chicago's more than 100 miles away.
17:44:47	7	MR. SNYDER: They just need a subpoena. That's it.
17:45:04	8	THE COURT: I don't see any harm in it. The request
17:45:06	9	is granted and proceed accordingly. It wouldn't affect the
17:45:13	10	September disclosure on expert testimony.
17:45:27	11	MR. SNYDER: No. And on that, Your Honor September
17:45:27	12	9th was the date in original order and what we request is that
17:45:27	13	we make our report to the Court 30 days after compliance.
17:45:32	14	THE COURT: I think 30 days is fine. All right.
17:45:41	15	Let's finish up. One further request from the Plaintiff.
17:45:44	16	MR. LAKE: This case was ordered for mediation before
17:45:47	17	I became involved.
17:45:52	18	THE COURT: I don't know how that could have happened.
17:45:55	19	It wasn't referred to me until after the remanned issue was
17:45:59 2	20	resolved. We'll find out in a second.
17:46:05 2	21	THE CLERK: It was automatically referred to mediation
17:46:09 2	22	July 9th, 2010.
17:46:11 2	23	THE COURT: Was that when the referral was made?
17:46:13 2	24	THE CLERK: No, no. The notice of removal from state
17:46:17	25	clerk to here it's automatically referred to mediation.

17:46:21 1	THE COURT: I see.
17:46:22 2	THE CLERK: So whenever it's active.
17:46:25 3	THE COURT: I understand. I would not have expected
17:46:28 4	that because of the remanned motion, but whatever.
17:46:31 5	MR. SNYDER: It was a stay of Rule 16 though, Your
17:46:35 6	Honor, that was issued subsequently.
17:46:37 7	THE COURT: This mediation operates on a but it's
17:46:41 8	not stay discovery.
17:46:41 9	MR. SNYDER: No.
17:46:43 10	THE COURT: So what's your concept here?
17:46:45 11	MR. LAKE: My concept here is if you believe
17:46:48 12	everything that you heard today
17:46:49 13	THE COURT: Yes.
17:46:49 14	MR. LAKE: that this case should resolve and that
17:46:53 15	we should begin
17:46:53 16	THE COURT: Why do you say that?
17:46:55 17	MR. LAKE: Because the Plaintiffs are at the pinnacle
17:46:57 18	of where they believe they will be.
17:46:59 19	THE COURT: No, I don't have to believe everything
17:47:01 20	that they've said is true. What I have to believe is that there
17:47:05 21	is a colorable basis that is sufficient to proceed with this
17:47:09 22	accelerated discovery and that's all I have found.
17:47:13 23	MR. LAKE: Okay.
17:47:14 24	THE COURT: I don't believe anything at this point as
17:47:16 25	far as this case is concerned. I believe the Defendant has made

17:47:20	1	out enough of a showing to warrant accelerated discovery and					
17:47:25	2	that's all I have found.					
17:47:25	3	MR. LAKE: Okay. Fair enough and thank you. I					
17:47:28	4	appreciate that.					
17:47:28	5	The reason I made that request is because despite the					
17:47:37	6	Defendants' continued position that they will litigate this case					
17:47:40	7	until their death unless they get a dismissal of prejudice.					
17:47:44	8	I think every client, not attorney, but actual client					
17:47:46	9	needs to determine whether or not any litigation is based and					
17:47:49	10	should be resolved as a matter of principal or as a matter of					
17:47:53	11	economics.					
17:47:54	12	And that if the Plaintiffs are truly in the position					
17:47:56	13	that they believe they are in at this moment, that they should					
17:47:59	14	invite mediation.					
17:48:06	15	THE COURT: Defendants.					
17:48:06	16	MR. LAKE: Defendants, excuse me. True for the					
17:48:09	17	Plaintiff too. We are about to conclude					
17:48:09	18	THE COURT: You're the one that's raised it so I'm					
17:48:13	19	assuming that you are requesting it?					
17:48:15	20	MR. LAKE: Right.					
17:48:15	21	THE COURT: That's the way I read your papers.					
17:48:17	22	MR. LAKE: Right. And what I was going to say is that					
17:48:18	23	we are about to conclude the expert					
17:48:19	24	THE COURT: Why don't we have that request in front of					
17:48:25	25	us before we go on?					

17:48:26 1	MR. LAKE: We should have. If I was here, I would						
17:48:28 2	have made it.						
17:48:31 3	THE COURT: Well, you were.						
17:48:31 4	MR. LAKE: No, I came in the day the motion, if you						
17:48:34 5	recall. All the papers were filed by the time I got here.						
17:48:35 6	THE COURT: There was no mention of it.						
17:48:40 7	MR. LAKE: No.						
17:48:40 8	THE COURT: Was that on your mind.						
17:48:42 9	MR. LAKE: It's always on my mind.						
17:48:44 10	THE COURT: At that time?						
17:48:45 11	MR. LAKE: At that time we hadn't conducted the						
17:48:48 12	discovery and I hadn't had an opportunity to even review the						
17:48:50 13	case file from the lawyers. I was completely in the dark.						
17:48:53 14	THE COURT: Fair enough. Fair enough.						
17:48:54 15	MR. LAKE: If you recall, I was in the case 48 hours.						
17:48:58 16	THE COURT: Mr. Ceglia had confident counsel						
17:49:02 17	throughout and Mr. Argentieri is here and we appreciate that, he						
17:49:04 18	is what was the name of the law firm that filed the						
17:49:07 19	MR. LAKE: DLA Piper.						
17:49:11 20	THE COURT: Is that formally Piper Marbury perhaps?						
17:49:15 21	MR. LAKE: Yes. They merged with Gray Carey and						
17:49:18 22	another firm.						
17:49:19 23	THE COURT: They certainly knew about the ADR and made						
17:49:24 24	no effort to launch that.						
17:49:26 25	MR. LAKE: As Mr. Snyder very correctly pointed out, I						

```
1
            can't speak for them.
17:49:32
                     THE COURT: I understand.
17:49:32
        2
17:49:33
        3
                     MR. LAKE: So my request is this: We are about to
            conclude the expedited portion of the discovery. We are about
17:49:37
        4
            to begin a full-blown discovery effort on our own upon the
17:49:40
        5
            Defendants.
17:49:45
        6
        7
                     THE COURT: No, you aren't because there's a stay, is
17:49:45
            that not true?
        8
17:49:47
                     MR. LAKE: Once that's done, we'll have our Rule 26
17:49:48
        9
17:49:52 10
            and --
17:49:52 11
                                 You have request to it or you'll have a
17:49:54 12
            Rule 16. Or we're going to have a motion, at least that's what
17:49:58 13
            I'm gathering, that is going to confront me pretty soon.
                     MR. LAKE: That's exactly my point. Why should we go
17:50:02 14
17:50:05 15
            through all that if this case can resolve. We don't know that
            unless the clients have an opportunity to decide how they want
17:50:06 16
17:50:08 17
            to pursue at this time.
                     I think we're at a critical juncture.
                                                              I think this is
17:50:10 18
17:50:13 19
            a good time that if the Plaintiff truly believes in their
            decision they can assert that in a mediation, then why don't we
17:50:15 20
17:50:17 21
            give a shot at resolving this case? If it's a matter of
            principal --
17:50:23 22
17:50:23 23
                     THE COURT: Do you have an answer to that?
17:50:25 24
                     MR. LAKE:
                                 If it's a matter of economics --
17:50:28 25
                     MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.
```

1 THE COURT: I realize that we do have a mediation 17:50:29 17:50:32 2 I had not understood that this case had already been referred to it. People don't need the Court's mediation to 17:50:35 3 17:50:39 mediate obviously. 4 To be clear, my client has no interest in 17:50:41 5 MR. SNYDER: mediating or resolving this case. We believe that this case is 17:50:45 6 7 a serious and egregious fraud on the Court that goes not only to 17:50:49 the integrity of the judicial process, but has victimized my 8 17:50:55 clients, their employees, their shareholders and the public. 17:51:04 9 There is no basis for mediation. We believe this case 17:51:04 10 will be ripe for dismissal upon Plaintiff's compliance with the 17:51:07 11 17:51:12 12 expedited discovery order. We believe that there will be no basis under 17:51:13 13 controlling second circuit law for full-blown discovery given 17:51:16 14 17:51:21 15 the fraud in the Court that has been presented to the Court and 17:51:24 16 will be presented to the Court and the other discovery of uses and misconduct --17:51:28 17 THE COURT: Those have nothing to do with mediation. 17:51:29 18 17:51:32 19 MR. SNYDER: And therefore, there is no need to 17:51:36 20 mediate because we will not, my clients, settle or resolve this 17:51:40 21 case short of the Plaintiff dismissing the case with prejudice and even then we might not consent to that unless they pay costs 17:51:45 22 17:51:52 23 and attorney fees. 17:51:53 24 MR. LAKE: Your Honor, if he's saying that --

THE COURT: You would not consent to what?

17:51:55 25

1 MR. SNYDER: We're not going to consult with my client 17:52:00 because we don't even consent to a dismissal with prejudice of 17:52:05 2 17:52:05 3 attorney fees and cost. Meaning to say, if they were prepared tomorrow to 17:52:08 4 dismiss this case with prejudice, as long as we waive fees and 17:52:12 5 cost, I know that Mr. Stretch and I would have a long 17:52:13 6 conversation has he would with his principals about whether that 7 17:52:18 8 was acceptable to us. 17:52:20 THE COURT: I understand. Again, I don't want to be 17:52:21 9 17:52:24 10 too technical, especially at the hour we're at here, but there is no motion to opt out of mediation, it has been literally --17:52:27 11 17:52:35 12 in Judge Arcara's order, literally right from the beginning. 17:52:40 13 So on the other handled I suppose that we've stayed discovery and we stayed the --17:52:44 14 17:52:46 15 MR. SNYDER: And we understood, Your Honor, the ADR 17:52:48 16 deadlines being tied to Rule 16 under the Court's order, which 17:52:54 17 is why we assumed that everything had been stayed but that which is the proceeding pursuant to Your Honor's order. 17:52:59 18 17:53:02 19 THE COURT: I understand. 17:53:02 20 MR. LAKE: Your Honor, if he is saying his client is 17:53:04 21 unwilling to negotiate this case in good faith, we know where we stand. We are willing to sit down and be open and honest and be 17:53:10 22 17:53:15 23 frank --17:53:15 24 THE COURT: Well, why didn't you do that without a 17:53:18 25 mediator?

17:53:19	1	MR. LAKE: Because if we have a mediator here, then we					
17:53:22	2	are going to be under mediation contact. If defense counsel					
17:53:27	3	wants to me meet with me privately.					
17:53:31	4	THE COURT: I'm not speaking out of turn here, but					
17:53:33	5	obviously the parties can always settle a case. All you have to					
17:53:37	6	do is send Mr. Snyder a demand.					
17:53:40	7	MR. LAKE: Right, but I think with the presence of a					
17:53:45	8	mediator it would go a long way. And if Mr. Zuckerberg is					
17:53:48	9	personally unwilling to attend, then we can talk about that and					
17:53:51	10	have him available					
17:53:51	11	THE COURT: Mr. Ceglia would come in from Ireland.					
17:53:55	12	MR. LAKE: If Mr. Zuckerberg will be here, he'll be					
17:53:57	13	here. If they want to					
17:53:58	14	THE COURT: You didn't answer the question.					
17:54:00	15	Mr. Ceglia will come in from Ireland? Is he changing his					
17:54:01	16	domicile or something? Are you able to say?					
17:54:04	17	MR. LAKE: Well, I can't speak to that, but I will					
17:54:07	18	tell you that if the Court orders the parties to a mediation					
17:54:11	19	that he will be here to resolve the case.					
17:54:14	20	THE COURT: Is it is a extended vacation in Ireland.					
17:54:18	21	MR. LAKE: You'd have to ask him that.					
17:54:18	22	THE COURT: I thought you might know.					
17:54:21	23	MR. LAKE: I've talked to him about resolution and if					
17:54:26	24	Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook are serious about resolving this					
17:54:29	25	case, there are many, many good reasons and if I can make that					

1 presentation to the Defendants and we have a mediator, I think 17:54:31 we can give a good run in resolving this case. 17:54:32 2 17:54:36 3 If they don't want to do that, they made that statement, they want the case to go to the end of the appeal 17:54:38 4 process, now we know. Now it will go forward. I'm offering 17:54:41 5 this: Negotiate in good faith. We're willing to do it now. 17:54:46 6 7 Whatever they want to do. 17:54:51 THE COURT: You wouldn't be willing to do that after 8 17:54:52 the expert reports are in? 17:54:55 9 MR. LAKE: I think now is the best time to do that 17:54:57 10 and not just for my benefit, but for the defense's benefit 17:55:02 11 because there is a lot of information that we have that is 17:55:05 12 17:55:08 13 about to come out. And I think they have the benefit to settle 17:55:12 14 now too. 17:55:12 15 THE COURT: You have information that's about to come 17:55:15 16 out? What do you mean by that? 17:55:17 17 MR. LAKE: I think once we conduct discovery and we turn over the information that we know exists that --17:55:20 18 17:55:22 19 I'm talking about the expert testimony. THE COURT: 17:55:25 20 MR. LAKE: Oh, our experts have done testing too, 17:55:28 21 They're going to be able to respond to their report and sure. our experts have certainly conducted their investigation as 17:55:31 22 17:55:34 23 well, sure. 17:55:35 24 THE COURT: That's right. The order doesn't right 17:55:37 25 them to report it, only requires --

17:55:39	MR. SNYDER: We will be filing a motion so the rules				
17:55:42	will kick into gear and they will have their response time. And				
17:55:46	what we anticipate is that we will be filing a motion which				
17:55:50	we'll attach as declarations or affidavits the findings of our				
17:55:55	experts as it is relevant to the filing of fraud.				
17:55:58	MR. LAKE: Well, then the question of course is if				
17:55:59	that is filed I will be under the presumption that their expert				
17:56:02	8 report is going to be deemed confidential and not be made				
17:56:05	available to the press because it includes information that is				
17:56:09 1	the result of protected discovery.				
17:56:13 1	MR. SNYDER: We can address that down the line. Yeah,				
17:56:15 1	we disagree, but it's not right for presenting now.				
17:56:19 1	THE COURT: Are you saying that a mediation order for				
17:56:23 1	this time would be futile?				
17:56:34 1	MR. SNYDER: Futile. We have no interest in mediating				
17:56:34 1	or settling this case. Period. With no disrespect to the Court				
17:56:34 1	or its process.				
17:56:35 1	THE COURT: All right. Well, it puts me in a little				
17:56:39 1	awkward position because the program does contemplate mediation				
17:56:41 2	after the motion to opt out, but there's been no motion to opt				
17:56:43 2	out.				
17:56:43 2	But considering that we're operating in a unusual				
17:56:48 2	procedure here with how with this started with the accelerated				
17:56:54 2	discovery, I'm reluctant to order a mediation procedure at this				
17:56:58 2	5 time.				

```
I'll take another look at it after the expert reports
17:56:59
        1
        2
            are filed and see where we're at. I'm not foreclosing it, but
17:57:02
            listening to Mr. Snyder, I don't want to waste anybody's time.
17:57:06
        3
            That request is denied for the reason stated.
17:57:10
        4
                      Anything further on behalf of the Plaintiff, Mr. Lake?
        5
17:57:14
17:57:16
                      MR. LAKE:
                                 I don't think so.
        6
        7
                                  Anything else for the Defendants,
                      THE COURT:
17:57:17
            Mr. Snyder?
17:57:20
        8
                                   No, thank you, the Court, for its time.
17:57:21
        9
                      MR. SNYDER:
                                 Well, thank you for bearing with me and
17:57:21 10
                      THE COURT:
17:57:30 11
            we'll look forward to that order to come in tomorrow.
       12
                      MR. LAKE:
                                 Thank you, Your Honor.
       13
                  (Proceedings concluded at 5:57 p.m.)
       14
       15
       16
       17
       18
       19
       20
       21
       22
       23
       24
       25
```

1	INDEX									
2		DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS					
3	WITNESSES FOR THE GOVERNMENT									
4	None									
5	None									
6	WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE									
7	None									
8	1.0.1.0									
9	EXHIBITS		MARKE	D R	ECEIVED					
10	GOVERNMENT'S		2 22 22 42 42	<u> </u>	,					
11	None									
12	1.0.1.0									
13	DEFENDANT'S									
14	None									
15										
16										
17										
18										
19										
20										
21										
22										
23										
24										
25										

```
"I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
1
 2
     record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter."
 3
      S / Jolene Lamphier
 4
                                        August 22, 2011
     Signature
                                         Date
 5
 6
     JOLENE LAMPHIER
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```